Labour shortage: Revised ratios of qualified staff members in child care centres

March 5, 2024

At a time when the pandemic is continuing to have repercussions and we are experiencing a severe labour shortage, the educational childcare sector is facing unprecedented challenges. These circumstances have led to a reassessment of the standards relating to the presence of qualified childcare staff with children.

The purpose of this bulletin is to shed light on the regulatory amendments that have been made to the Educational Childcare Regulation¹ (the “ECR”), and more specifically to the required ratio of qualified staff members. Enacted by Order in Council 102-2024,² these amendments came into force on March 1, 2024.

Childcare providers should imperatively take cognizance of these regulatory amendments, as they will help them optimize their operations and improve their ability to respond to the challenges they are facing in attracting and retaining qualified childcare staff.

Background

On July 22, 2021, in response to the impact of the pandemic on educational childcare services, amendments were made to the requirements respecting the ratio of qualified staff members provided for in the ECR.

During the first 9 months that followed the end of the public health emergency, the ratio was reduced to one qualified staff member out of three. During the 12 months after that, it was increased to one in two. The ratio applicable to childcare services was expected to return to pre-pandemic levels, or a ratio of two qualified staff members out of three, on March 1, 2024.³ However, faced with the labour shortage,⁴ which is particularly affecting the childcare sector, the government estimated that many childcare providers would not be able to comply with a qualified childcare staff ratio of two out of three, as was initially required for that date.

As a result, the legislator amended the ECR once again so as to address ongoing problems and prevent service closures or disruptions. These amendments are summarized below.

New ratio requirements for childcare services

Section 23 of the ECR has been amended to reaffirm the general standard stipulating that the ratio of qualified childcare staff must be two out of three.

However, section 23.1 of the ECR now provides for certain exceptions to the previously established rule on the ratio of qualified childcare staff. The notable exceptions are as follows:

A ratio of one qualified childcare staff member out of two may be maintained during the provision of childcare until March 31, 2027.
A ratio of one qualified childcare staff member out of three will be authorized while childcare is being provided during the first and last business hour of the permit holder’s core hours.
A ratio of one qualified childcare staff member out of three will also be authorized during the first five years following:
the initial issuance of a day care centre permit;
the modification of a day care centre permit to increase, by 8 or more, the maximum number of children that may be provided with childcare in the permit holder’s facility; or
the conclusion of a first subsidy agreement between the Ministère de la Famille and the holder of a day care centre permit, provided that the agreement was entered into after October 31, 2023.

Conclusion

The changes described above, came into force on March 1, 2024, are intended to address the current shortage of qualified staff in the childcare sector in Quebec. Although the temporary flexibility and the exceptions to the qualified staff ratio will help childcare providers guarantee the continuity and accessibility of their services, compliance with prescribed ratios is still mandatory. Note that failure to comply with these requirements may lead to administrative penalties or penal sanctions, as well as a decision by the Ministère de la Famille suspending, revoking or not renewing a permit.

The members of the Lavery team are available to answer your questions.

The information and comments contained herein do not constitute legal advice. They are intended solely to enable readers, who assume full responsibility, to use them for their own purposes.

Chapter S-4.1.1, r. 2.
Regulation to amend the Educational Childcare Regulation, O.C. 102-2024 (G.O. II)
Regulation to amend the Educational Childcare Regulation, O.C. 879-2021 (G.O. II).
Ministère de la Famille, Mémoire au conseil des ministres : Projet de règlement modifiant le Règlement sur les services de garde éducatifs à l’enfance, tabled on September 20, 2023; Ministère de la Famille, Portrait de la main-d’œuvre du réseau des services de garde éducatifs à l’enfance, 2022–2023, October 2023.

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Myriam Lavallée
Partner, Lawyer
Justine Chaput
Lawyer
Simon Gagné-Carrier
Lawyer

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December 11, 2024

Hiring Process: Can Knowledge of a Language Other Than French Be Required by an Employer?

In a decision rendered on September 16, 2024,1 the Administrative Labour Tribunal (the “ALT”) found that a company (the “employer”) had violated the Charter of the French language2 (the “CFL”) by requiring knowledge of languages other than French as part of a hiring process. This is one of the first decisions ruling on the new complaint mechanisms introduced by Bill 96, An Act respecting French, the official and common language of Québec3 (“Bill 96”), aimed at amending the CFL. The Legislative Changes Made in 2022 On May 24, 2022, the Quebec government passed Bill 96, which received royal assent on June 1, 2022. This law made significant amendments to the CFL and other laws. Even before the amendments introduced by Bill 96 were adopted, the CFL prohibited employers from requiring that a person have knowledge or a specific level of knowledge of a language other than French to keep or obtain a position, unless the nature of the duties required such knowledge. Bill 96 has clarified the scope of employer obligations in this respect. In particular, employers must have taken all reasonable means to avoid imposing such a requirement,4 and, if they do impose it, they must indicate the reasons justifying this requirement in their job postings.5 Bill 96 also made it possible for job applicants and employees to challenge employers’ requirements respecting knowledge of a language other than French. The CFL now stipulates that if an employer does not meet the “necessity” conditions described below, requiring knowledge of a language other than French will be deemed a prohibited practice. The notion of a complaint for “prohibited practice” already exists in the Act respecting labour standards,6 notably in section 122. It enables employees to file a complaint if they believe they have been subjected to sanctions, discriminatory measures or reprisals for exercising a right provided under this law. The amendments introduced by Bill 96 have thus broadened the concept of prohibited practice to also include the exercise of certain language rights. The CFL was further amended to allow employees to directly file a complaint with the Commission des normes, de l’équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail (the “CNESST”)7 if they believe that an illegal requirement to know a language other than French is being imposed on them. These are the issues addressed by the ALT in this decision. The facts On March 3, 2023, the complainant, Byung Chan Kim, filed a complaint for prohibited practice under the CFL. He believed that he was not granted a position posted by the defendant, the employer, because it required knowledge of a language other than French as part of a hiring process. The complainant came across a job posting in the defendant’s procurement and logistics department, which it had published in January 2023. The posting appeared exclusively in Korean in an online newspaper aimed at the Korean community. The complainant submitted his application in February along with his resume, which was written in French only. A representative of the defendant requested the complainant to provide an English version of the document, which the complainant provided. The complainant then participated in an interview, during which the defendant’s representative asked the complainant to speak in English and Korean because he did not understand French. Since the complainant’s application was not selected, he filed a complaint for prohibited practice based on the provisions of the CFL. Presumption of Prohibited Practice Section 46 of the CFL prohibits an employer from requiring knowledge of a language other than French, except when such a requirement is necessary for the performance of duties. The provision reads, in part, as follows: 46. An employer is prohibited from requiring a person, in order for the person to be able to keep a position, or to obtain a position through, in particular, recruitment, hiring, transfer or promotion, to have knowledge or a specific level of knowledge of a language other than the official language, unless the nature of the duties requires such knowledge; even in the latter case, the employer shall first take all reasonable means to avoid imposing such a requirement. [...] The second paragraph of section 45 of the CFL equates the requirement for knowledge of a language other than French in the context of employment to a prohibited practice: 45. The fact that an employer requires a person to have knowledge or a specific level of knowledge of a language other than the official language to keep a position or to obtain a position, in particular through recruitment, hiring, transfer or promotion, is considered a prohibited practice under the first paragraph, unless the employer shows, in accordance with sections 46 and 46.1, that the performance of the duty requires such knowledge and that he first took all reasonable means to avoid imposing such a requirement. Based on these provisions, the ALT confirmed that a person in a hiring process, and therefore not bound to the employer by an employment agreement, bears the burden of demonstrating that the following conditions exist to benefit from a presumption of prohibited practice. They must:8 apply to a position in response to a job posting by the employer;9 demonstrate that the employer requires knowledge, or a specific level of knowledge, of a language other than French to access the position;10 and file a complaint within 45 days after the occurrence of the practice complained of.11 The ALT concluded that the complainant did indeed prove that all the conditions to apply the legal presumption of prohibited practice were met, such that it is presumed that the language requirements associated with the employer’s job posting violated the CFL. At that stage, it was a simple presumption. The presumption in favor of the complainant places the burden of proof on the employer, requiring it to demonstrate why the language requirement associated with the position was necessary, and that all reasonable means were taken to avoid imposing it. In order to prove the second criterion, the employer must show that it conducted an analysis of reasonable means before imposing the language requirement, and that it had indicated the reasons justifying this requirement in the job posting. Assessment of Language Requirements The defendant argued that the requirement for knowledge of English and Korean is necessary because the position includes tasks such as acquiring equipment on the international market, and because the defendant’s representative and employees communicate in Korean. In its analysis of these arguments, the ALT reaffirmed that the legislator has provided that any law must be interpreted in a manner that promotes the use and protection of the French language.12 Thus, the ALT emphasized that, to achieve the objectives of the law, a narrow interpretation must be made of the exceptions set out in the CFL, and that the criteria set out in sections 46 and 46.1 of the CFL are cumulative for each language requirement involving a language other than French. The ALT further noted that any decision to require knowledge of a language other than French to access a position must be based on a thorough and well-documented understanding of the actual constraints of the service in question.13 In this case, the ALT found that the defendant had failed to meet its burden of proof. First, the reasons justifying the English and Korean language requirements were not included in the job posting, an omission which in itself contravenes section 46 para. 2 of the CFL. Furthermore, the defendant failed to provide evidence regarding the nature of the positions already held within the company and the tasks associated with them, nor did it demonstrate the English language proficiency that was already required of employees. Lastly, according to the evidence, all employees in the company’s supply and logistics department spoke Korean. However, the defendant failed to prove that it had ascertained, prior to publishing its job posting, that the knowledge of English and Korean already required of other employees was insufficient. It also failed to demonstrate that it had limited the number of positions involving tasks requiring knowledge of either of these languages to the greatest extent possible. As a result, the ALT concluded that the defendant had not taken all reasonable measures to avoid imposing these requirements and, therefore, did not succeed in rebutting the presumption of prohibited practice. Limited Defence The defendant claimed that it was not because the complainant had insufficient knowledge of languages other than French that he was not hired, but rather because he lacked the skills required for the position. However, the ALT concluded that the CFL does not allow a defendant to raise an additional defence, such as having another just and sufficient cause that does not relate to the requirement for knowledge of a language other than French, to be used to avoid the application of the presumption. Since the defendant failed to prove that the performance of the task required knowledge of a language other than French, and because it failed to previously take all reasonable measures to avoid imposing such a requirement, the simple presumption became an absolute presumption, and the defendant cannot counter it with any other defence. Consequently, when a hiring process includes language requirements other than French and does not comply with the conditions of section 46.1 of the CFL, the process becomes irreparably tainted by an unlawful motive. The ALT thus confirmed that the only way to rebut the presumption of section 45, paragraph 2, and section 46 of the CFL, is to demonstrate that the performance of the duties requires knowledge of a language other than French, and that the employer has preemptively taken all reasonable means to avoid imposing such a requirement. The ALT therefore upheld the complainant’s complaint and reserved its powers to determine the appropriate remedies. Conclusion This decision marked a significant turning point in the application of the CFL. The ALT emphasized the importance of complying with the new provisions introduced by Bill 96, which aims to strengthen the language rights of Quebec workers. This decision serves as a reminder to employers of the obligation to clearly justify any language requirement and to demonstrate that they have taken all reasonable measures to avoid imposing conditions contrary to the CFL. Furthermore, this decision unequivocally rules out the possibility of defending against such a complaint with a defence based on the existence of another just and sufficient cause to justify the employer’s decision. It is crucial for businesses in Quebec to ensure compliance with these rules to prevent potential litigation, while respecting the fundamental right of workers to carry on their activities in French. Moreover, in light of this decision enforcing the prohibition on imposing language requirements under the amended CFL, it will also be pertinent to monitor how the ALT might eventually interpret the notion of “unreasonable reorganization” of a business. Indeed, the CFL stipulates that the first paragraph of section 46.1 must not be interpreted in a way that imposes on an employer an unreasonable reorganization of its business. Such an interpretation could provide employers with a way to avoid being bound by the conditions provided by the CFL. It will be important to closely follow any subsequent developments. Kim c. Ultium Cam, 2024 QCTAT 3295. CQLR, c. C-11. SQ 2022, c. 14. S. 46 para. 1 of the CFL. S. 46 para. 2 of the CFL. CQLR, c. N-1.1. S. 47 of the CFL. S. 47.2 para. 2 of the CFL, which refers to the Labour Code, CQLR, c. C-27, s. 17 with the necessary modifications. S. 46 of the CFL. S. 46 of the CFL. S. 47 of the CFL. Interpretation Act, CQLR, c. I-16, s. 40.3. Gatineau (Ville de) c. Syndicat des cols blancs de Gatineau inc., 2016 QCCA 1596.

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October 29, 2024

Employers’ Right to Require Medical Certificates: New Restrictions as of January 1, 2025

Quebec is currently facing a major shortage of physicians. To remedy the situation, several ministers in the CAQ government announced in early 2024 that significant changes would be implemented to reduce physicians’ administrative burden. In this context, on October 9, 2024, the National Assembly assented to Bill 68, An Act mainly to reduce the administrative burden of physicians.1 The provisions of the Act The new Act comprises 11 sections, many of which introduce amendments to the Act respecting labour standards2 (ALS) by restricting the right of employers to require documents attesting to the reasons for certain absences. Under the current legislation, an employer may be entitled to require a document from an employee who misses work owing to sickness in order to assess the reasons for the absence, its duration, or the employee’s ability to return to work. This is because, under the terms of a contract of employment,3every employer is entitled to expect their employee to fully perform the work agreed upon. Depending on the circumstances, the supporting document provided must in some instances indicate a specific medical diagnosis, an estimated duration of absence and other details relevant to handling the employee’s absence. In keeping with these principles, section 79.2 of the ALS provided that an employer informed of an absence owing to sickness, an organ or tissue donation, an accident, domestic violence, sexual violence or a criminal offence may, “[i]f it is warranted by the duration of the absence or its repetitive nature, for instance, [...] request that the employee furnish a document attesting to those reasons.” According to arbitral jurisprudence4 and that of the Administrative Labour Tribunal5, unwarranted refusal to provide such a document may constitute valid grounds for imposing an administrative or disciplinary measure, depending on the circumstances. That said, the new Act as adopted changes this balance. Indeed, a paragraph has been added to section 79.2 of the ALS specifying that “[...] no employer may request the document referred to in the first paragraph for the first three periods of absence not exceeding three consecutive days taken over a period of 12 months.” It will therefore be prohibited to require a supporting document, including a medical certificate, for the first three short-term absences (less than four days) occurring over the 12 preceding months. According to the comments of the Minister of Labour, such calculation of absences is to begin with the first absence during the year rather than as of January 1st of each year.6 The Act does not provide for an exception in cases where absences are excessive or otherwise questionable. Under which conditions will employers be entitled to require a medical certificate? Under the Act, employers retain the right to require a medical certificate where the absence is likely to last four consecutive days or more. What is more, the provision does not deny employers the right to investigate situations that appear questionable. The aforementioned prohibition will also apply to employers whose employees are governed by the Act respecting labour relations, vocational training and workforce management in the construction industry.7 Furthermore, the Act includes an amendment to the provisions relating to family or parental leave and absences. The third paragraph of section 79.7 of the ALS is amended so as to prevent employers from requiring a medical certificate to justify such absences. However, we believe this amendment in no way affects their right to require any other type of documentation, particularly as regards obligations relating to daycare services or educational institutions. Where an offence is committed, the penal provisions already included in sections 139 to 147 of the ALS apply. As these amendments are of public order and take precedence over any contract, policy or collective agreement, any measure imposed on an employee that would contravene any of these new obligations may be deemed invalid or result in a prohibited practice complaint. How will the Act affect insurers and employee benefit plan administrators? On another note, the Act mainly to reduce the administrative burden of physicians also introduces a new prohibition applicable to insurers and employee benefit plan administrators. They will no longer be entitled to require that a medical service, such as a consultation, be received in order to reimburse the cost of services or a technical aid, nor will they be entitled to require that a medical service be received at a predetermined frequency different from that considered appropriate by the attending physician for the purpose of maintaining the payment of disability benefits. Coming into force The amendments to the ALS will come into force as of January 1, 2025. The amendments concerning insurers and employee benefit plan administrators will apply subsequently at a date or dates to be set by the Government. S.Q., 2024, c. 29. CQLR, c. N-1.1. Civil Code of Québec, CQLR, c. CCQ-1991, art. 2085. See in particular the case law cited in Linda Bernier, Guy Blanchet and Éric Séguin, Les mesures disciplinaires et non disciplinaires dans les rapports collectifs du travail, 2nd ed. Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, loose-leaf, updated to May 30, 2024, paras. 1.055 et seq. See in particular : Marchessault et CPE Les Petits Adultes, 2019 QCTAT 1632, paras. 37–38; Labourdette et Protecteur du citoyen, 2019 QCTAT 4831, para. 52. COMMITTEE ON LABOUR AND THE ECONOMY, Clause-by-clause consideration of Bill 68, An Act mainly to reduce the administrative burden of physicians, October 1, 2024. CQLR, c. R-20.

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October 2, 2024

Proof of incapacity: analysis of CIUSSS de L’Ouest-de-L’île-de-Montréal (ST. Mary’s Hospital Center) c. R.C.

PROOF OF INCAPACITY: ANALYSIS OF CIUSSS DE L’OUEST-DE-L’ÎLE-DE-MONTRÉAL (ST. MARY’S HOSPITAL CENTER) c. R.C.1 Summary The authors comment on this decision rendered on September 20, 2024, in which the Court of Appeal ruled on the capacity to consent to care in the presence of a psychiatric disorder. The Court of Appeal overturned the first instance decision, which had found the respondent capable of refusing treatment with antipsychotic medications even though he had refuted his diagnosis, because he understood the benefits that antipsychotic medications could afford him and refused to take them because of their side effects. The Court of Appeal rather concluded that the trial judge had misapplied the five criteria to be used to assess whether a person is capable of consenting to care, particularly in the context where (i) the trial judge’s conclusion ran counter to the uncontradicted opinion of an expert; and (ii) there was much evidence supporting the fact that the respondent was incapable of making an informed decision. INTRODUCTION In this case, the Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’Ouest-de-l'Île-de-Montréal (the “CIUSSS”) appealed a decision rendered by the Superior Court on March 14, 2024, dismissing its application for an authorization to provide care to R.C., a 51-year-old man. The Superior Court had concluded that the CIUSSS had not proven that the respondent was incapable of consenting to care. The Court of Appeal was thus called upon to review the trial judge’s answer to the first question (incapacity to consent) in the analytical framework2 surrounding the test that has now been used for three decades.3 THE FACTS R.C. has a complex medical history. He was hospitalized several times between 2007 and 2019 for mental health issues, including suicidal ideation and personality disorders. In 2021, he was admitted to the CHUM for COVID-19-related complications having resulted in brain damage caused by hypoxia. From 2022 onwards, he made repeated visits to the emergency room, often to obtain benzodiazepines, leading him to become addicted. Even though he adhered to treatment with antipsychotic medication for a time, R.C. stopped taking his medication because of undesirable side effects. In January 2024, after an episode of confusion, he was taken to hospital where he was diagnosed with late-onset schizophrenia. However, R.C. refuted the diagnosis, claiming that his health problems were caused by an artificial intelligence device he believed had been implanted in his body. The psychiatrists who assessed him concluded that he was incapable of consenting to care. On February 16, 2024, the CIUSSS filed an application for authorization to re-hospitalize R.C. and administer antipsychotic medications, despite his categorical refusal. After analyzing the evidence, which essentially consisted of R.C.’s testimony and that of the CIUSSS psychiatrist, the Superior Court concluded that R.C. understood the nature of his condition and the benefits of the proposed treatment, despite his refusal to accept his diagnosis. The Court was of the opinion that the CIUSSS psychiatrists, in their analysis of R.C.’s capacity, had erroneously and repeatedly carried over his rejection of the diagnosis in a cascading fashion in their analysis of the five criteria from the decision in A.G.,4 thereby making the same error as the one that the Court of Appeal had identified in the M.H. decision.5 Despite the absence of a second opinion on R.C.’s capacity, the Superior Court had determined that he was able to consent to his care. According to the trial judge, in keeping with the teachings of the Court of Appeal in the F.D. decision,6 he therefore lacked jurisdiction to order care. For this reason, he dismissed the application for an authorization to provide care. THE COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION The Court of Appeal began by reiterating the five criteria for assessing a person’s capacity, namely: Does the person understand the nature of the illness for which treatment is proposed? Does the person understand the nature and purpose of the treatment? Does the person understand the risks and benefits involved in undergoing the treatment? Does the person understand the risks involved in not undergoing the treatment? ls the capacity to consent to treatment affected by the patient's illness?7 It pointed out that the criteria are not cumulative and that it is incumbent upon the trier to assess them as a whole.8 Moreover, the mere fact that a person refuses care that would be in their best interest is not enough to conclude that the person is incapable,9 nor is their mere rejection of their diagnosis.10 In this case, the Court of Appeal considered that the Superior Court judge had committed a palpable and overriding error making its intervention warranted. It stated that the trial judge was obliged to express an opinion on whether the evidence proffered was sufficient, adding that the judge had a proactive role to play in protecting the interests of the person involved. If the trial judge felt that a point that had not been the subject in a genuine adversarial debate raised a problem in his view, it was up to him to ask questions.11 Subsequently, the court took extracts from the evidence consisting of a psychiatric report and the testimony of its author and went on to note that the evidence did not allow the trial judge to conclude that R.C. was capable of consenting or refusing the proposed treatment plan, on the contrary. Based on the same evidence, the Court declared R.C. incapable of consenting to care and sent the case back to the Superior Court so that it could determine whether there was indeed categorical refusal and assess the terms of the treatment plan sought. AUTHORS’ COMMENTS This decision of the Court of Appeal follows approximately 20 other decisions12 respecting orders authorizing care handed down by this same court, which have all further established and clarified the guiding principles surrounding such orders since the F.D. decision of 2015.13 These successive decisions have not only added to case law, they have refined the assessment criteria and legal requirements pertaining to applications for authorization to provide care. Such a development in case law shows that the courts are committed to circumscribing complex healthcare situations. Doing so involves striking a balance between the rights to freedom and self-determination and the protection of those who are vulnerable or otherwise unable to consent. On July 6, 2015, the Court of Appeal of Quebec marked a decisive turning point where orders authorizing care are involved by rendering a decision that sent a clear message to the Superior Court, namely F.D. c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria).14 In that decision, an analytical framework was established to ensure compliance both with the provisions of the law and the spirit of the law. Since then, the Court has handed down some 20 other significant decisions, each shedding additional light. The guiding principles derived from these decisions can be summarized under the following themes: Rights relating to the judicial process Every person has the fundamental right to contest an application for a order authorizing care, to be heard and to be represented.15 The judge must proactively protect the user’s interests and ensure that they are represented by a lawyer.16 Scope of the care plan Requiring a definite care plan does not mean dictating which medication should be administered in a limitative way.17 A judge may remove certain substances from a treatment plan if they deem that to be in the patient’s best interest.18 It is crucial to draw a distinction between preventive care and a treatment plan that includes various alternatives as the situation evolves.19 For a future hospitalization clause to be valid, there must be a reasonable foreseeability of hospitalization.20 When a patient is to be placed, the application for authorization must indicate where they are to be placed.21 Physical restraint may only be used if it is necessary to avoid serious harm, and must be limited to the minimum.22 A parent’s refusal to consent to a treatment plan may not be warranted if the plan is in the child’s best interests.23 Duration of the authorization When the person concerned is not cooperating and access to their previous medical records is not available, the judge must be especially careful in assessing whether the proposed care plan is legal, in particular in terms of its duration and scope.24 The duration of the care order should be as short as reasonably possible, without compromising the effectiveness of the treatment.25 When a future hospitalization is contemplated, the judge must take into account the time required to stabilize the patient.26 The 30-day period for a future hospitalization should not be considered an absolute limit, as a longer period may be deemed necessary after a thorough analysis.27 The evidence The mere fact that a relationship exists between an expert and a party does not make the expert’s testimony inadmissible: The circumstances surrounding the expert’s role must be reviewed.28 An expert who does not know a patient’s reasons for refusing treatment is not deemed to have breached their duty to inform.29 An expert may testify to reported facts without the possibility of anyone opposing them; however, this does not mean that reported facts are proven, as the rules of evidence remain stringent in this context.30 An expert report may suffice as testimony; the judge need not require the patient’s testimony if the patient cannot understand the issues at hand.31 Applications for safeguard orders may be unsuccessful where there is no expert report and it is not demonstrated that the matter is urgent.32 This review highlights the significant advances that the courts have made in overseeing applications for orders authorizing care and protecting vulnerable people. The analytical framework established in the F.D. decision remains relevant, and subsequent decisions have further refined its questions. The decision that the Court of Appeal handed down in Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’Ouest-de-l'Île-de-Montréal c. R.C. is milestone in the jurisprudence on court orders authorizing care. By overturning the lower court’s judgment, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the need for a thorough assessment of the capacity to consent, emphasizing that the work of medical teams and applications made by healthcare institutions are important to ensure appropriate care. This decision not only underscores the fact that it is important to protect the rights of users, but also that the work of the court is crucial, for it must ensure that the criteria are met without substituting its opinion for that of the experts heard. CONCLUSION The decision discussed in this paper is part of a series of decisions that have clarified and enhanced the guiding principles established since the F.D. decision was handed down in 2015.33 The Court of Appeal has provided valuable guidelines for judges, institutions and healthcare professionals to use in their assessment of applications for authorization to provide care. Through a careful review of the circumstances of each case, the courts have shown that they are committed to effectively circumscribing complex health situations by ensuring that institutions have the tools they need to respond appropriately. Lastly, we must recognize that while progress has been made, there are still unresolved issues that need to be addressed. Recent court decisions, including the one that led to the R.C. decision,34 illustrate the importance of constant dialogue between those involved in the legal aspect of cases and those dealing with clinical realities. As jurisprudence continues to develop, paying close attention to future developments will be key to ensuring that healthcare institutions can act effectively in consideration of patients’ needs. 2024 QCCA 1231. F.D.c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. See the landmark decision, Institut Philippe Pinel de Montréal c. A.G., 1994 CanLII 6105 (QC CA). Institut Philippe Pinel de Montréal c. A.G., 1994 CanLII 6105 (QC CA). M.H. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2018 QCCA 1948, para. 57. F.D. c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. This decision, para. 13; with reference to Institut Philippe Pinel de Montréal c. A.G., 1994 CanLII 6105 (QC CA), pp. 28 to 33. This decision, para. 14; with reference to M. B. c. Centre hospitalier Pierre-le-Gardeur, 2004 CanLII 29017 (QC CA), para. 45; M.C. c. Service professionnel du Centre de santé et de services sociaux d’Arthabaska-et-de-L’Érable, 2010 QCCA 1114, para. 13. This decision, para. 14; with reference to M. B. c. Centre hospitalier Pierre-le-Gardeur, 2004 CanLII 29017 (QC CA), para. 46. This decision, para. 14, with reference to Starson v. Swayze, 2003 SCC 32, para. 79 and M.H. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2018 QCCA 1948, paras. 61–62. This decision, para. 18. We have excluded the following decisions from our analysis: Bédard c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Nord-de-l’Île-de-Montréal, 2023 QCCA 508; M.G. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2019 QCCA 203; S.F. c. CIUSSS de Centre-Ouest-de-l’île-de-Montréal – Hôpital général juif – Sir Mortimer B. Davis, 2021 QCCA 1531; P.L. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de la Montérégie-Centre, 2018 QCCA 318; N.G. c. Sir Mortimer B. Davis Jewish General Hospital, 2021 QCCA 1892; F.D. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2017 QCCA 1206. F.D.c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. Ibid. M.H.c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2018 QCCA 1948, paras. 68 and 69. A.N. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Nord-de-l’île-de-Montréal, 2022 QCCA 1167 , para. 30. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale c. D.M., 2017 QCCA 1333, para. 25. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean c. O.G., 2018 QCCA 345, paras. 15 and 16. C.R.c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux du Bas-St-Laurent, 2017 QCCA 328, para. 28. G.J. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de Laval, 2021 QCCA 1944, paras. 24 to 26. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Mauricie-et-du-Centre-du-Québec (CIUSSS MCQ) c. J.B., 2017 QCCA 1638,, paras. 30 to 35. X.Y.c. Hôpital général du Lakeshore, 2017 QCCA 1465, para. 20. A.P. c. Centre hospitalier universitaire Sainte-Justine, 2023 QCCA 58, para. 19. L.C. c. Centre hospitalier de l’Université de Montréal (CHUM), 2015 QCCA 1139, paras. 4 and 5. D.A. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux des Laurentides, 2016 QCCA 1734, para. 31. T.F. c. CIUSSS de l’Est-de-l’île-de-Montréal , 2022 QCCA 1306, para. 25. N.M. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de la Montérégie-Centre, 2022 QCCA1567, para. 17. M.G. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Centre-Sud-de-l’Île-de-Montréal , 2021 QCCA 1326, para. 11. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’Ouest-de-l’île-de-Montréal (Douglas Mental Health University Institute) c. I.A., 2023 QCCA 1100, para. 30. Institut universitaire en santé mentale Douglas c. W.M., 2016 QCCA 1081, para. 5 A.D. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Centre-Sud-de-l’île-de-Montréal, 2023 QCCA 1240, paras. 50, 56–57. A.F. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux des Laurentides, 2021 QCCA 928, para. 50. F.D. c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. CIUSSS de l'Ouest-de-l'Île-de-Montréal (St. Mary’s Hospital Center) c. R.C.,2024 QCCA 1231.

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August 1, 2024

Major change to the Canada Labour Code with new anti-replacement-worker provisions

Bill C-58, An Act to amend the Canada Labour Code and the Canada Industrial Relations Board Regulations, 2012, was passed on June 20, 2024, introducing anti-replacement-worker provisions to the Canada Labour Code. While anti-replacement-worker legislation has existed in Quebec since 1977, nothing of the sort existed for federal jurisdiction employers. Before Bill C-58, federal legislation only stipulated that an employer or a person acting on behalf of an employer could not use replacement workers “for the demonstrated purpose of undermining a trade union’s representational capacity rather than the pursuit of legitimate bargaining objectives.” Unions faced a heavy burden of proof to demonstrate that replacement workers were being used for this purpose. As a result, union activists have been pushing for decades for more protection during labour disputes. New anti-replacement-worker provisions Bill C-58 adds a new subsection to section 94 of the Canada Labour Code on unfair practices, which limits and regulates the use of replacement workers during strikes and lockouts. The new provisions no longer require unions to demonstrate the employer’s intention to undermine the union’s representational capacity and they prevent federal jurisdiction employers from using the services of any of the following persons to perform the duties of an employee who is in the bargaining unit on strike or locked out: Any employee hired after the day on which notice to bargain collectively was given. Any person who performs management functions or who is employed in a confidential capacity in matters related to industrial relations, if the person was hired after the day on which notice to bargain collectively was given. Any contractor, other than a dependent contractor, or any employee of another employer whose services were not being used on the day on which notice to bargain collectively was given. If, before the day on which notice to bargain collectively was given, an employer was using the services of a contractor or an employee of another employer and those services were the same as or substantially similar to the duties of an employee in the bargaining unit, they may continue to use those services during a labour dispute, so long as they do so in the same manner, to the same extent and in the same circumstances as they did before the notice was given. Any employee whose normal workplace is a workplace other than that at which the strike or lockout is taking place or who was transferred to the workplace at which the strike or lockout is taking place after the day on which notice to bargain collectively was given. Any volunteer, student or member of the public. Any employee who is in a bargaining unit on strike or locked out. However, the new provisions allow employers to use the services of such persons during a strike or lockout as long as the services are used solely to deal with a situation that presents or could reasonably be expected to present one of the following imminent or serious threats: A threat to the life, health or safety of any person. A threat of destruction of, or serious damage to, the employer’s property or premises. A threat of serious environmental damage affecting the employer’s property or premises. The use of the services must be necessary in order to deal with the situation because the employer is unable to use the services of the employees on strike or locked out. As in Quebec’s Labour Code, an employer may only rely on the services of a person referred to above for conservation purposes, and not for the purpose of continuing the supply of services or production of goods by the employer. Finally, the bill specifies that the employer must first offer these conservation duties to the employees who are on strike or locked out. The bill also includes provisions applicable to employers who contravene the anti-replacement-worker provisions. These offences can result in fines of up to $100,000 per day. The government may also ensure compliance with the new provisions by adopting regulations to establish an administrative framework with financial penalties. New provisions regarding the maintenance of activities during a strike or lockout In order to prevent imminent and serious threats to public health and safety, Bill C-58 provides that the union and employer must reach an agreement on the activities to be maintained in the event of a labour dispute. If no activities need to be maintained, the parties must still enter into an agreement to this effect. An employer and a union must enter into this agreement no later than 15 days after the day on which notice to bargain collectively was given to the Minister of Labour and the Canada Industrial Relations Board. If the parties do not reach an agreement, the matter will be brought before the Board at the request of one of the parties. The 72-hour strike or lockout notices referred to in section 87.2 of the Canada Labour Code may be given only once this agreement has been reached and a copy has been filed with the Minister and the Board, or if no agreement has been reached, if the Board has determined an application made by one of the parties. Coming into force Bill C-58 will come into force on June 20, 2025. Until then, the new anti-replacement-worker provisions will undoubtedly cause federal jurisdiction employers to seriously consider their bargaining power and level of preparedness for possible labour disputes. Our team is here to help you through this process.

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