Bill 78 and the notion of ultimate beneficiary

July 19, 2021

Bill 78 was introduced in December 2020 by Minister Jean Boulet and given assent on June 8, 2021. It amends the Act respecting the legal publicity of enterprises (the “Act”) and its regulation, the Regulation respecting the application of the Act respecting the legal publicity of enterprises (the “Regulation”). This legislative amendment is part of a process to prevent and fight tax evasion, money laundering and corruption, and will now require registrants to disclose more of their information.

Disclosure of information relating to ultimate beneficiaries

The amendments set out new requirements for corporate transparency and now require registrants to disclose information about the natural persons who are their ultimate beneficiaries, including their names, domiciles and dates of birth, in order to prevent the use of nominees for tax evasion, among other things.

It should be noted that the obligation to disclose the ultimate beneficiary’s domicile can be circumvented by disclosing a professional address instead. New section 35.2 of the Bill provides that “a registrant who must declare the domicile of a natural person under a provision of this Bill may also declare a professional address for the natural person.” If such an address is declared, the information relating to the domicile of that person may not be consulted.

Under the Bill, a “registrant” means a person or group of persons registered voluntarily or any person, trust or partnership required to be registered.

The Bill specifies that “ultimate beneficiary” means a natural person who meets any of the following conditions in respect of a registrant¹:

Is the holder, even indirectly, or beneficiary of a number of shares or units of the registrant, conferring on the person the power to exercise 25% or more of the voting rights attached to the shares or units;
Is the holder, even indirectly, or beneficiary of a number of shares or units the value of which corresponds to 25% or more of the fair market value of all the shares or units issued by the registrant;
Exercises control in fact of the registrant; or
Is a general partner of a limited partnership.

The Bill also provides that where natural persons holding shares or units of the registrant have agreed to jointly exercise the voting rights attached to the shares or units and the agreement confers on them, together, the power to exercise 25% or more of those voting rights, each of those natural persons is considered to be an ultimate beneficiary of the registrant. Lastly, it provides that a natural person operating a sole proprietorship is presumed to be the only ultimate beneficiary of the sole proprietorship, unless he or she declares otherwise.

Notwithstanding this definition of ultimate beneficiary, it is important to note that the government may make regulations determining other conditions according to which a natural person is considered to be an ultimate beneficiary.

Search by name of an ultimate beneficiary

The Bill provides that a natural person’s name may be part of a compilation of information or serve as the basis for a compilation, and may be used as a search term for the purposes of a search in the enterprise register. This will allow the public to identify all corporations with which a natural person is associated, where such a person has been named the ultimate beneficiary of a registrant. However, information that may not be consulted may not be part of such a compilation or serve as the basis for one.

It should be noted that the Bill also allows the government to make regulations determining the information contained in the enterprise register that may not be consulted.

Conclusion

This legislative amendment, particularly with the addition of the notion of ultimate beneficiary, will considerably increase disclosure requirements for corporations that are already required to communicate certain types of information to the Registraire des entreprises du Québec.

We can only hope that at the end of this legislative process, the government will implement a clear and effective information disclosure system, making it easier for registrants and their advisors to manage the information that they disclose.

The new section 0.3 will now be part of the new Chapter 0.1 “Purposes and definitions.”

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Written by

Justine Beauchesne
Lawyer
François Bélanger
Partner, Lawyer

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July 9, 2024

Presumptive Evidence of an Insured’s Intentional Fault: The Superior Court Dismisses Proceedings Instituted Against an Insurer

Introduction On July 2, 2024, the Superior Court rendered a decision in Lallier c. Société d’assurance Beneva inc.,1 ruling on an insured’s claim against his insurer for an insurance benefit further to a loss, as the insurer had denied coverage, alleging the insured’s intentional fault. Despite the absence of hard evidence of the insured’s intentional fault, the Court ruled in favour of the insurer based on evidence established by presumption. The facts During the night of August 2 to 3, 2020, a fire destroyed the home of Plaintiff, Mr. Réjean Lallier (hereinafter “the Insured”). His version is that he accidentally left a candle burning in the bathroom before running errands with his son. When he returned, the Insured saw that the house was on fire. Having no telephone, he rushed to a convenience store to call the fire department, rather than asking a nearby resident for help. After the loss, the Insured contacted his insurer Société d’assurance Beneva inc., the defendant in the case (“the Insurer”), to obtain compensation for the damage to his property. The claims adjuster that the Insurer had assigned to the case and who had been tasked with investigating the loss and compensating the Insured raised several anomalies in the Insured’s deposition. These included the Insured’s precarious financial situation, the fact that the residence was poorly maintained and the fact that, despite the urgency of the situation, the Insured had decided to take his car to call for help rather than go to a neighbour’s house. In these circumstances, the case is referred to the Insurer's special investigation unit. The Insurer’s investigation ultimately led to the conclusion that the Insured had intentionally caused the fire. This meant that contractual and legal exclusions applied, allowing the Insurer to deny coverage and justify its refusal to pay an insurance benefit. The Insured, who represented himself at the trial, instituted legal proceedings for the sum of $680,000, seeking reparation for damage to the immovable, his movable property and for living expenses. He also claimed $20,000 in compensation for the alleged inconvenience he suffered as a result of the Insurer’s “abusive behaviour.” Analysis The Honourable Justice Sébastien Vaillancourt, J.S.C., pointed out that, under article 2464 of the Civil Code of Québec2 and the provisions of the insurance policy, the Insurer is not obliged to compensate for damages intentionally caused by the Insured. However, the Insurer has the burden of establishing the Insured’s intentional fault. The Court reiterated that intentional fault is defined as behaviour that is deliberately and voluntarily intended to cause harm.3 The offender’s intention must not only be evident in the actions taken, but also in the ensuing consequences.4 This can be demonstrated through serious, precise and concordant presumptions, in accordance with the teachings of the Court of Appeal in Barrette on the subject.5 To meet its burden of proof, the Insurer presented to the Court the inconsistencies and improbabilities in the Insured’s statements. For example, in some statements, he claimed to be in a good financial position, while in others, he stated the opposite. In addition, the time at which he left his house after lighting the candle, what he did with his son after he left and how long he was gone changed from one statement to the next. The Insured had trouble explaining in a coherent manner why he was gone for so long late in the evening while his house was going up in flames. The Insured indicated that he went to the convenience store to contact the fire department after seeing the fire, stating that he did not want to go to his neighbour’s house because they had had a disagreement in the past. The Court concluded that this version was implausible given the gravity of the situation. Several other contradictions were noted in the Insured’s testimony at trial. The Insured tried to justify himself by claiming that he had trouble speaking in public and that his medication was causing him to lose his memory.6 However, there was no evidence to support these claims, and they were not upheld by the Court.7 Ultimately, the judge did not accept the Insured’s version. The sheer number of contradictions in his statements went beyond what was acceptable to the Court to consider them reliable. Given that certain contradictions emerged as early as the first statement after the fire, the time lapse between the incident and the trial could not be used as a justification.8 The statements were considered untrue, as they were mutually inconsistent.9 What is more, the contradictions and inconsistencies in the statements pointed to fraudulent intent on the Insured’s part. Lastly, the claim for damages in compensation for the Insurer’s abusive behaviour was also dismissed, given the absence of evidence in this regard.10 Conclusion Demonstrating fraudulent intent to deny coverage is no simple feat for insurers. In this case, the Insurer succeeded in meeting its burden of proof by relying on presumptions rather than hard evidence. The facts spoke for themselves. And faced with the Insured’s numerous inconsistent and contradictory statements, the Court ruled in favour of the Insurer. The Insured’s fraudulent intent was successfully substantiated and his claim against the Insurer was dismissed.11 Lallier c. Société d’assurance Beneva inc., [2024] n° 500-17-116356-216, QCCS. [Lallier] (Time limit for appeal: 30 days after the date of the notice of judgment). Civil Code of Québec, a. 2464; Lallier, para. 34. Allstate du Canada, compagnie d’assurances c. D., SOQUIJ AZ-50101469, J.E. 2001–1891, (C.A.), para. 18, as quoted in Lallier, para. 36. [Allstate] Allstate, para. 18, as quoted in Lallier, para. 36. Lallier, paras. 37–38; see Barrette c. Union canadienne (L’), compagnie d’assurances,2013 QCCA 1687, paras. 12–13. Lallier, para. 43. Lallier, paras. 44–46. Lallier, para. 47. Maud Rivard, Dispositions générales applicables aux assurances de dommages, JCQ-Droit civil Contrats nommés II, Fascicle 20, para. 92, updated to June 20, 2023, as quoted in Lallier para. 49. Lallier, paras. 59–62. Lallier, paras. 56–58.

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July 3, 2024

Environmental claims about a product, a service or business activities: stricter rules to combat greenwashing

Greenwashing is a form of marketing that misrepresents a product, service or practice as having positive environmental effects,1 thereby misleading consumers and preventing them from making an informed purchasing decision.2 Several initiatives have been launched around the world to counter this practice. In California, a law requires business entities to disclose information in support of environmental claims.3 In France, ads featuring environmental claims such as “carbon-neutral” and “net zero” must include a quick response (QR) code that links to the studies and data supporting such claims.4 Within the European Union, a proposal for a directive was published with a view to possibly banning generic terms like “environmentally friendly.”5 In South Korea, the Korea Fair Trade Commission proposed an amendment to its Guidelines for Review of Environment-Related Labeling and Advertising that would simplify the process of issuing fines to businesses engaged in greenwashing.6 The Parliament of Canada seemingly followed suit by tabling Bill C-597 on November 30, 2023, which introduces a provision into the Competition Act8aimed at improving the means to fight greenwashing. Amended on May 28, 2024, Bill C-59 finally received royal assent on June 20, 2024, date on which it partially came into force. Because the provision will apply to “any person,” all businesses will be subject to it, regardless of their size or legal form. Amendments to the Competition Act regarding environmental claims The Competition Act now allows9 the Commissioner of the Competition Bureau (the “Bureau”) to inquire into10 the conduct of a person who promotes 1) a product by making an environmental claim or warranty11 or 2) any business interest by making representations about the environmental benefits of a business or business activity. Claim concerning a product or service Insofar as a business or person is unable to demonstrate a product’s benefits for protecting the environment or mitigating the environmental and ecological effects of climate change, the Commissioner of Competition will be entitled to apply to a court for an order requiring such business or person to (i)cease promoting the product on the basis of a non-compliant environmental claim or warranty, (ii)publish a corrective notice and (iii)pay an administrative monetary penalty12 of up to, for a legal person, the greater of $10 million and three times the value of the benefit derived from the deceptive conduct, or, if that amount cannot be reasonably determined, 3% of the legal person’s annual worldwide gross revenue. The penalty for each subsequent offence could be as high as $15 million. A “product” within the meaning of the Competition Act may be an article (real or personal property of every description) or a service.13 This new provision expressly requires any person or business to base their environmental claims on “an adequate and proper test”.14 A “test” within the meaning of this Act consists in an analysis, verification or assessment intended to demonstrate the result or alleged effect of a product. It does not necessarily have to be a scientific method nor do the results need to meet a test of certainty, as the courts have generally interpreted the term “proper” to mean fit, apt, suitable or as required by the circumstances.15 With regard to misleading claims, the courts16 have clarified the nature of the criteria that must be considered to determine whether a particular test is “adequate and proper.” Thus, an adequate and proper test depends on the claim made as understood by the common person. The test must also meet the following criteria: It must be reflective of the risk or harm which the product is designed to prevent or assist in preventing. It must be done under controlled circumstances or in conditions which exclude external variables or take account in a measurable way for such variables. It must be conducted on more than one independent sample wherever possible (e.g., destruction testing may be an exception). The results need not be measured against a test of certainty, but must be reasonable given the nature of the harm at issue and establish that it is the product itself which causes the desired effect in a material manner. It must be performed regardless of the size of the seller’s organization or the anticipated volume of sales.17 Representations accompanying product that come from a person outside Canada are deemed to be made by the person who imports the product into Canada.18 General claims about a company’s activities While Bill C-59 was initially intended to cover only environmental statements, warranties or guarantees regarding products, the assented version of the bill provides that any representation made regarding the benefits of a business or business activity for protecting or restoring the environment or mitigating the environmental and ecological causes or effects of climate change are subject to a Bureau inquiry.19 As an example cited by the Bureau, a company’s claims about being “carbon neutral” or that it commits to becoming so within a certain number of years20 would constitute “representations of the benefits of a business or business activity in mitigating the causes of climate change.” The company making such claims must be able to demonstrate that they are based on “adequate and proper substantiation” obtained using an “internationally recognized methodology”.21 The Competition Act does not specify which internationally recognized methods may be used for this purpose. Should the substantiation the company uses be inadequate, improper or obtained using a method that is not recognized internationally, it will be subject to the same consequences as those mentioned in the previous section.22 Regardless of whether the claims concern a product or service or a business activity, the persons concerned are allowed to defend themselves under the Competition Act by establishing that they exercised due diligence.23 What impact will these amendments really have? Notwithstanding the proposed legislative amendment, the Competition Act already covers false or misleading representations with respect to green advertising.24 The current provisions already prohibit making representations to the public that are false or misleading in a material respect.25 In recent years, several complaints of greenwashing have been lodged with the Bureau on that basis, prompting it to open a number of investigations. Some have led to major settlements involving companies having made representations regarding their products.26/27/28/29 In all of these cases, the heavy burden of establishing that the business’s environmental claim was false or misleading fell on the Bureau. The proposed amendments to the Competition Act would change this by shifting the burden of proof onto businesses. The onus would therefore be on them to demonstrate that their product benefits the environment in some way or mitigates the environmental and ecological effects of climate change or that its claims are based on adequate and proper substantiation obtained using an internationally recognized method. These new legislative provisions now confirm what was already a general standard since 1999, and they ease the Bureau’s burden of proof. In addition to the Competition Act, other laws applicable in Quebec provide a general framework for greenwashing, such as the Consumer Protection Act.30Under this Act, no merchant, manufacturer or advertiser may, by any means whatsoever, make false or misleading claims to a consumer, which implicitly includes greenwashing.31 To determine whether a representation constitutes a prohibited practice, the general impression it gives, and, as the case may be, the literal meaning of the terms used therein must be taken into account. In particular, it is prohibited to falsely ascribe particular advantages to a product or service, or to claim that a product has a particular feature or ascribe certain characteristics of performance to it.33 Offences are subject to criminal34 and civil35 penalties. Private remedies Another new measure to combat greenwashing in the Competition Act is the possibility for any person (individual, organization, competitor, etc.) to apply directly to the Competition Tribunal for an order against a business making environmental claims or representations about a product, service or activities without adequate substantiation.36 In the first version of Bill C-59, only the Commissioner of Competition could institute such proceedings before the Tribunal.37 However, the Competition Tribunal must first give leave to make such an application.38 The Tribunal’s power to give leave is largely discretionary, meaning that the Tribunal may grant it if it deems that it is in the public interest to do so.39 This new measure will come into force in one year on June 20, 2025.40 Best practices It is crucial for a company to adopt and display a realistic image of its environmental impact based on credible data and facts. Making sure that claims are legally compliant is not all that’s at stake. A business’s failure to do the above is likely to seriously harm not only its reputation, but also its relationship with its stakeholders. Thus, before claiming to be “green,” businesses must consider the following questions. Are the real motivations behind the business’s sustainability commitments clear, legitimate and convincing? Is sustainable development an integral part of the business strategy? Is it applied when addressing key business issues and taking new actions? Does the company have a sustainable development policy that is credible and based on relevant issues? Was it developed collaboratively with and approved by its Board of Directors? Has the company set specific, clear, measurable and achievable objectives and targets? Considerations for public companies As concerns public companies subject to continuous disclosure obligations under Canadian securities legislation (“reporting issuers”), these considerations are set against a backdrop of increasing pressure from investors, including institutional investors, and others for greater transparency on climate-related issues. Although climate-related disclosure requirements for Canadian reporting issuers are still relatively limited, many issuers choose to voluntarily disclose such information, for example in sustainability reports. Reporting issuers must pay particular attention to their communications, which could constitute greenwashing within the meaning of the Competition Act and give rise to the penalties and other consequences mentioned above. This is another risk to add to reporting issuers’ liability in the secondary market for misrepresentation and failure to make disclosures within prescribed time limits. As far as climate issues are concerned, the risk arises in particular from overestimating or inadequately disclosing how activities contribute to protecting the environment or how they mitigate the environmental and ecological effects of climate change. The current move towards standardized methodologies and frameworks and the forthcoming adoption of binding rules on climate-related disclosures should help to limit greenwashing in this context. In the meantime, reporting issuers can reduce the risk of greenwashing by following a well-established international methodology and by including disclaimers for forward-looking statements adapted to the risks and uncertainties inherent to the climate-related information they provide. Conclusion The new provisions of the Competition Act are already having an impact. As a precaution, some companies have removed ads, promotional documents and websites containing claims that certain activities were undertaken specifically to mitigate the causes of climate change. Parliament’s message could not be clearer: Shifting the burden of proof onto businesses means closing the door on an era when products, services and business activities could be marketed as green in the absence of tangible evidence. Definition of the Autorité des marchés financiers: 8 questions and answers about carbon credits and related concepts | AMF (lautorite.qc.ca). Definition of the Competition Bureau: Environmental claims and greenwashing (canada.ca). Assembly Bill No. 1305: Voluntary carbon market disclosures, California, 2023. Read it here: Bill Text – AB-1305 Voluntary carbon market disclosures. Décret no 2022-539 du 13 avril 2022 relatif à la compensation carbone et aux allégations de neutralité carbone dans la publicité, Journal officiel de la République française, 2022. Read it here: Légifrance – Publications officielles – Journal officiel – JORF n° 0088 du 14/04/2022 (legifrance.gouv.fr). Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU as regards empowering consumers for the green transition through better protection against unfair practices and better information, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 2022. Read it here: pdf(europa.eu). Read it here: KFTC Proposes Amendment to Review Guidelines Regarding Greenwashing – Kim & Chang (kimchang.com). An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session. Read it here: Government Bill (House of Commons) C-59 (44-1) – First Reading – Fall Economic Statement Implementation Act, 2023 – Parliament of Canada. The Bill is currently at second reading in the House of Commons. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34. These provisions came into force on June 20, 2024. This power to make inquiry would be available, as the Competition Act already provides, upon receipt of a complaint signed by six persons who are not less than 18 years of age or in any situation where the Commissioner has reason to believe that a person has contravened section 74.01 of the Competition Act (see R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, ss. 9 and 10). An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, section 236. Read it here: Government Bill (House of Commons) C-59 (44-1) – First Reading – Fall Economic Statement Implementation Act, 2023 – Parliament of Canada; section 236 of this Act adds paragraphs b.1 and b.2 to subsection 74.01(1) of the Competition Act. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, article 74.1. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, subsection 2(1). An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, para. 236(1). Read it here: Government Bill (House of Commons) C-59 (44-1) – First Reading – Fall Economic Statement Implementation Act, 2023 – Parliament of Canada The Commissioner of Competition v. Imperial Brush Co. Ltd. and Kel Kem Ltd. (c.o.b. as Imperial Manufacturing Group), 2008 CACT 2, paras. 122 et seq. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, section 74.09: “courts” means the Competition Tribunal, the Federal Court and the superior court of a province. The Commissioner of Competition v. Imperial Brush Co. Ltd. and Kel Kem Ltd. (c.o.b. as Imperial Manufacturing Group), 2008 CACT 2. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, subsections 74.03(1) and (2). An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, section 236. Read it here: Government Bill (House of Commons) C-59 (44-1) – First Reading – Fall Economic Statement Implementation Act, 2023 – Parliament of Canada; paragraph b.2 of section 74.01 of the Competition Act was added by amendment adopted on May 28, 2024. Letter from Anthony Durocher and Bradley Callaghan to the Honourable Pamela Wallin dated May 31, 2024. Read it here: BANC_Follow-up_CompetitionBureau_e.pdf (sencanada.ca). An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, section 236. Read it here: Government Bill (House of Commons) C-59 (44-1) – First Reading – Fall Economic Statement Implementation Act, 2023 – Parliament of Canada. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, article 74.1. Competition Act, subsection 74.1(3). Louis-Philippe Lampron, “L’encadrement juridique de la publicité écologique fausse ou trompeuse au Canada : une nécessité pour la réalisation du potentiel de la consommation écologique?” Revue de Droit de l’Université de Sherbrooke, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2005, p. 474. Read it here: A:\lampron.wpd (usherbrooke.ca). Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, paragraph 74.01(1)(a). Amanda Stephenson, Des groupes écologistes misent sur la Loi sur la concurrence(Environmental groups banking on the Competition Act), October 1, 2023, La Presse. Read it here: Des groupes écologistes misent sur la Loi sur la concurrence | La Presse. Brenna Owen, Un groupe accuse Lululemon d’« écoblanchiment » et demande une enquête (A group accuses Lululemon of “greenwashing” and calls for an investigation) February 13, 2024, La Presse. Read it here: Un groupe accuse Lululemon d’« écoblanchiment » et demande une enquête | La Presse. Martin Vallières, “Gare aux tromperies écologiques” (Beware of greenwashing), January 26, 2022, La Presse. Read it here: Écoblanchiment | Gare aux tromperies écologiques | La Presse; Keurig Canada to pay $3 million penalty to settle Competition Bureau’s concerns over coffee pod recycling claims – Canada.ca. The Commissioner of Competition v. Volkswagen Group Canada Inc. and Audi Canada Inc., 2018 Competition Tribunal 13. Consumer Protection Act, CQLR c. P-40.1, ss. 219, 220 and 221. Definition of the Competition Bureau: Environmental claims and greenwashing (canada.ca). Richard v. Time Inc., 2012 SCC 8, paras. 46 to 57. Consumer Protection Act, CQLR c. P-40.1, ss. 220 and 221. Consumer Protection Act, CQLR c P-40.1, ss. 277 to 279: Fines range from $600 to $15 000 in the case of a natural person and $2 000 to $100 000 in the case of a legal person. Offenders convicted a second time are liable to fines twice as high as those prescribed. Id. at ss. 271 to 276: Consumers may request that the contract be annulled, that the merchant’s obligation be performed or that their obligation be reduced, among other things. For civil matters only; An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, subsection 254(1). See subsection 103.1(1) of the Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, effective before June 20, 2024. An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, subsection 254(1). Id. at 254(4). An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, section 272.

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June 5, 2024

Almost two years after the issuance of the Single-use Plastics Prohibition Regulations, where do we stand and how are businesses affected?

On December 20, 2022, the federal government's Single-Use Plastics Prohibition Regulations1 (the “Regulations”) gradually came into force, with the effect, as the name suggests, of prohibiting (or restricting, in certain cases) the manufacture, import and sale of certain single-use plastics that pose a threat to the environment. In principle, it is now prohibited to manufacture, import and sell certain single-use plastic products made entirely or partially of plastic, such as foodservice ware, checkout bags and straws. On June 20, 2024, beverage ring carriers and flexible straws packaged with beverage containers have been added to this list.2 However, there are cases currently pending before the courts that have the potential to change the situation. Currently contested: the Regulations and the Order A contestation to the Regulations has been before the Federal Court since July 15, 2022, in an application for judicial review brought by Petro Plastics Corporation Ltd et al3 (the “Petro Plastics Case”). However, the parties to this case have asked for it to be suspended pending a final judgment in another case4 brought by the Responsible Plastics Use Coalition (the “Coalition Case”).5 In the Coalition case, the validity of the order by which plastic products were added to the list of toxic substances in Schedule 1 of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (“CEPA”)6 is called into question. The Federal Court of Appeal will soon hear this case and render a judgment that will affect the Petro Plastics case. On November 16, 2023, in the Coalition Case, the Federal Court ruled in favour of the Coalition, retroactively quashing the Order Adding a Toxic Substance to Schedule 1 to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (the “Order”) and declaring it invalid and unlawful as of April 23, 2021.7 Essentially, the Federal Court had two main reasons for concluding that the registration was illegal. Findings of the Federal Court Order found unreasonable The Federal Court concluded that the Order was unreasonable because the evidence that the federal government had in hand did not support the conclusion that all plastic manufactured articles were toxic within the meaning of CEPA. On the contrary, the evidence showed that certain plastic manufactured articles included in the scope of the Schedule 1 list were not toxic. According to the Federal Court, the government acted outside its authority by listing the broad category of plastic manufactured articles on Schedule 1 in an unqualified manner. Order found unconstitutional The Federal Court also concluded that the Order was unconstitutional because it did not fall within the federal government’s criminal law power. Only substances that are toxic in “the real sense” can be included on the list of toxic substances. They must be substances that are harmful, dangerous to the environment or human life, and truly have the potential to cause harm. In other words, according to the Federal Court, the power to regulate the broad and exhaustive category of “single-use plastics” lies with the provinces. The Attorney General of Canada appealed this decision with the Federal Court of Appeal on December 8, 2023. The Federal Court of Appeal granted a stay of the judgment rendered on November 16, 2023, until disposition of the appeal,8 such that the Order and the Regulations remain in force, at least for the time being. If the Federal Court of Appeal upholds the decision that the Federal Court rendered on November 16, 2023, this will affect the validity of the Regulations. Under section 90 of CEPA, a substance can only be added to Schedule 1 by order if the federal government determines that it is toxic within the meaning of CEPA, and, under section 93 of CEPA, the government only has the power to regulate such a substance after it has been added to the list. The plastic items in question Subject to the outcome of the court cases discussed above, here is the exhaustive list of items that the Regulations prohibit: Single-use plastic ring carriers designed to surround beverage containers in order to carry them together.9 Single-use plastic stir sticks designed to stir or mix beverages or to prevent a beverage from spilling from the lid of its container.10 Single-use plastic foodservice ware that (a) is formed in the shape of a clamshell container, lidded container, box, cup, plate or bowl, (b) is designed to serve or transport ready-to-eat food or beverages and (c) contains certain materials.11 Single-use plastic checkout bags designed to carry purchased goods from a business and : (a) whose plastic is not a fabric,12 or (b) whose plastic is a fabric that will break or tear, as the case may be, (i) if it is used to carry 10 kg over a distance of 53 m 100 times; (ii) if it is washed in accordance with the washing procedures specified for a single domestic wash in the International Organization for Standardization standard ISO 6330, as amended from time to time.13 Single-use plastic cutlery that is formed in the shape of a fork, knife, spoon, spork or chopstick and that (a) contains polystyrene or polyethylene; or (b) changes its physical properties after being run through an electrically operated household dishwasher 100 times.14 Single-use plastic straws that either (a) contain polystyrene or polyethylene, or (b) change their physical properties after being run through an electrically operated household dishwasher 100 times. Exceptions Single-use flexible plastic straws Single-use flexible plastic straws, i.e., those with a corrugated section that allows the straw to bend and maintain its position at various angles,15 may be manufactured and imported.16 These flexible straws may also be sold in any of the following circumstances:17 The sale does not take place in a commercial, industrial, or institutional setting. This exception means that individuals can sell such flexible straws. The sale is between businesses in packages of at least 20 straws. The sale of a package of 20 or more straws is between a retail store and a customer if the customer requests straws and the package is not displayed in a manner that permits the customer to view the package without the help of a store employee.18 The sale of straws is between a retail store and a customer, if the straw is packaged together with a beverage container and the packaging was done at a location other than the retail store. The sale is between a care facility, such as a hospital or long-term care facility, and its patients or residents. Export of single-use plastic items All the manufactured single-use plastic items listed above may be manufactured, imported or sold for export until December 20, 2025.19 That said, any person who manufactures or imports such items for export will be required to keep a record of certain information and documents as appropriate for each type of plastic manufactured item.20 Records of the information and documents will have to be kept for at least five years in Canada.21 Conclusion: an opportunity to rethink the use of plastics In the short term, businesses will need to start thinking about how they will replace the plastic manufactured items they use. To help businesses select alternatives to single-use plastic items, the federal government has released its Guidance for selecting alternatives to the single-use plastics in the proposed Single-Use Plastics Prohibition Regulations.m22 According to this document, the aim should be to reduce plastics. Businesses may begin by considering whether a single-use plastic product should be replaced or no longer provided. Only products that perform essential functions should be replaced with non-plastic equivalents. Stir sticks and straws can be eliminated most of the time. Another way to reduce waste is to opt for reusable products and packaging. Businesses are invited to rethink their products and services to provide reusable options. Reusable container programs (i.e., offering customers the option of bringing their own reusable containers) are a reuse option that businesses may want to consider, in particular to reduce the amount of plastic foodservice ware. Only where reusable products are not feasible should businesses substitute a single-use plastic product with a recyclable single-use alternative. In such cases, businesses are encouraged to contact local recycling facilities to ensure that they can successfully recycle the products at their end of life. Ultimately, charging consumers for certain single-use alternatives (e.g., single-use wooden or moulded fibre cutlery) may also discourage their use. SOR/2022-138 Regulations, ss. 3 (2), s. 11 and ss. 13 (4) Petro Plastics Corporation Ltd et al v Canada (Attorney General), Court File No. T-1468-22. Order registered on April 23, 2021 and published in the Canada Gazette on May 12, 2021 Court File No. T-824-21 S.C. 1999, c. 33 Responsible Plastic Use Coalition v. Canada (Environment and Climate Change) 2023 FC 1511 2024 FCA 18 Regulations, s. 1 and 3 Regulations, s. 1 and 6 Regulations, s. 1 and 6 “Any material woven, knitted, crocheted, knotted, braided, felted, bonded, laminated or otherwise produced from, or in combination with, a textile fibre” as defined in section 2 of the Textile Labelling Act, RSC 1985, c. T-10 Regulations, s. 1 and 6 Regulations, s. 1 and 4 and ss. 5 (1) Regulations, s. 1 Ibid, s. 4 Regulations, ss. 5 (2)–(6) According to Guidance for selecting alternatives to the single-use plastics in the proposed Single-Use Plastics Prohibition Regulations, the goal is to ensure that people with disabilities who need flexible single-use plastic straws continue to have access to them at home and can carry them to restaurants and other premises. Regulations, ss. 2 (2), s. 10 and ss. 13 (5). Ibid., s. 8 Ibid, ss. 9 (1). https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/managing-reducing-waste/consultations/proposed-single-use-plastics-prohibition-regulations-consultation-document.html

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March 13, 2024

An insurer ordered to pay damages – The Court of Appeal intervenes

On February 12, 2024, the Court of Appeal of Quebec handed down its decision in Société d’assurance Beneva inc. c. Bordeleau,1 dealing in particular with the burden of proof incumbent on an insurer when it denies coverage on the basis of an insured’s intentional fault, and an award of damages against an insurer for breach of its duty of good faith. The facts This decision was rendered further to a dispute between Société d’assurance Beneva inc. (hereinafter the “Insurer") and some of its insureds, including Mr. Michel Bordeleau, the owner of a multi-storey rental building that was damaged by fire. He lived in one of the units with his parents. According to the uncontested expert evidence presented, the fire originated in one of the storage spaces in the basement of the building, which was assigned to a lessee couple. Access to the basement and all storage spaces was locked. The cause of the fire was deemed to be intentional, given the traces of accelerant found in the area of the fire’s origin. The instigator or instigators were not identified. On November 21, 2016, 60 days after the fire, the Insurer denied coverage because of the intentional nature of the fire, which it attributed to its insured, Mr. Bordeleau. A few months later, on March 22, 2017, it reached an agreement with Mr. Bordeleau’s hypothecary creditor. The subrogation release provides for the Insurer’s payment of the balance of the hypothecary debt of $149,720.99, and subrogation to the creditor’s rights up to the amount paid. Mr. Bordeleau, in his belief that he had been harmed by the Insurer’s decision, instituted legal proceedings to recover the insurance benefit to which he claimed to be entitled, while also claiming damages. The Insurer filed a cross-application for recovery of the balance paid to the hypothecary creditor. The trial The trial judge, relying on the evidence, concluded that although the fire was intentional in nature, the Insurer had not discharged its burden of establishing the insured’s involvement in the fire. Taking this conclusion into account, she then proceeded to analyze the plaintiffs’ claim and to weigh the damages in light of the evidence and the limits of the insurance policy. In particular, she ruled in favour of Mr. Bordeleau’s claim for damages for the building, the amount of which was admitted. In addition, she ordered the Insurer to pay $15,000.00 in damages for nuisance and inconvenience caused by its conduct, which she considered faulty. This conclusion was based on the Insurer’s duty to act in good faith, to consider the facts and act on their basis, and to conduct a full investigation, duty which the Insurer had breached by failing to sufficiently follow-up on leads that could have identified who was responsible for the fire. In order to deny coverage, clear and compelling evidence of the insured’s involvement, going beyond mere suspicion, was necessary. Given the sometimes implausible and sometimes contradictory testimonies of the people met during the investigation, there was no such evidence. In other words, the claims adjuster had jumped to conclusions. In light of her conclusions, the trial judge dismissed the Insurer’s cross-application, which she deemed to be unfounded, without giving further reasons. The appeal The Court of Appeal first refrained from intervening in light of the Superior Court’s conclusions regarding the failure to demonstrate Mr. Bordeleau’s involvement in the fire. It did however intervene on the damages awarded for nuisance and inconvenience suffered by the insureds, and pointed out the following: [40] [translation] Firstly, apart from the strict mathematical calculation of the amounts payable, and perhaps other technical aspects not requiring the exercise of judgment, the processing of a claim is an obligation of means, not one of result. The fact that a court found at the end of a trial held many years after the incident that an insurer should have covered in the first place obviously does not mean that the insurer necessarily committed a fault other than its refusal to pay, making it civilly liable, let alone that it acted in bad faith. [41] In this case, there was nothing in the evidence to support a finding of fault or breach of the duty of good faith. [42] On the contrary, there is enough evidence to conclude that the investigation by the appellant and its experts, which led to the denial of coverage, was not botched. . . . In the opinion of the Court of Appeal, the evidence showed that the Insurer’s investigation had been done in a conscientious manner, in particular because it had transferred the claim file to a special investigative unit, mandated a fire origin and cause expert and external investigators, and interviewed many witnesses who could have provided information on the circumstances of the incident. Moreover, it had no allegations that the Insurer had failed to consider exculpatory evidence against its insured. In this context, although it took several years for the insured to obtain his due, with all the inconveniences of going through proceedings, the Insurer’s conduct could not be considered offending or revealing of bad faith. No damages could be awarded. Lastly, the Court of Appeal took a closer look at the question of the Insurer’s subrogation to the hypothecary creditor’s rights, which was little discussed in the judgment under appeal. Reiterating the fundamental principle in property and casualty insurance that the indemnification of an insured cannot result in enrichment, the Court of Appeal concluded that dismissing the Insurer’s cross-application would have such an effect. In addition to receiving an insurance benefit for the damages sustained, Mr. Bordeleau would also have had seen his hypothecary debt discharged. This would have given him a clear advantage. In this case, the benefit paid to the hypothecary creditor needed to be deducted from the damages claimed by the insured. The trial judge’s finding were thus revised accordingly. Conclusion Despite the clear principles addressed in this case, the Court of Appeal’s analysis points to practical difficulties that insureds and insurers can encounter when dealing with similar claims. It points to the coexistence of two factors that can be difficult to balance: First, the burden of proof where coverage is denied on the basis of the insured's intentional fault, and second, the insurer’s obligation of means in processing the associated claim. The dismissal of a coverage defence does not in itself warrant awarding damages. Société d’assurance Beneva inc. c. Bordeleau, 2024 QCCA 171

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