Single-Use Plastics Prohibition Regulations: Impact on Businesses

July 14, 2022

On June 20, 2022, the federal government registered regulations that, as the name implies, prohibit (or restrict, in some cases) the manufacture, import and sale of certain single-use plastics that pose a threat to the environment. The Regulations will come into force on December 20, 2022, with the exception of certain provisions taking effect in the following months.¹

Manufacturing, importing and selling certain single-use plastic products made entirely or partially of plastic, such as foodservice ware, checkout bags and straws, will be soon be prohibited.

This regulation is expected to affect more than 250,000 Canadian businesses that sell or provide single-use plastic products, primarily in the retail, food service, hospitality and healthcare industries.

The following is a comprehensive list of items that will be prohibited:

Single-use plastic ring carriers designed to hold and carry beverage containers together²;
Single-use plastic stir sticks designed to stir or mix beverages or to prevent liquid from spilling from the lid of its container³;
Single-use plastic foodservice ware (a) designed in the form of a clamshell container, lidded container, box, cup, plate or bowl, (b) designed to serve or transport ready-to-eat food or beverages without further preparation, and (c) made from certain materials⁴;
Single-use plastic checkout bags designed to carry purchased goods from a business and (a) whose plastic is not a fabric, or (b) whose plastic is a fabric that will break or tear, as the case may be, (i) if it is used to carry 10 kg over a distance of 53 m 100 times; (ii) if it is washed in accordance with the washing procedures specified for a single domestic wash in the International Organization for Standardization standard ISO 6330, as amended from time to time⁵;
Single-use plastic cutlery that is formed in the shape of a fork, knife, spoon, spork or chopstick that either (a) contains polystyrene or polyethylene, or (b) changes its physical properties after being run through an electrically operated household dishwasher 100 times⁶;
Single-use plastic straws that either (a) contain polystyrene or polyethylene, or (b) change their physical properties after being run through an electrically operated household dishwasher 100 times⁷.

The main exceptions

Single-use flexible plastic straws
Single-use flexible plastic straws, i.e. those with a corrugated section that allows the straw to bend and maintain its position at various angles,⁸ may be manufactured and imported⁹.

These flexible straws may also be sold in any of the following circumstances:
- The sale does not take place in a commercial, industrial, or institutional setting¹ ⁰. This exception means that individuals can sell these flexible straws.
- The sale is between businesses in packages of at least 20 straws.¹ ¹
- The sale is made by a retail store of a package of 20 or more straws to a customer who requests it without the package being displayed in a manner that permits the customer to view the package without the help of a store employee¹²;
- The sale of straws is between a retail store and a customer, if the straw is packaged together with a beverage container and the packaging was done at a location other than the retail store¹³;
- The sale is between a care facility, such as a hospital or long-term care facility, and its patients or residents¹⁴.
The export of single-use plastic items -
All the manufactured single-use plastic items listed above may be manufactured, imported or sold for export¹⁵.

That said, any person who manufactures or imports such items for export will be required to keep a record of certain information and documents as appropriate for each type of plastic manufactured item¹⁶. Records of the information and documents will have to be kept for at least five years in Canada¹⁷.

Conclusion: an opportunity to rethink common practices

In the short term, businesses will need to start thinking about how they will replace the plastic manufactured items they use.

To help businesses select alternatives to single-use plastic items, the federal government has released its Guidance for selecting alternatives to the single-use plastics in the proposed Single-Use Plastics Prohibition Regulations.¹⁸

According to this document, the aim should be to reduce plastics. Businesses may begin by considering whether a single-use plastic should be replaced or no longer provided. Only products that perform essential functions should be replaced with non-plastic equivalents. Stir sticks and straws can be eliminated most of the time.

Another way to reduce waste is to opt for reusable products and packaging. Businesses are invited to rethink their products and services to provide reusable options. Reusable container programs (i.e. offering customers the option of using their own reusable containers) are a reuse option that businesses may want to consider, in particular to reduce the amount of plastic food containers.

Only where reusable products are not feasible should businesses substitute a single-use plastic product with a recyclable single-use alternative. Businesses in this situation are encouraged to contact local recycling facilities to ensure that they can successfully recycle products at their end of life. Ultimately, charging consumers for certain single-use substitutes (e.g. single-use wooden or moulded fibre cutlery) may also discourage their use.

Ibid, s. 1
Ibid, s. 3
Ibid, s. 6
Polystyrene foam, polyvinyl chloride, plastic containing black pigment produced through the partial or incomplete combustion of hydrocarbons or oxo-degradable plastic; Ibid.
This standard is entitled Textiles – Domestic washing and drying procedures for textile testing; Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid, ss. 4 and 5.
Ibid, s. 1.
Ibid, s. 4.
Ibid, para. 5(2).
Ibid, para. 5(3).
Ibid, para. 5(4); According to Guidance for selecting alternatives to the single-use plastics in the proposed Single-Use Plastics Prohibition Regulations, the goal is to ensure that people with disabilities who need flexible single-use plastic straws continue to have access to them at home and can carry them to restaurants and other premises.
Ibid, para. 5(5).
Ibid, para. 5(6).
Ibid, para. 2(2).
Ibid., s. 8
Ibid, para. 9(1).
https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/managing-reducing-waste/consultations/proposed-single-use-plastics-prohibition-regulations-consultation-document.html

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Chloé Fauchon
Partner, Lawyer
William Bolduc
Lawyer
Juliette St-Pierre
Lawyer

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November 27, 2024

Announcement of U.S. tariffs: repercussions and trade strategies for Quebec businesses?

Nearly four years after the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (the “CUSMA” or the “Agreement”) came into force, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump announced on November 25, 2024, that he would impose 25% tariffs on all products entering the U.S. from Canada and Mexico, starting on the first day of his presidency, that is, January 20, 2025. Mr. Trump added that the tariffs would remain in effect until Canada and Mexico strengthened their border policies, which he blames for the increase in illegal immigration and the trafficking of devastating drugs in the United States. As a reminder, under the current provisions of the CUSMA, most products made in Quebec and Canada can be sold on U.S. markets without tariffs applying. And so, although we can only speculate and although Mr. Trump did not give details on this subject in his announcement, his future administration could indeed invoke a number of legislative authorities to implement such a measure. In particular, it could invoke the CUSMA’s essential security exception, which allows a party to the Agreement to apply any measure deemed necessary to protect its essential security interests, the national security exception in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which President Trump’s first administration used in 2018 to introduce tariffs on U.S. imports of certain steel and aluminum products, or the provisions of the National Emergencies Act. Needless to say, the announcement sent shockwaves through the political and business communities in Canada and Quebec what with the close commercial ties that the U.S. has with Canada, including with Quebec. In the first quarter of 2024 alone, Quebec’s merchandise exports to the U.S. reached CAN$21.2 billion, which accounts for nearly 74.6% of the province’s international merchandise exports and makes the U.S. Quebec’s main trading partner on the world stage. The imposition of 25% tariffs would therefore significantly affect Quebec businesses. It would make them less competitive on the U.S. market, on which they rely heavily to export their products. The measure could be particularly detrimental to the Canadian forestry industry, which is already severely affected by tariffs of nearly 15% on lumber. The U.S. economy would also be considerably affected by such protectionist tariffs. While in the short term, tariffs could benefit certain domestic manufacturers and producers, in the longer term, they are likely to harm the U.S. economy as a whole. Many U.S. manufacturers would face higher costs of inputs, and established supply chains would be disrupted, in particular in the automotive and steel industries. To continue to make profits, many U.S. companies could be forced to pass on the additional costs to their end consumers by raising the prices of their products, which would undoubtedly result in another wave of inflation. Worth mentioning also are the retaliatory measures that the Canadian government may want to implement in response to such tariffs, which could affect certain parts of the U.S. economy. Although the CUSMA provides for dispute resolution mechanisms, they are unlikely to lessen the impact of the measures that the Trump administration is considering in the short term, as a final decision under these mechanisms could take a long time to be issued. The new U.S. administration could use the announcement made on November 25 as leverage in future CUSMA renewal negotiations, the preparatory discussions for which are slated to begin next year, or in negotiations for a separate trade agreement between the U.S. and Canada that would exclude Mexico. Canadian businesses would do well to encourage their various trade associations to take steps to lobby both American decision-makers and their corporate customers in the U.S. and remind them of the harmful effects that the announced tariffs may have on American businesses. While we wait for a more detailed announcement with information concerning specific tariff exemptions in particular, we suggest that businesses choose their future trading partners with great care. In an increasingly protectionist global economic context, a strategy involving the diversification of trading partners is the best way for businesses to offset the risks associated with a particular country’s tariff policies. The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement signed by Canada and the European Union in 2017, which our firm helped to negotiate, may prove to be an interesting solution in this respect. Our team of commercial law and tax professionals is available to help you find solutions to the issues arising from this announcement. With our expertise, we can assist you in your commercial negotiations and help you develop strategies to mitigate the impact that the announced tariff increase may have on your business.

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October 2, 2024

Proof of incapacity: analysis of CIUSSS de L’Ouest-de-L’île-de-Montréal (ST. Mary’s Hospital Center) c. R.C.

PROOF OF INCAPACITY: ANALYSIS OF CIUSSS DE L’OUEST-DE-L’ÎLE-DE-MONTRÉAL (ST. MARY’S HOSPITAL CENTER) c. R.C.1 Summary The authors comment on this decision rendered on September 20, 2024, in which the Court of Appeal ruled on the capacity to consent to care in the presence of a psychiatric disorder. The Court of Appeal overturned the first instance decision, which had found the respondent capable of refusing treatment with antipsychotic medications even though he had refuted his diagnosis, because he understood the benefits that antipsychotic medications could afford him and refused to take them because of their side effects. The Court of Appeal rather concluded that the trial judge had misapplied the five criteria to be used to assess whether a person is capable of consenting to care, particularly in the context where (i) the trial judge’s conclusion ran counter to the uncontradicted opinion of an expert; and (ii) there was much evidence supporting the fact that the respondent was incapable of making an informed decision. INTRODUCTION In this case, the Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’Ouest-de-l'Île-de-Montréal (the “CIUSSS”) appealed a decision rendered by the Superior Court on March 14, 2024, dismissing its application for an authorization to provide care to R.C., a 51-year-old man. The Superior Court had concluded that the CIUSSS had not proven that the respondent was incapable of consenting to care. The Court of Appeal was thus called upon to review the trial judge’s answer to the first question (incapacity to consent) in the analytical framework2 surrounding the test that has now been used for three decades.3 THE FACTS R.C. has a complex medical history. He was hospitalized several times between 2007 and 2019 for mental health issues, including suicidal ideation and personality disorders. In 2021, he was admitted to the CHUM for COVID-19-related complications having resulted in brain damage caused by hypoxia. From 2022 onwards, he made repeated visits to the emergency room, often to obtain benzodiazepines, leading him to become addicted. Even though he adhered to treatment with antipsychotic medication for a time, R.C. stopped taking his medication because of undesirable side effects. In January 2024, after an episode of confusion, he was taken to hospital where he was diagnosed with late-onset schizophrenia. However, R.C. refuted the diagnosis, claiming that his health problems were caused by an artificial intelligence device he believed had been implanted in his body. The psychiatrists who assessed him concluded that he was incapable of consenting to care. On February 16, 2024, the CIUSSS filed an application for authorization to re-hospitalize R.C. and administer antipsychotic medications, despite his categorical refusal. After analyzing the evidence, which essentially consisted of R.C.’s testimony and that of the CIUSSS psychiatrist, the Superior Court concluded that R.C. understood the nature of his condition and the benefits of the proposed treatment, despite his refusal to accept his diagnosis. The Court was of the opinion that the CIUSSS psychiatrists, in their analysis of R.C.’s capacity, had erroneously and repeatedly carried over his rejection of the diagnosis in a cascading fashion in their analysis of the five criteria from the decision in A.G.,4 thereby making the same error as the one that the Court of Appeal had identified in the M.H. decision.5 Despite the absence of a second opinion on R.C.’s capacity, the Superior Court had determined that he was able to consent to his care. According to the trial judge, in keeping with the teachings of the Court of Appeal in the F.D. decision,6 he therefore lacked jurisdiction to order care. For this reason, he dismissed the application for an authorization to provide care. THE COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION The Court of Appeal began by reiterating the five criteria for assessing a person’s capacity, namely: Does the person understand the nature of the illness for which treatment is proposed? Does the person understand the nature and purpose of the treatment? Does the person understand the risks and benefits involved in undergoing the treatment? Does the person understand the risks involved in not undergoing the treatment? ls the capacity to consent to treatment affected by the patient's illness?7 It pointed out that the criteria are not cumulative and that it is incumbent upon the trier to assess them as a whole.8 Moreover, the mere fact that a person refuses care that would be in their best interest is not enough to conclude that the person is incapable,9 nor is their mere rejection of their diagnosis.10 In this case, the Court of Appeal considered that the Superior Court judge had committed a palpable and overriding error making its intervention warranted. It stated that the trial judge was obliged to express an opinion on whether the evidence proffered was sufficient, adding that the judge had a proactive role to play in protecting the interests of the person involved. If the trial judge felt that a point that had not been the subject in a genuine adversarial debate raised a problem in his view, it was up to him to ask questions.11 Subsequently, the court took extracts from the evidence consisting of a psychiatric report and the testimony of its author and went on to note that the evidence did not allow the trial judge to conclude that R.C. was capable of consenting or refusing the proposed treatment plan, on the contrary. Based on the same evidence, the Court declared R.C. incapable of consenting to care and sent the case back to the Superior Court so that it could determine whether there was indeed categorical refusal and assess the terms of the treatment plan sought. AUTHORS’ COMMENTS This decision of the Court of Appeal follows approximately 20 other decisions12 respecting orders authorizing care handed down by this same court, which have all further established and clarified the guiding principles surrounding such orders since the F.D. decision of 2015.13 These successive decisions have not only added to case law, they have refined the assessment criteria and legal requirements pertaining to applications for authorization to provide care. Such a development in case law shows that the courts are committed to circumscribing complex healthcare situations. Doing so involves striking a balance between the rights to freedom and self-determination and the protection of those who are vulnerable or otherwise unable to consent. On July 6, 2015, the Court of Appeal of Quebec marked a decisive turning point where orders authorizing care are involved by rendering a decision that sent a clear message to the Superior Court, namely F.D. c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria).14 In that decision, an analytical framework was established to ensure compliance both with the provisions of the law and the spirit of the law. Since then, the Court has handed down some 20 other significant decisions, each shedding additional light. The guiding principles derived from these decisions can be summarized under the following themes: Rights relating to the judicial process Every person has the fundamental right to contest an application for a order authorizing care, to be heard and to be represented.15 The judge must proactively protect the user’s interests and ensure that they are represented by a lawyer.16 Scope of the care plan Requiring a definite care plan does not mean dictating which medication should be administered in a limitative way.17 A judge may remove certain substances from a treatment plan if they deem that to be in the patient’s best interest.18 It is crucial to draw a distinction between preventive care and a treatment plan that includes various alternatives as the situation evolves.19 For a future hospitalization clause to be valid, there must be a reasonable foreseeability of hospitalization.20 When a patient is to be placed, the application for authorization must indicate where they are to be placed.21 Physical restraint may only be used if it is necessary to avoid serious harm, and must be limited to the minimum.22 A parent’s refusal to consent to a treatment plan may not be warranted if the plan is in the child’s best interests.23 Duration of the authorization When the person concerned is not cooperating and access to their previous medical records is not available, the judge must be especially careful in assessing whether the proposed care plan is legal, in particular in terms of its duration and scope.24 The duration of the care order should be as short as reasonably possible, without compromising the effectiveness of the treatment.25 When a future hospitalization is contemplated, the judge must take into account the time required to stabilize the patient.26 The 30-day period for a future hospitalization should not be considered an absolute limit, as a longer period may be deemed necessary after a thorough analysis.27 The evidence The mere fact that a relationship exists between an expert and a party does not make the expert’s testimony inadmissible: The circumstances surrounding the expert’s role must be reviewed.28 An expert who does not know a patient’s reasons for refusing treatment is not deemed to have breached their duty to inform.29 An expert may testify to reported facts without the possibility of anyone opposing them; however, this does not mean that reported facts are proven, as the rules of evidence remain stringent in this context.30 An expert report may suffice as testimony; the judge need not require the patient’s testimony if the patient cannot understand the issues at hand.31 Applications for safeguard orders may be unsuccessful where there is no expert report and it is not demonstrated that the matter is urgent.32 This review highlights the significant advances that the courts have made in overseeing applications for orders authorizing care and protecting vulnerable people. The analytical framework established in the F.D. decision remains relevant, and subsequent decisions have further refined its questions. The decision that the Court of Appeal handed down in Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’Ouest-de-l'Île-de-Montréal c. R.C. is milestone in the jurisprudence on court orders authorizing care. By overturning the lower court’s judgment, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the need for a thorough assessment of the capacity to consent, emphasizing that the work of medical teams and applications made by healthcare institutions are important to ensure appropriate care. This decision not only underscores the fact that it is important to protect the rights of users, but also that the work of the court is crucial, for it must ensure that the criteria are met without substituting its opinion for that of the experts heard. CONCLUSION The decision discussed in this paper is part of a series of decisions that have clarified and enhanced the guiding principles established since the F.D. decision was handed down in 2015.33 The Court of Appeal has provided valuable guidelines for judges, institutions and healthcare professionals to use in their assessment of applications for authorization to provide care. Through a careful review of the circumstances of each case, the courts have shown that they are committed to effectively circumscribing complex health situations by ensuring that institutions have the tools they need to respond appropriately. Lastly, we must recognize that while progress has been made, there are still unresolved issues that need to be addressed. Recent court decisions, including the one that led to the R.C. decision,34 illustrate the importance of constant dialogue between those involved in the legal aspect of cases and those dealing with clinical realities. As jurisprudence continues to develop, paying close attention to future developments will be key to ensuring that healthcare institutions can act effectively in consideration of patients’ needs. 2024 QCCA 1231. F.D.c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. See the landmark decision, Institut Philippe Pinel de Montréal c. A.G., 1994 CanLII 6105 (QC CA). Institut Philippe Pinel de Montréal c. A.G., 1994 CanLII 6105 (QC CA). M.H. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2018 QCCA 1948, para. 57. F.D. c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. This decision, para. 13; with reference to Institut Philippe Pinel de Montréal c. A.G., 1994 CanLII 6105 (QC CA), pp. 28 to 33. This decision, para. 14; with reference to M. B. c. Centre hospitalier Pierre-le-Gardeur, 2004 CanLII 29017 (QC CA), para. 45; M.C. c. Service professionnel du Centre de santé et de services sociaux d’Arthabaska-et-de-L’Érable, 2010 QCCA 1114, para. 13. This decision, para. 14; with reference to M. B. c. Centre hospitalier Pierre-le-Gardeur, 2004 CanLII 29017 (QC CA), para. 46. This decision, para. 14, with reference to Starson v. Swayze, 2003 SCC 32, para. 79 and M.H. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2018 QCCA 1948, paras. 61–62. This decision, para. 18. We have excluded the following decisions from our analysis: Bédard c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Nord-de-l’Île-de-Montréal, 2023 QCCA 508; M.G. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2019 QCCA 203; S.F. c. CIUSSS de Centre-Ouest-de-l’île-de-Montréal – Hôpital général juif – Sir Mortimer B. Davis, 2021 QCCA 1531; P.L. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de la Montérégie-Centre, 2018 QCCA 318; N.G. c. Sir Mortimer B. Davis Jewish General Hospital, 2021 QCCA 1892; F.D. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2017 QCCA 1206. F.D.c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. Ibid. M.H.c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2018 QCCA 1948, paras. 68 and 69. A.N. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Nord-de-l’île-de-Montréal, 2022 QCCA 1167 , para. 30. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale c. D.M., 2017 QCCA 1333, para. 25. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean c. O.G., 2018 QCCA 345, paras. 15 and 16. C.R.c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux du Bas-St-Laurent, 2017 QCCA 328, para. 28. G.J. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de Laval, 2021 QCCA 1944, paras. 24 to 26. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Mauricie-et-du-Centre-du-Québec (CIUSSS MCQ) c. J.B., 2017 QCCA 1638,, paras. 30 to 35. X.Y.c. Hôpital général du Lakeshore, 2017 QCCA 1465, para. 20. A.P. c. Centre hospitalier universitaire Sainte-Justine, 2023 QCCA 58, para. 19. L.C. c. Centre hospitalier de l’Université de Montréal (CHUM), 2015 QCCA 1139, paras. 4 and 5. D.A. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux des Laurentides, 2016 QCCA 1734, para. 31. T.F. c. CIUSSS de l’Est-de-l’île-de-Montréal , 2022 QCCA 1306, para. 25. N.M. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de la Montérégie-Centre, 2022 QCCA1567, para. 17. M.G. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Centre-Sud-de-l’Île-de-Montréal , 2021 QCCA 1326, para. 11. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’Ouest-de-l’île-de-Montréal (Douglas Mental Health University Institute) c. I.A., 2023 QCCA 1100, para. 30. Institut universitaire en santé mentale Douglas c. W.M., 2016 QCCA 1081, para. 5 A.D. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Centre-Sud-de-l’île-de-Montréal, 2023 QCCA 1240, paras. 50, 56–57. A.F. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux des Laurentides, 2021 QCCA 928, para. 50. F.D. c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. CIUSSS de l'Ouest-de-l'Île-de-Montréal (St. Mary’s Hospital Center) c. R.C.,2024 QCCA 1231.

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September 19, 2024

Financing Quebec’s Energy Transition: Unlocking the Potential of Flow-Through Shares

Quebec has set ambitious energy transition and industrial decarbonization targets. The shift to greener practices has to be taken in a context where our energy consumption could rapidly grow under the combined effect of a number of factors, such as the reindustrialization of our economy, population growth, transport electrification and the potential for artificial intelligence to consume vast amounts of energy. Investing in the development of energy infrastructure is therefore critically important, as an abundance of energy is key to economic prosperity. The problem is that public finances are already stretched to the limit with the need to renovate our aging infrastructure, among other things. Encouraging private equity investment is thus vital, and tax incentives can be very effective in this respect. The American example In 2022, the United States passed its Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), with the goal of stimulating investment in the renewable energy sector, in particular. More specifically, the IRA altered or created a number of tax credits to encourage private investment.1 Over the past two years, US businesses have announced a total of almost US$276 billion in new investments in clean energy generation and the capturing or elimination of carbon dioxide and other forms of industrial decarbonization, an increase of 34% on the two years previous.2 The IRA is effective in that it takes the respective situations of various energy sector stakeholders into account in a creative, flexible and pragmatic way, especially where taxation is involved. Energy project promoters often have to wait many years for their projects to generate income and profits, even though the banks and other investment funds they solicit financing from can be presumed to be operating profitable businesses. The tax losses that occur in the years during which such projects are designed and built are therefore of little interest to developers, but of immediate interest to investors. And so, a tax equity market has emerged, in which businesses subject to taxes can invest in the shares of entities set up to develop such projects so as to benefit from tax credits and faster depreciation. Typically, the entity that cashes in the investment and develops the project distributes 99% of income, losses and tax credits to investors until a predetermined return is achieved. Once that return is achieved, the investor’s share of the benefits decreases, and the developer has the option of buying out the investor’s residual share. The IRA has transformed how federal clean energy tax credits are monetized, and it is now possible to buy and sell such credits without having to make a long-term investment. For businesses, this new way of doing things is an additional and attractive way to participate in the growing tax credit market.3 In 2023, the volume of the tax equity market for American projects was around US$20 to 21 billion, up about US$18 billion from the previous year.4 It appears that the trend will continue. It is estimated that the value of the current market, which is particularly attractive to banks, is set to double to US$50 billion a year by 2025.5 The equivalent of flow-through shares The Quebec and Canadian tax deductions mechanism that most closely resembles the US tax equity market is probably flow-through shares. Through these, businesses in the mining and renewable energy sectors can transfer their mining exploration expenses and other expenses—specifically designated as eligible—to investors, who can then deduct them from their own taxable incomes.6 These businesses can thus issue shares at a higher price than they would receive for common shares to finance their exploration and development operations. Investors are willing to pay a higher price in return for the tax deductions afforded by the eligible expenses incurred by the issuing businesses, which can amount to a maximum of 120% of the equity invested in the shares.7 Investors can also claim a 15% or 30% federal tax credit. However, because tax incentives cannot be transferred, our mechanism is more rigid than the American one, and it can only be applied to mineral exploration and development expenses and certain specific expenditures related to renewable energy and energy conservation projects, such as electricity generation using renewable sources like wind, solar energy and geothermal energy.8 With ambition and innovation comes the need to take action Quebec could draw inspiration from the IRA to increase the attractiveness of flow-through shares and broaden their scope of application, thereby creating a new tool to finance the energy transition. The renewable energy sector is similar to the mining sector in many respects, not least in terms of the considerable amount of capital required to build the infrastructure needed to operate a mine or energy generation facility. The flow-through share mechanism, which is well-established and popular with investors,9 could be just as successful in our energy transition context. Making such incentives easier to transfer would also drive the emergence of a market similar to the US tax equity market. A number of Québec flagship companies, such as Hydro-Québec,10 Innergex11 and Boralex,12 are also very ambitious when it comes to developing large-scale energy projects. They face major financing challenges, as do those in the industrial decarbonization and infrastructure renewal sectors. Innovation is necessary to meet these challenges and make the transition to a more sustainable, but just as prosperous, world, and to do so in good time.13 Link Rhodium Group and MIT’s Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR), Clean Investment Monitor, link Brandon Hill, How to take advantage of tax credit transferability though the Inflation Reduction Act, Thomson Reuters Institute, April 16, 2024, link Allison Good, Renewables project finance to keep pace in 2024, but tax equity rule looms, S&P Global, January 12, 2024, link Lesley Hunter and Mason Vliet, The Risk Profile of Renewable Energy Tax Equity Investments, American Council on Renewable Energy, December 2023, link Link, page in French only Link Link Prospectors & Developers Association of Canada, Flow-through shares & the mineral exploration tax credit explained, link Link Link Link The authors would like to acknowledge the participation and the work done by Sophie Poirier in this publication

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July 3, 2024

Environmental claims about a product, a service or business activities: stricter rules to combat greenwashing

Greenwashing is a form of marketing that misrepresents a product, service or practice as having positive environmental effects,1 thereby misleading consumers and preventing them from making an informed purchasing decision.2 Several initiatives have been launched around the world to counter this practice. In California, a law requires business entities to disclose information in support of environmental claims.3 In France, ads featuring environmental claims such as “carbon-neutral” and “net zero” must include a quick response (QR) code that links to the studies and data supporting such claims.4 Within the European Union, a proposal for a directive was published with a view to possibly banning generic terms like “environmentally friendly.”5 In South Korea, the Korea Fair Trade Commission proposed an amendment to its Guidelines for Review of Environment-Related Labeling and Advertising that would simplify the process of issuing fines to businesses engaged in greenwashing.6 The Parliament of Canada seemingly followed suit by tabling Bill C-597 on November 30, 2023, which introduces a provision into the Competition Act8aimed at improving the means to fight greenwashing. Amended on May 28, 2024, Bill C-59 finally received royal assent on June 20, 2024, date on which it partially came into force. Because the provision will apply to “any person,” all businesses will be subject to it, regardless of their size or legal form. Amendments to the Competition Act regarding environmental claims The Competition Act now allows9 the Commissioner of the Competition Bureau (the “Bureau”) to inquire into10 the conduct of a person who promotes 1) a product by making an environmental claim or warranty11 or 2) any business interest by making representations about the environmental benefits of a business or business activity. Claim concerning a product or service Insofar as a business or person is unable to demonstrate a product’s benefits for protecting the environment or mitigating the environmental and ecological effects of climate change, the Commissioner of Competition will be entitled to apply to a court for an order requiring such business or person to (i)cease promoting the product on the basis of a non-compliant environmental claim or warranty, (ii)publish a corrective notice and (iii)pay an administrative monetary penalty12 of up to, for a legal person, the greater of $10 million and three times the value of the benefit derived from the deceptive conduct, or, if that amount cannot be reasonably determined, 3% of the legal person’s annual worldwide gross revenue. The penalty for each subsequent offence could be as high as $15 million. A “product” within the meaning of the Competition Act may be an article (real or personal property of every description) or a service.13 This new provision expressly requires any person or business to base their environmental claims on “an adequate and proper test”.14 A “test” within the meaning of this Act consists in an analysis, verification or assessment intended to demonstrate the result or alleged effect of a product. It does not necessarily have to be a scientific method nor do the results need to meet a test of certainty, as the courts have generally interpreted the term “proper” to mean fit, apt, suitable or as required by the circumstances.15 With regard to misleading claims, the courts16 have clarified the nature of the criteria that must be considered to determine whether a particular test is “adequate and proper.” Thus, an adequate and proper test depends on the claim made as understood by the common person. The test must also meet the following criteria: It must be reflective of the risk or harm which the product is designed to prevent or assist in preventing. It must be done under controlled circumstances or in conditions which exclude external variables or take account in a measurable way for such variables. It must be conducted on more than one independent sample wherever possible (e.g., destruction testing may be an exception). The results need not be measured against a test of certainty, but must be reasonable given the nature of the harm at issue and establish that it is the product itself which causes the desired effect in a material manner. It must be performed regardless of the size of the seller’s organization or the anticipated volume of sales.17 Representations accompanying product that come from a person outside Canada are deemed to be made by the person who imports the product into Canada.18 General claims about a company’s activities While Bill C-59 was initially intended to cover only environmental statements, warranties or guarantees regarding products, the assented version of the bill provides that any representation made regarding the benefits of a business or business activity for protecting or restoring the environment or mitigating the environmental and ecological causes or effects of climate change are subject to a Bureau inquiry.19 As an example cited by the Bureau, a company’s claims about being “carbon neutral” or that it commits to becoming so within a certain number of years20 would constitute “representations of the benefits of a business or business activity in mitigating the causes of climate change.” The company making such claims must be able to demonstrate that they are based on “adequate and proper substantiation” obtained using an “internationally recognized methodology”.21 The Competition Act does not specify which internationally recognized methods may be used for this purpose. Should the substantiation the company uses be inadequate, improper or obtained using a method that is not recognized internationally, it will be subject to the same consequences as those mentioned in the previous section.22 Regardless of whether the claims concern a product or service or a business activity, the persons concerned are allowed to defend themselves under the Competition Act by establishing that they exercised due diligence.23 What impact will these amendments really have? Notwithstanding the proposed legislative amendment, the Competition Act already covers false or misleading representations with respect to green advertising.24 The current provisions already prohibit making representations to the public that are false or misleading in a material respect.25 In recent years, several complaints of greenwashing have been lodged with the Bureau on that basis, prompting it to open a number of investigations. Some have led to major settlements involving companies having made representations regarding their products.26/27/28/29 In all of these cases, the heavy burden of establishing that the business’s environmental claim was false or misleading fell on the Bureau. The proposed amendments to the Competition Act would change this by shifting the burden of proof onto businesses. The onus would therefore be on them to demonstrate that their product benefits the environment in some way or mitigates the environmental and ecological effects of climate change or that its claims are based on adequate and proper substantiation obtained using an internationally recognized method. These new legislative provisions now confirm what was already a general standard since 1999, and they ease the Bureau’s burden of proof. In addition to the Competition Act, other laws applicable in Quebec provide a general framework for greenwashing, such as the Consumer Protection Act.30Under this Act, no merchant, manufacturer or advertiser may, by any means whatsoever, make false or misleading claims to a consumer, which implicitly includes greenwashing.31 To determine whether a representation constitutes a prohibited practice, the general impression it gives, and, as the case may be, the literal meaning of the terms used therein must be taken into account. In particular, it is prohibited to falsely ascribe particular advantages to a product or service, or to claim that a product has a particular feature or ascribe certain characteristics of performance to it.33 Offences are subject to criminal34 and civil35 penalties. Private remedies Another new measure to combat greenwashing in the Competition Act is the possibility for any person (individual, organization, competitor, etc.) to apply directly to the Competition Tribunal for an order against a business making environmental claims or representations about a product, service or activities without adequate substantiation.36 In the first version of Bill C-59, only the Commissioner of Competition could institute such proceedings before the Tribunal.37 However, the Competition Tribunal must first give leave to make such an application.38 The Tribunal’s power to give leave is largely discretionary, meaning that the Tribunal may grant it if it deems that it is in the public interest to do so.39 This new measure will come into force in one year on June 20, 2025.40 Best practices It is crucial for a company to adopt and display a realistic image of its environmental impact based on credible data and facts. Making sure that claims are legally compliant is not all that’s at stake. A business’s failure to do the above is likely to seriously harm not only its reputation, but also its relationship with its stakeholders. Thus, before claiming to be “green,” businesses must consider the following questions. Are the real motivations behind the business’s sustainability commitments clear, legitimate and convincing? Is sustainable development an integral part of the business strategy? Is it applied when addressing key business issues and taking new actions? Does the company have a sustainable development policy that is credible and based on relevant issues? Was it developed collaboratively with and approved by its Board of Directors? Has the company set specific, clear, measurable and achievable objectives and targets? Considerations for public companies As concerns public companies subject to continuous disclosure obligations under Canadian securities legislation (“reporting issuers”), these considerations are set against a backdrop of increasing pressure from investors, including institutional investors, and others for greater transparency on climate-related issues. Although climate-related disclosure requirements for Canadian reporting issuers are still relatively limited, many issuers choose to voluntarily disclose such information, for example in sustainability reports. Reporting issuers must pay particular attention to their communications, which could constitute greenwashing within the meaning of the Competition Act and give rise to the penalties and other consequences mentioned above. This is another risk to add to reporting issuers’ liability in the secondary market for misrepresentation and failure to make disclosures within prescribed time limits. As far as climate issues are concerned, the risk arises in particular from overestimating or inadequately disclosing how activities contribute to protecting the environment or how they mitigate the environmental and ecological effects of climate change. The current move towards standardized methodologies and frameworks and the forthcoming adoption of binding rules on climate-related disclosures should help to limit greenwashing in this context. In the meantime, reporting issuers can reduce the risk of greenwashing by following a well-established international methodology and by including disclaimers for forward-looking statements adapted to the risks and uncertainties inherent to the climate-related information they provide. Conclusion The new provisions of the Competition Act are already having an impact. As a precaution, some companies have removed ads, promotional documents and websites containing claims that certain activities were undertaken specifically to mitigate the causes of climate change. Parliament’s message could not be clearer: Shifting the burden of proof onto businesses means closing the door on an era when products, services and business activities could be marketed as green in the absence of tangible evidence. Definition of the Autorité des marchés financiers: 8 questions and answers about carbon credits and related concepts | AMF (lautorite.qc.ca). Definition of the Competition Bureau: Environmental claims and greenwashing (canada.ca). Assembly Bill No. 1305: Voluntary carbon market disclosures, California, 2023. Read it here: Bill Text – AB-1305 Voluntary carbon market disclosures. Décret no 2022-539 du 13 avril 2022 relatif à la compensation carbone et aux allégations de neutralité carbone dans la publicité, Journal officiel de la République française, 2022. Read it here: Légifrance – Publications officielles – Journal officiel – JORF n° 0088 du 14/04/2022 (legifrance.gouv.fr). Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU as regards empowering consumers for the green transition through better protection against unfair practices and better information, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 2022. Read it here: pdf(europa.eu). Read it here: KFTC Proposes Amendment to Review Guidelines Regarding Greenwashing – Kim & Chang (kimchang.com). An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session. Read it here: Government Bill (House of Commons) C-59 (44-1) – First Reading – Fall Economic Statement Implementation Act, 2023 – Parliament of Canada. The Bill is currently at second reading in the House of Commons. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34. These provisions came into force on June 20, 2024. This power to make inquiry would be available, as the Competition Act already provides, upon receipt of a complaint signed by six persons who are not less than 18 years of age or in any situation where the Commissioner has reason to believe that a person has contravened section 74.01 of the Competition Act (see R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, ss. 9 and 10). An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, section 236. Read it here: Government Bill (House of Commons) C-59 (44-1) – First Reading – Fall Economic Statement Implementation Act, 2023 – Parliament of Canada; section 236 of this Act adds paragraphs b.1 and b.2 to subsection 74.01(1) of the Competition Act. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, article 74.1. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, subsection 2(1). An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, para. 236(1). Read it here: Government Bill (House of Commons) C-59 (44-1) – First Reading – Fall Economic Statement Implementation Act, 2023 – Parliament of Canada The Commissioner of Competition v. Imperial Brush Co. Ltd. and Kel Kem Ltd. (c.o.b. as Imperial Manufacturing Group), 2008 CACT 2, paras. 122 et seq. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, section 74.09: “courts” means the Competition Tribunal, the Federal Court and the superior court of a province. The Commissioner of Competition v. Imperial Brush Co. Ltd. and Kel Kem Ltd. (c.o.b. as Imperial Manufacturing Group), 2008 CACT 2. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, subsections 74.03(1) and (2). An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, section 236. Read it here: Government Bill (House of Commons) C-59 (44-1) – First Reading – Fall Economic Statement Implementation Act, 2023 – Parliament of Canada; paragraph b.2 of section 74.01 of the Competition Act was added by amendment adopted on May 28, 2024. Letter from Anthony Durocher and Bradley Callaghan to the Honourable Pamela Wallin dated May 31, 2024. Read it here: BANC_Follow-up_CompetitionBureau_e.pdf (sencanada.ca). An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, section 236. Read it here: Government Bill (House of Commons) C-59 (44-1) – First Reading – Fall Economic Statement Implementation Act, 2023 – Parliament of Canada. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, article 74.1. Competition Act, subsection 74.1(3). Louis-Philippe Lampron, “L’encadrement juridique de la publicité écologique fausse ou trompeuse au Canada : une nécessité pour la réalisation du potentiel de la consommation écologique?” Revue de Droit de l’Université de Sherbrooke, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2005, p. 474. Read it here: A:\lampron.wpd (usherbrooke.ca). Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, paragraph 74.01(1)(a). Amanda Stephenson, Des groupes écologistes misent sur la Loi sur la concurrence(Environmental groups banking on the Competition Act), October 1, 2023, La Presse. Read it here: Des groupes écologistes misent sur la Loi sur la concurrence | La Presse. Brenna Owen, Un groupe accuse Lululemon d’« écoblanchiment » et demande une enquête (A group accuses Lululemon of “greenwashing” and calls for an investigation) February 13, 2024, La Presse. Read it here: Un groupe accuse Lululemon d’« écoblanchiment » et demande une enquête | La Presse. Martin Vallières, “Gare aux tromperies écologiques” (Beware of greenwashing), January 26, 2022, La Presse. Read it here: Écoblanchiment | Gare aux tromperies écologiques | La Presse; Keurig Canada to pay $3 million penalty to settle Competition Bureau’s concerns over coffee pod recycling claims – Canada.ca. The Commissioner of Competition v. Volkswagen Group Canada Inc. and Audi Canada Inc., 2018 Competition Tribunal 13. Consumer Protection Act, CQLR c. P-40.1, ss. 219, 220 and 221. Definition of the Competition Bureau: Environmental claims and greenwashing (canada.ca). Richard v. Time Inc., 2012 SCC 8, paras. 46 to 57. Consumer Protection Act, CQLR c. P-40.1, ss. 220 and 221. Consumer Protection Act, CQLR c P-40.1, ss. 277 to 279: Fines range from $600 to $15 000 in the case of a natural person and $2 000 to $100 000 in the case of a legal person. Offenders convicted a second time are liable to fines twice as high as those prescribed. Id. at ss. 271 to 276: Consumers may request that the contract be annulled, that the merchant’s obligation be performed or that their obligation be reduced, among other things. For civil matters only; An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, subsection 254(1). See subsection 103.1(1) of the Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, effective before June 20, 2024. An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, subsection 254(1). Id. at 254(4). An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, section 272.

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