Adoption of Bill 82: The insurer’s duty to defend can now be adjusted

June 8, 2021

On Thursday, May 27, 2021, article 2503 of the Civil Code of Québec was amended as part of the adoption of Bill 82, titled An Act respecting mainly the implementation of certain provisions of the budget speech of 10 March 2020, which we had discussedin a publication last December.

The added paragraph provides that in cases to be provided for by regulation, it will now be possible to depart from the insurer's duty to defend and the exclusive allocation of insurance coverage to injured third parties, within the meaning of article 2500 of the Civil Code of Quebec:

2503. The insurer is bound to take up the interest of any person entitled to the benefit of the insurance and assume his defence in any action brought against him.

Legal costs and expenses resulting from actions against the insured, including those of the defence, and interest on the proceeds of the insurance are borne by the insurer over and above the proceeds of the insurance.

However, the Government may, by regulation, determine categories of insurance contracts that may depart from those rules and from the rule set out in article 2500, as well as classes of insureds that may be covered by such contracts. The Government may also prescribe any standard applicable to those contracts

This legislative amendment confirms the government’s desire to allow contractual limits to certain rules of public order previously applicable to liability insurance for “categories of insurance contracts” and certain “classes of insureds” to be established by regulation. According to the May 12, 2021 debates, the government does not intend to include insurance contracts for individuals and small and medium-sized businesses in the categories covered. Instead, Finance Minister Éric Girard referred to public companies and insurance for directors and officers. This is what he said when the bill was presented for adoption last May 27:

In terms of insurance, there is also a change in defence costs, which can be excluded from the insurer’s liability, because we had, in Quebec’s Civil Code, a distinction with the rest of Canada that put large public companies in Quebec at a disadvantage with respect to their competitors. That is to say that insurance premiums for directors and officers were much higher in Quebec, and now, with what we are introducing here, we will be able to make a difference and help our companies to grow and encourage head offices to be here.

We will continue to closely monitor the presentation of the regulation that will specify the departures allowed under the new article 2503 of the Civil Code of Québec.

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Dominic Boisvert
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October 29, 2024

Employers’ Right to Require Medical Certificates: New Restrictions as of January 1, 2025

Quebec is currently facing a major shortage of physicians. To remedy the situation, several ministers in the CAQ government announced in early 2024 that significant changes would be implemented to reduce physicians’ administrative burden. In this context, on October 9, 2024, the National Assembly assented to Bill 68, An Act mainly to reduce the administrative burden of physicians.1 The provisions of the Act The new Act comprises 11 sections, many of which introduce amendments to the Act respecting labour standards2 (ALS) by restricting the right of employers to require documents attesting to the reasons for certain absences. Under the current legislation, an employer may be entitled to require a document from an employee who misses work owing to sickness in order to assess the reasons for the absence, its duration, or the employee’s ability to return to work. This is because, under the terms of a contract of employment,3every employer is entitled to expect their employee to fully perform the work agreed upon. Depending on the circumstances, the supporting document provided must in some instances indicate a specific medical diagnosis, an estimated duration of absence and other details relevant to handling the employee’s absence. In keeping with these principles, section 79.2 of the ALS provided that an employer informed of an absence owing to sickness, an organ or tissue donation, an accident, domestic violence, sexual violence or a criminal offence may, “[i]f it is warranted by the duration of the absence or its repetitive nature, for instance, [...] request that the employee furnish a document attesting to those reasons.” According to arbitral jurisprudence4 and that of the Administrative Labour Tribunal5, unwarranted refusal to provide such a document may constitute valid grounds for imposing an administrative or disciplinary measure, depending on the circumstances. That said, the new Act as adopted changes this balance. Indeed, a paragraph has been added to section 79.2 of the ALS specifying that “[...] no employer may request the document referred to in the first paragraph for the first three periods of absence not exceeding three consecutive days taken over a period of 12 months.” It will therefore be prohibited to require a supporting document, including a medical certificate, for the first three short-term absences (less than four days) occurring over the 12 preceding months. According to the comments of the Minister of Labour, such calculation of absences is to begin with the first absence during the year rather than as of January 1st of each year.6 The Act does not provide for an exception in cases where absences are excessive or otherwise questionable. Under which conditions will employers be entitled to require a medical certificate? Under the Act, employers retain the right to require a medical certificate where the absence is likely to last four consecutive days or more. What is more, the provision does not deny employers the right to investigate situations that appear questionable. The aforementioned prohibition will also apply to employers whose employees are governed by the Act respecting labour relations, vocational training and workforce management in the construction industry.7 Furthermore, the Act includes an amendment to the provisions relating to family or parental leave and absences. The third paragraph of section 79.7 of the ALS is amended so as to prevent employers from requiring a medical certificate to justify such absences. However, we believe this amendment in no way affects their right to require any other type of documentation, particularly as regards obligations relating to daycare services or educational institutions. Where an offence is committed, the penal provisions already included in sections 139 to 147 of the ALS apply. As these amendments are of public order and take precedence over any contract, policy or collective agreement, any measure imposed on an employee that would contravene any of these new obligations may be deemed invalid or result in a prohibited practice complaint. How will the Act affect insurers and employee benefit plan administrators? On another note, the Act mainly to reduce the administrative burden of physicians also introduces a new prohibition applicable to insurers and employee benefit plan administrators. They will no longer be entitled to require that a medical service, such as a consultation, be received in order to reimburse the cost of services or a technical aid, nor will they be entitled to require that a medical service be received at a predetermined frequency different from that considered appropriate by the attending physician for the purpose of maintaining the payment of disability benefits. Coming into force The amendments to the ALS will come into force as of January 1, 2025. The amendments concerning insurers and employee benefit plan administrators will apply subsequently at a date or dates to be set by the Government. S.Q., 2024, c. 29. CQLR, c. N-1.1. Civil Code of Québec, CQLR, c. CCQ-1991, art. 2085. See in particular the case law cited in Linda Bernier, Guy Blanchet and Éric Séguin, Les mesures disciplinaires et non disciplinaires dans les rapports collectifs du travail, 2nd ed. Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, loose-leaf, updated to May 30, 2024, paras. 1.055 et seq. See in particular : Marchessault et CPE Les Petits Adultes, 2019 QCTAT 1632, paras. 37–38; Labourdette et Protecteur du citoyen, 2019 QCTAT 4831, para. 52. COMMITTEE ON LABOUR AND THE ECONOMY, Clause-by-clause consideration of Bill 68, An Act mainly to reduce the administrative burden of physicians, October 1, 2024. CQLR, c. R-20.

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October 2, 2024

Proof of incapacity: analysis of CIUSSS de L’Ouest-de-L’île-de-Montréal (ST. Mary’s Hospital Center) c. R.C.

PROOF OF INCAPACITY: ANALYSIS OF CIUSSS DE L’OUEST-DE-L’ÎLE-DE-MONTRÉAL (ST. MARY’S HOSPITAL CENTER) c. R.C.1 Summary The authors comment on this decision rendered on September 20, 2024, in which the Court of Appeal ruled on the capacity to consent to care in the presence of a psychiatric disorder. The Court of Appeal overturned the first instance decision, which had found the respondent capable of refusing treatment with antipsychotic medications even though he had refuted his diagnosis, because he understood the benefits that antipsychotic medications could afford him and refused to take them because of their side effects. The Court of Appeal rather concluded that the trial judge had misapplied the five criteria to be used to assess whether a person is capable of consenting to care, particularly in the context where (i) the trial judge’s conclusion ran counter to the uncontradicted opinion of an expert; and (ii) there was much evidence supporting the fact that the respondent was incapable of making an informed decision. INTRODUCTION In this case, the Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’Ouest-de-l'Île-de-Montréal (the “CIUSSS”) appealed a decision rendered by the Superior Court on March 14, 2024, dismissing its application for an authorization to provide care to R.C., a 51-year-old man. The Superior Court had concluded that the CIUSSS had not proven that the respondent was incapable of consenting to care. The Court of Appeal was thus called upon to review the trial judge’s answer to the first question (incapacity to consent) in the analytical framework2 surrounding the test that has now been used for three decades.3 THE FACTS R.C. has a complex medical history. He was hospitalized several times between 2007 and 2019 for mental health issues, including suicidal ideation and personality disorders. In 2021, he was admitted to the CHUM for COVID-19-related complications having resulted in brain damage caused by hypoxia. From 2022 onwards, he made repeated visits to the emergency room, often to obtain benzodiazepines, leading him to become addicted. Even though he adhered to treatment with antipsychotic medication for a time, R.C. stopped taking his medication because of undesirable side effects. In January 2024, after an episode of confusion, he was taken to hospital where he was diagnosed with late-onset schizophrenia. However, R.C. refuted the diagnosis, claiming that his health problems were caused by an artificial intelligence device he believed had been implanted in his body. The psychiatrists who assessed him concluded that he was incapable of consenting to care. On February 16, 2024, the CIUSSS filed an application for authorization to re-hospitalize R.C. and administer antipsychotic medications, despite his categorical refusal. After analyzing the evidence, which essentially consisted of R.C.’s testimony and that of the CIUSSS psychiatrist, the Superior Court concluded that R.C. understood the nature of his condition and the benefits of the proposed treatment, despite his refusal to accept his diagnosis. The Court was of the opinion that the CIUSSS psychiatrists, in their analysis of R.C.’s capacity, had erroneously and repeatedly carried over his rejection of the diagnosis in a cascading fashion in their analysis of the five criteria from the decision in A.G.,4 thereby making the same error as the one that the Court of Appeal had identified in the M.H. decision.5 Despite the absence of a second opinion on R.C.’s capacity, the Superior Court had determined that he was able to consent to his care. According to the trial judge, in keeping with the teachings of the Court of Appeal in the F.D. decision,6 he therefore lacked jurisdiction to order care. For this reason, he dismissed the application for an authorization to provide care. THE COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION The Court of Appeal began by reiterating the five criteria for assessing a person’s capacity, namely: Does the person understand the nature of the illness for which treatment is proposed? Does the person understand the nature and purpose of the treatment? Does the person understand the risks and benefits involved in undergoing the treatment? Does the person understand the risks involved in not undergoing the treatment? ls the capacity to consent to treatment affected by the patient's illness?7 It pointed out that the criteria are not cumulative and that it is incumbent upon the trier to assess them as a whole.8 Moreover, the mere fact that a person refuses care that would be in their best interest is not enough to conclude that the person is incapable,9 nor is their mere rejection of their diagnosis.10 In this case, the Court of Appeal considered that the Superior Court judge had committed a palpable and overriding error making its intervention warranted. It stated that the trial judge was obliged to express an opinion on whether the evidence proffered was sufficient, adding that the judge had a proactive role to play in protecting the interests of the person involved. If the trial judge felt that a point that had not been the subject in a genuine adversarial debate raised a problem in his view, it was up to him to ask questions.11 Subsequently, the court took extracts from the evidence consisting of a psychiatric report and the testimony of its author and went on to note that the evidence did not allow the trial judge to conclude that R.C. was capable of consenting or refusing the proposed treatment plan, on the contrary. Based on the same evidence, the Court declared R.C. incapable of consenting to care and sent the case back to the Superior Court so that it could determine whether there was indeed categorical refusal and assess the terms of the treatment plan sought. AUTHORS’ COMMENTS This decision of the Court of Appeal follows approximately 20 other decisions12 respecting orders authorizing care handed down by this same court, which have all further established and clarified the guiding principles surrounding such orders since the F.D. decision of 2015.13 These successive decisions have not only added to case law, they have refined the assessment criteria and legal requirements pertaining to applications for authorization to provide care. Such a development in case law shows that the courts are committed to circumscribing complex healthcare situations. Doing so involves striking a balance between the rights to freedom and self-determination and the protection of those who are vulnerable or otherwise unable to consent. On July 6, 2015, the Court of Appeal of Quebec marked a decisive turning point where orders authorizing care are involved by rendering a decision that sent a clear message to the Superior Court, namely F.D. c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria).14 In that decision, an analytical framework was established to ensure compliance both with the provisions of the law and the spirit of the law. Since then, the Court has handed down some 20 other significant decisions, each shedding additional light. The guiding principles derived from these decisions can be summarized under the following themes: Rights relating to the judicial process Every person has the fundamental right to contest an application for a order authorizing care, to be heard and to be represented.15 The judge must proactively protect the user’s interests and ensure that they are represented by a lawyer.16 Scope of the care plan Requiring a definite care plan does not mean dictating which medication should be administered in a limitative way.17 A judge may remove certain substances from a treatment plan if they deem that to be in the patient’s best interest.18 It is crucial to draw a distinction between preventive care and a treatment plan that includes various alternatives as the situation evolves.19 For a future hospitalization clause to be valid, there must be a reasonable foreseeability of hospitalization.20 When a patient is to be placed, the application for authorization must indicate where they are to be placed.21 Physical restraint may only be used if it is necessary to avoid serious harm, and must be limited to the minimum.22 A parent’s refusal to consent to a treatment plan may not be warranted if the plan is in the child’s best interests.23 Duration of the authorization When the person concerned is not cooperating and access to their previous medical records is not available, the judge must be especially careful in assessing whether the proposed care plan is legal, in particular in terms of its duration and scope.24 The duration of the care order should be as short as reasonably possible, without compromising the effectiveness of the treatment.25 When a future hospitalization is contemplated, the judge must take into account the time required to stabilize the patient.26 The 30-day period for a future hospitalization should not be considered an absolute limit, as a longer period may be deemed necessary after a thorough analysis.27 The evidence The mere fact that a relationship exists between an expert and a party does not make the expert’s testimony inadmissible: The circumstances surrounding the expert’s role must be reviewed.28 An expert who does not know a patient’s reasons for refusing treatment is not deemed to have breached their duty to inform.29 An expert may testify to reported facts without the possibility of anyone opposing them; however, this does not mean that reported facts are proven, as the rules of evidence remain stringent in this context.30 An expert report may suffice as testimony; the judge need not require the patient’s testimony if the patient cannot understand the issues at hand.31 Applications for safeguard orders may be unsuccessful where there is no expert report and it is not demonstrated that the matter is urgent.32 This review highlights the significant advances that the courts have made in overseeing applications for orders authorizing care and protecting vulnerable people. The analytical framework established in the F.D. decision remains relevant, and subsequent decisions have further refined its questions. The decision that the Court of Appeal handed down in Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’Ouest-de-l'Île-de-Montréal c. R.C. is milestone in the jurisprudence on court orders authorizing care. By overturning the lower court’s judgment, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the need for a thorough assessment of the capacity to consent, emphasizing that the work of medical teams and applications made by healthcare institutions are important to ensure appropriate care. This decision not only underscores the fact that it is important to protect the rights of users, but also that the work of the court is crucial, for it must ensure that the criteria are met without substituting its opinion for that of the experts heard. CONCLUSION The decision discussed in this paper is part of a series of decisions that have clarified and enhanced the guiding principles established since the F.D. decision was handed down in 2015.33 The Court of Appeal has provided valuable guidelines for judges, institutions and healthcare professionals to use in their assessment of applications for authorization to provide care. Through a careful review of the circumstances of each case, the courts have shown that they are committed to effectively circumscribing complex health situations by ensuring that institutions have the tools they need to respond appropriately. Lastly, we must recognize that while progress has been made, there are still unresolved issues that need to be addressed. Recent court decisions, including the one that led to the R.C. decision,34 illustrate the importance of constant dialogue between those involved in the legal aspect of cases and those dealing with clinical realities. As jurisprudence continues to develop, paying close attention to future developments will be key to ensuring that healthcare institutions can act effectively in consideration of patients’ needs. 2024 QCCA 1231. F.D.c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. See the landmark decision, Institut Philippe Pinel de Montréal c. A.G., 1994 CanLII 6105 (QC CA). Institut Philippe Pinel de Montréal c. A.G., 1994 CanLII 6105 (QC CA). M.H. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2018 QCCA 1948, para. 57. F.D. c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. This decision, para. 13; with reference to Institut Philippe Pinel de Montréal c. A.G., 1994 CanLII 6105 (QC CA), pp. 28 to 33. This decision, para. 14; with reference to M. B. c. Centre hospitalier Pierre-le-Gardeur, 2004 CanLII 29017 (QC CA), para. 45; M.C. c. Service professionnel du Centre de santé et de services sociaux d’Arthabaska-et-de-L’Érable, 2010 QCCA 1114, para. 13. This decision, para. 14; with reference to M. B. c. Centre hospitalier Pierre-le-Gardeur, 2004 CanLII 29017 (QC CA), para. 46. This decision, para. 14, with reference to Starson v. Swayze, 2003 SCC 32, para. 79 and M.H. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2018 QCCA 1948, paras. 61–62. This decision, para. 18. We have excluded the following decisions from our analysis: Bédard c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Nord-de-l’Île-de-Montréal, 2023 QCCA 508; M.G. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2019 QCCA 203; S.F. c. CIUSSS de Centre-Ouest-de-l’île-de-Montréal – Hôpital général juif – Sir Mortimer B. Davis, 2021 QCCA 1531; P.L. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de la Montérégie-Centre, 2018 QCCA 318; N.G. c. Sir Mortimer B. Davis Jewish General Hospital, 2021 QCCA 1892; F.D. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2017 QCCA 1206. F.D.c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. Ibid. M.H.c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2018 QCCA 1948, paras. 68 and 69. A.N. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Nord-de-l’île-de-Montréal, 2022 QCCA 1167 , para. 30. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale c. D.M., 2017 QCCA 1333, para. 25. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean c. O.G., 2018 QCCA 345, paras. 15 and 16. C.R.c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux du Bas-St-Laurent, 2017 QCCA 328, para. 28. G.J. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de Laval, 2021 QCCA 1944, paras. 24 to 26. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Mauricie-et-du-Centre-du-Québec (CIUSSS MCQ) c. J.B., 2017 QCCA 1638,, paras. 30 to 35. X.Y.c. Hôpital général du Lakeshore, 2017 QCCA 1465, para. 20. A.P. c. Centre hospitalier universitaire Sainte-Justine, 2023 QCCA 58, para. 19. L.C. c. Centre hospitalier de l’Université de Montréal (CHUM), 2015 QCCA 1139, paras. 4 and 5. D.A. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux des Laurentides, 2016 QCCA 1734, para. 31. T.F. c. CIUSSS de l’Est-de-l’île-de-Montréal , 2022 QCCA 1306, para. 25. N.M. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de la Montérégie-Centre, 2022 QCCA1567, para. 17. M.G. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Centre-Sud-de-l’Île-de-Montréal , 2021 QCCA 1326, para. 11. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’Ouest-de-l’île-de-Montréal (Douglas Mental Health University Institute) c. I.A., 2023 QCCA 1100, para. 30. Institut universitaire en santé mentale Douglas c. W.M., 2016 QCCA 1081, para. 5 A.D. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Centre-Sud-de-l’île-de-Montréal, 2023 QCCA 1240, paras. 50, 56–57. A.F. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux des Laurentides, 2021 QCCA 928, para. 50. F.D. c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. CIUSSS de l'Ouest-de-l'Île-de-Montréal (St. Mary’s Hospital Center) c. R.C.,2024 QCCA 1231.

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September 19, 2024

Financing Quebec’s Energy Transition: Unlocking the Potential of Flow-Through Shares

Quebec has set ambitious energy transition and industrial decarbonization targets. The shift to greener practices has to be taken in a context where our energy consumption could rapidly grow under the combined effect of a number of factors, such as the reindustrialization of our economy, population growth, transport electrification and the potential for artificial intelligence to consume vast amounts of energy. Investing in the development of energy infrastructure is therefore critically important, as an abundance of energy is key to economic prosperity. The problem is that public finances are already stretched to the limit with the need to renovate our aging infrastructure, among other things. Encouraging private equity investment is thus vital, and tax incentives can be very effective in this respect. The American example In 2022, the United States passed its Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), with the goal of stimulating investment in the renewable energy sector, in particular. More specifically, the IRA altered or created a number of tax credits to encourage private investment.1 Over the past two years, US businesses have announced a total of almost US$276 billion in new investments in clean energy generation and the capturing or elimination of carbon dioxide and other forms of industrial decarbonization, an increase of 34% on the two years previous.2 The IRA is effective in that it takes the respective situations of various energy sector stakeholders into account in a creative, flexible and pragmatic way, especially where taxation is involved. Energy project promoters often have to wait many years for their projects to generate income and profits, even though the banks and other investment funds they solicit financing from can be presumed to be operating profitable businesses. The tax losses that occur in the years during which such projects are designed and built are therefore of little interest to developers, but of immediate interest to investors. And so, a tax equity market has emerged, in which businesses subject to taxes can invest in the shares of entities set up to develop such projects so as to benefit from tax credits and faster depreciation. Typically, the entity that cashes in the investment and develops the project distributes 99% of income, losses and tax credits to investors until a predetermined return is achieved. Once that return is achieved, the investor’s share of the benefits decreases, and the developer has the option of buying out the investor’s residual share. The IRA has transformed how federal clean energy tax credits are monetized, and it is now possible to buy and sell such credits without having to make a long-term investment. For businesses, this new way of doing things is an additional and attractive way to participate in the growing tax credit market.3 In 2023, the volume of the tax equity market for American projects was around US$20 to 21 billion, up about US$18 billion from the previous year.4 It appears that the trend will continue. It is estimated that the value of the current market, which is particularly attractive to banks, is set to double to US$50 billion a year by 2025.5 The equivalent of flow-through shares The Quebec and Canadian tax deductions mechanism that most closely resembles the US tax equity market is probably flow-through shares. Through these, businesses in the mining and renewable energy sectors can transfer their mining exploration expenses and other expenses—specifically designated as eligible—to investors, who can then deduct them from their own taxable incomes.6 These businesses can thus issue shares at a higher price than they would receive for common shares to finance their exploration and development operations. Investors are willing to pay a higher price in return for the tax deductions afforded by the eligible expenses incurred by the issuing businesses, which can amount to a maximum of 120% of the equity invested in the shares.7 Investors can also claim a 15% or 30% federal tax credit. However, because tax incentives cannot be transferred, our mechanism is more rigid than the American one, and it can only be applied to mineral exploration and development expenses and certain specific expenditures related to renewable energy and energy conservation projects, such as electricity generation using renewable sources like wind, solar energy and geothermal energy.8 With ambition and innovation comes the need to take action Quebec could draw inspiration from the IRA to increase the attractiveness of flow-through shares and broaden their scope of application, thereby creating a new tool to finance the energy transition. The renewable energy sector is similar to the mining sector in many respects, not least in terms of the considerable amount of capital required to build the infrastructure needed to operate a mine or energy generation facility. The flow-through share mechanism, which is well-established and popular with investors,9 could be just as successful in our energy transition context. Making such incentives easier to transfer would also drive the emergence of a market similar to the US tax equity market. A number of Québec flagship companies, such as Hydro-Québec,10 Innergex11 and Boralex,12 are also very ambitious when it comes to developing large-scale energy projects. They face major financing challenges, as do those in the industrial decarbonization and infrastructure renewal sectors. Innovation is necessary to meet these challenges and make the transition to a more sustainable, but just as prosperous, world, and to do so in good time.13 Link Rhodium Group and MIT’s Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR), Clean Investment Monitor, link Brandon Hill, How to take advantage of tax credit transferability though the Inflation Reduction Act, Thomson Reuters Institute, April 16, 2024, link Allison Good, Renewables project finance to keep pace in 2024, but tax equity rule looms, S&P Global, January 12, 2024, link Lesley Hunter and Mason Vliet, The Risk Profile of Renewable Energy Tax Equity Investments, American Council on Renewable Energy, December 2023, link Link, page in French only Link Link Prospectors & Developers Association of Canada, Flow-through shares & the mineral exploration tax credit explained, link Link Link Link The authors would like to acknowledge the participation and the work done by Sophie Poirier in this publication

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August 9, 2024

The elected domicile appearing in the Québec Enterprise Register cannot provide a basis for the Superior Court’s territorial jurisdiction within the meaning of article 41(3) of the Code of Civil Proce

Introduction On July 11, 2024, the Court of Appeal1 rendered a decision that, for the first time, addresses the question of whether the elected domicile appearing in the Québec Enterprise Register (the “REQ”), established under the Act respecting the legal publicity of enterprises,2 can provide a basis for the Superior Court’s territorial jurisdiction within the meaning of article 41(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure.3 Upholding the decision rendered by the Superior Court,4 the Court of Appeal answered that it cannot. The Facts On April 25, 2023, Promark Electronics Inc. and Electrical Components International Inc. (collectively, “Promark”) filed a claim for damages against Bombardier Recreational Products Inc. (“BRP”) in the judicial district of Montréal, alleging that a letter of agreement had been terminated and related purchase orders cancelled. On June 22, 2023, BRP raised a declinatory exception asking the court to issue an order transferring the case to the judicial district of Bedford, where its head office is located. Promark argued that filing its claim in the judicial district of Montréal was warranted because of BRP’s elected domicile indicated in the REQ, which corresponded to the office of its counsel located in Montréal. On September 5, 2023, the Honourable Tiziana Di Donato, J.S.C. (the “Judge”) allowed BRP’s declinatory exception and issued an order referring the case to the judicial district of Bedford. On November 10, 2023, the Honourable Stephen W. Hamilton, J.C.A., granted leave to appeal the Judge’s decision, indicating that the courts have never settled the question of whether the domicile elected under section 33 ALPE is sufficient to make paragraph 3 of article 41 of the C.C.P. apply. He added that it appeared to him that the lower courts had rendered contradictory judgments in this regard.5 The Trial Judgement The Judge began by pointing out that, generally, for a purely personal action, the judicial district of the defendant’s domicile is the natural forum (article 41(1) C.C.P.) and that, in the case of a corporation, the domicile would be that of its head office. The Judge further clarified this principle by explaining that, where more than one judicial district has jurisdiction, the plaintiff may institute its proceedings before another court having territorial jurisdiction (article 42 C.C.P.), provided that it establishes that it is entitled to make such an election. In support of its contestation to the declinatory exception, Promark argued that it was entitled to institute the proceedings in the judicial district of Montréal because BRP had elected its domicile under the ALPE, and that, consequently, that district constituted an “elected domicile” under article 41(3) C.C.P., which reads as follows: So far as public order permits, the court of the defendant’s elected domicile, or the court designated by an agreement between the parties other than a contract adhesion, also has territorial jurisdiction. [Our emphasis] To render her decision, the Judge determined that article 41(3) C.C.Q. should be interpreted using modern rules of statutory interpretation, adding in particular that it is useful to refer to prior provisions of a law to ascertain the legislature’s intent. The Judge thus revisited the legislative history of article 41 C.C.P., affirming that it essentially restates the prior law, in particular article 68 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR c. C-25, which provided in paragraph 1, subparagraph 1 that “. . . a purely personal action may be instituted: (1) [b]efore the court of the defendant’s real domicile or, in the cases contemplated by article 83 of the Civil Code, before that of his elected domicile.” Although paragraph 3 of article 41 C.C.P. no longer specifically refers to article 83 of the Civil Code of Québec (the “C.C.Q.”)6 the Judge, following an interpretive analysis, found that said article still applies to determine whether a party has elected domicile, and stressed the fact that the election of domicile must be express and unequivocal. The Judge added that election of domicile is the exception and must be interpreted restrictively. As for the scope of an election of domicile under the ALPE, the Judge pointed out that subsection 33(1) ALPE indicates that a business may elect domicile and appoint a person to “receive documents for the purposes of this Act.” Article 98(5) ALPE also indicates that the domicile elected by a business under the ALPE is intended to inform third parties of the address where the business wishes to receive documents “for the purposes of this Act.” The Judge was thus of the opinion that sections 33(1) and 98(5) ALPE, as drafted, cannot have the scope that Promark seeks to ascribe to them, as they are clear and they do not need to be interpreted. In the case of an election of domicile under the ALPE, the purpose of the election is to provide an address where documents can be sent to the business, unless there is specific evidence to the contrary. For these reasons, the Judge allowed the declinatory exception and referred the case to the judicial district of Bedford. The Judgement on Appeal From the outset, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the Judge did not commit a reviewable error: (1) the domicile elected for purposes of attributing territorial jurisdiction under article 41 (3) C.C.P. is the domicile designated by the parties for the execution of their agreement within the meaning of article 83 C.C.Q., and (2) the domicile elected under the ALPE is elected for the purposes of applying the ALPE (para. 23). The Court of Appeal is of the opinion that the Judge’s decision is consistent with what the legislature had prescribed in article 68 of the former Code of Civil Procedure and upholds stability in the law, which is particularly important in matters of jurisdiction. After analyzing the parliamentary debates surrounding the enactment of article 41 C.C.P. and the Commentaires de la ministre de la justice, the Court indicated that there is a presumption of the survival of the existing legal rule and that, contrary to what the appellants claimed, the wording of article 41 C.C.P. and articles 33 and 98 ALPE do not give the courts territorial jurisdiction other than that of the defendant’s domicile. The removal of the reference to article 83 C.C.Q. in article 41 C.C.P. does not constitute a clear indication of the legislature’s intent to set aside the requirements of article 83 C.C.Q., under which, for the purposes of determining territorial jurisdiction, the parties must establish the elected domicile in their agreement. On that basis, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal without costs and confirmed the Judge’s reasoning that territorial jurisdiction of the courts under article 41(3) C.C.P. is established based on the election of domicile made under article 83 C.C.Q., and not on the election of domicile made by a corporation under the ALPE, whereby a business elects a domicile for the purposes of the application of that law. Conclusion This case serves as a reminder that the C.C.Q. establishes the general law in our province. It is therefore important to refer to it when interpreting other laws enacted by the Quebec legislature. Because the legislature is “deemed to know its legislative fabric as well as the existing law,”7 the Court cannot interpret a given law—such as the ALPE—in a way that would amend a substantive statutory provision of general application—in this case, the C.C.Q.—where there is no clearly expressed intention to that effect. Promark Electronics Inc. c. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., 2024 QCCA 906 CQLR, c. P-44.1 (the “ALPE”) CQLR, c. C-25.01 (the “C.C.P.”) Promark Electronics Inc. c. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., 2023 QCCS 3405 Promark Electronics Inc. c. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., 2023 QCCA 1427, para. 8 83. “The parties to a juridical act may, in writing, elect domicile with a view to the execution of the act or the exercise of the rights arising from it. Election of domicile is not presumed.” Promark Electronics Inc. c. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., 2024 QCCA 906, para. 24

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