End-of-life care (part 2 of 2)

November 2, 2016

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In our newsletter No. 8, we discussed advance medical directives, which are restricted to three specific clinical situations and allow a person to consent to or refuse in advance five specific types of care in the event that the person in question becomes incapable of consenting to them.

In addition to advance medical directives, the Act respecting end-of-life care provides a framework for two other types of end-of-life care, that is: medical aid in dying and continuous palliative sedation. However, advance medical directives do not allow one to consent in advance to the administration of medical aid in dying or to continuous palliative sedation.

These types of end-of-life care are provided in a very precise context, which is the subject of this newsletter.

What is medical aid in dying ?

The law defines medical aid in dying as “care consisting in the administration by a physician of medications or substances to an endof- life patient, at the patient’s request, in order to relieve their suffering by hastening death.”¹ Not everyone is allowed to request medical aid in dying. Such a request is dealt with according a stringent process.

Who may request medical aid in dying?

Only a person who meets all the following conditions may obtain medical aid in dying in Québec:

being an insured person within the meaning of the Health Insurance Act (chapter A-29);
being of full age and capable of giving consent to care;
being at the end of life;
suffering from a serious and incurable illness;
being in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability;
and experiencing constant and unbearable physical or psychological suffering which cannot be relieved in a manner the patient deems tolerable.²

How to request medical aid in dying?

The request for medical aid in dying is made by filling out a form prescribed by the Minister. Patients must request medical aid in dying themselves. The form must be signed and dated by the patient in the presence of and countersigned by a health or social services professional. In addition, two independent witnesses of full age must be present at the signature and countersign the form (i.e. a potential heir may not be considered as being independent). The form must then be given to the patient’s attending physician. If the patient cannot date and sign the form because he³ does not know how to write or is physically incapable of doing so, an authorized third person who is not a member of the team responsible for caring for the patient may do so in the patient’s presence. The authorized third party must not have a potential interest in the estate of the patient. Persons who request medical aid in dying may withdraw their request at any time and by any means.

What are the prior requirements for a physician before administering medical aid in dying?

Ten full days (excluding the day on which the request was made) must elapse between the request for medical aid in dying and it being administered, unless the life condition requires otherwise.

Before administering medical aid in dying, the physician must make sure that the patient consents. He must also:

make sure that the patient satisfies all the conditions to be eligible for medical aid in dying (see the “Who may request medical aid in dying?” section)
ascertain with the patient that the request is made in a free and informed manner
ascertain that the request is not made as a result of external pressure
ascertain that the patient is informed of the prognosis for the illness, as well as other therapeutic possibilities and their consequences
verify the persistence of suffering and that the patient’s wish to obtain medical aid in dying remains unchanged
verify with the care team members who have regular contact with the patient that he consents to receive medical aid in dying
make sure that the patient has had the opportunity to discuss the request with the persons he wished to contact
make sure that the request has been made using the prescribed form, which has been signed and dated by the person making the request or the authorized third party before two independent witnesses who have also signed and dated
make sure that the patient has been advised that he could at any time and by any mean withdraw his request for medical aid in dying

In addition to making sure that the request complies with all the above conditions, the physician must also obtain the written opinion of a second physician confirming that the patient is eligible to receive medical aid in dying. The physician consulted must be independent of both the patient requesting medical aid in dying and the physician seeking the second medical opinion. The physician must consult the patient’s record and examine the patient.

Once the verification of all of the above criteria is done and the second medical opinion is obtained, the physician will provide medical aid in dying after the expiry of the period of 10 full days referred to above.

Continuous palliative sedation

The Act respecting end-of-life care also governs continuous palliative sedation.

Palliative care means the total and active care delivered by an interdisciplinary team to patients suffering from a disease with reserved prognosis, in order to relieve their suffering, without delaying or hastening death. Reserved prognosis refers to a disease at an advanced stage jeopardizing survival within a period of less than two years or terminal illness leading to probable death in the near future. Continuous palliative sedation is palliative care consisting in administering drugs or substances to an end-of-life patient for the purpose of relieving his suffering by rendering him unconscious in a continuous manner until he dies.⁴

Consent to continuous palliative sedation is given by using the form prescribed by the Minister according to a procedure which is similar to that applicable to medical aid in dying. The physician must therefore obtain a free and informed consent from the patient. This consent must be given by a person capable of consenting to care or, if that person is incapable, by a person authorized by law or pursuant to a protection mandate. The patient or his representative must be informed of the prognosis for the illness, the irreversible nature of the sedation and the anticipated duration of the sedation. The physician must also make sure that the decision does not result from external pressure. The patient or his representative must be informed of the patient’s right to refuse or put off the procedure and the consequences of either of his choices.

Conclusion

It is important to understand that the entire end-of-life process is conducted with the greatest respect for the patient who made the request and that the patient must be treated with understanding, compassion, courtesy and fairness, with respect for his dignity, autonomy, needs and safety. Open and honest communication is also favoured by the members of the medical team in order to provide the patient with quality end-of-life care, which is adapted to his needs for the duration of the process.

An Act respecting end-of-life care, RSQ c S-32.0001, sec. 3 para. 6.
An Act respecting end-of-life care, RSQ c S-32.0001, sec. 26.
The masculine gender is used in this text solely for the sake of concision.
An Act respecting end-of-life care, RSQ c S-32.0001, sec. 3 para. 4 and 5.

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Written by

Chantal Tremblay
Senior Notary
Marc-André Bouchard
Senior Associate

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October 2, 2024

Proof of incapacity: analysis of CIUSSS de L’Ouest-de-L’île-de-Montréal (ST. Mary’s Hospital Center) c. R.C.

PROOF OF INCAPACITY: ANALYSIS OF CIUSSS DE L’OUEST-DE-L’ÎLE-DE-MONTRÉAL (ST. MARY’S HOSPITAL CENTER) c. R.C.1 Summary The authors comment on this decision rendered on September 20, 2024, in which the Court of Appeal ruled on the capacity to consent to care in the presence of a psychiatric disorder. The Court of Appeal overturned the first instance decision, which had found the respondent capable of refusing treatment with antipsychotic medications even though he had refuted his diagnosis, because he understood the benefits that antipsychotic medications could afford him and refused to take them because of their side effects. The Court of Appeal rather concluded that the trial judge had misapplied the five criteria to be used to assess whether a person is capable of consenting to care, particularly in the context where (i) the trial judge’s conclusion ran counter to the uncontradicted opinion of an expert; and (ii) there was much evidence supporting the fact that the respondent was incapable of making an informed decision. INTRODUCTION In this case, the Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’Ouest-de-l'Île-de-Montréal (the “CIUSSS”) appealed a decision rendered by the Superior Court on March 14, 2024, dismissing its application for an authorization to provide care to R.C., a 51-year-old man. The Superior Court had concluded that the CIUSSS had not proven that the respondent was incapable of consenting to care. The Court of Appeal was thus called upon to review the trial judge’s answer to the first question (incapacity to consent) in the analytical framework2 surrounding the test that has now been used for three decades.3 THE FACTS R.C. has a complex medical history. He was hospitalized several times between 2007 and 2019 for mental health issues, including suicidal ideation and personality disorders. In 2021, he was admitted to the CHUM for COVID-19-related complications having resulted in brain damage caused by hypoxia. From 2022 onwards, he made repeated visits to the emergency room, often to obtain benzodiazepines, leading him to become addicted. Even though he adhered to treatment with antipsychotic medication for a time, R.C. stopped taking his medication because of undesirable side effects. In January 2024, after an episode of confusion, he was taken to hospital where he was diagnosed with late-onset schizophrenia. However, R.C. refuted the diagnosis, claiming that his health problems were caused by an artificial intelligence device he believed had been implanted in his body. The psychiatrists who assessed him concluded that he was incapable of consenting to care. On February 16, 2024, the CIUSSS filed an application for authorization to re-hospitalize R.C. and administer antipsychotic medications, despite his categorical refusal. After analyzing the evidence, which essentially consisted of R.C.’s testimony and that of the CIUSSS psychiatrist, the Superior Court concluded that R.C. understood the nature of his condition and the benefits of the proposed treatment, despite his refusal to accept his diagnosis. The Court was of the opinion that the CIUSSS psychiatrists, in their analysis of R.C.’s capacity, had erroneously and repeatedly carried over his rejection of the diagnosis in a cascading fashion in their analysis of the five criteria from the decision in A.G.,4 thereby making the same error as the one that the Court of Appeal had identified in the M.H. decision.5 Despite the absence of a second opinion on R.C.’s capacity, the Superior Court had determined that he was able to consent to his care. According to the trial judge, in keeping with the teachings of the Court of Appeal in the F.D. decision,6 he therefore lacked jurisdiction to order care. For this reason, he dismissed the application for an authorization to provide care. THE COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION The Court of Appeal began by reiterating the five criteria for assessing a person’s capacity, namely: Does the person understand the nature of the illness for which treatment is proposed? Does the person understand the nature and purpose of the treatment? Does the person understand the risks and benefits involved in undergoing the treatment? Does the person understand the risks involved in not undergoing the treatment? ls the capacity to consent to treatment affected by the patient's illness?7 It pointed out that the criteria are not cumulative and that it is incumbent upon the trier to assess them as a whole.8 Moreover, the mere fact that a person refuses care that would be in their best interest is not enough to conclude that the person is incapable,9 nor is their mere rejection of their diagnosis.10 In this case, the Court of Appeal considered that the Superior Court judge had committed a palpable and overriding error making its intervention warranted. It stated that the trial judge was obliged to express an opinion on whether the evidence proffered was sufficient, adding that the judge had a proactive role to play in protecting the interests of the person involved. If the trial judge felt that a point that had not been the subject in a genuine adversarial debate raised a problem in his view, it was up to him to ask questions.11 Subsequently, the court took extracts from the evidence consisting of a psychiatric report and the testimony of its author and went on to note that the evidence did not allow the trial judge to conclude that R.C. was capable of consenting or refusing the proposed treatment plan, on the contrary. Based on the same evidence, the Court declared R.C. incapable of consenting to care and sent the case back to the Superior Court so that it could determine whether there was indeed categorical refusal and assess the terms of the treatment plan sought. AUTHORS’ COMMENTS This decision of the Court of Appeal follows approximately 20 other decisions12 respecting orders authorizing care handed down by this same court, which have all further established and clarified the guiding principles surrounding such orders since the F.D. decision of 2015.13 These successive decisions have not only added to case law, they have refined the assessment criteria and legal requirements pertaining to applications for authorization to provide care. Such a development in case law shows that the courts are committed to circumscribing complex healthcare situations. Doing so involves striking a balance between the rights to freedom and self-determination and the protection of those who are vulnerable or otherwise unable to consent. On July 6, 2015, the Court of Appeal of Quebec marked a decisive turning point where orders authorizing care are involved by rendering a decision that sent a clear message to the Superior Court, namely F.D. c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria).14 In that decision, an analytical framework was established to ensure compliance both with the provisions of the law and the spirit of the law. Since then, the Court has handed down some 20 other significant decisions, each shedding additional light. The guiding principles derived from these decisions can be summarized under the following themes: Rights relating to the judicial process Every person has the fundamental right to contest an application for a order authorizing care, to be heard and to be represented.15 The judge must proactively protect the user’s interests and ensure that they are represented by a lawyer.16 Scope of the care plan Requiring a definite care plan does not mean dictating which medication should be administered in a limitative way.17 A judge may remove certain substances from a treatment plan if they deem that to be in the patient’s best interest.18 It is crucial to draw a distinction between preventive care and a treatment plan that includes various alternatives as the situation evolves.19 For a future hospitalization clause to be valid, there must be a reasonable foreseeability of hospitalization.20 When a patient is to be placed, the application for authorization must indicate where they are to be placed.21 Physical restraint may only be used if it is necessary to avoid serious harm, and must be limited to the minimum.22 A parent’s refusal to consent to a treatment plan may not be warranted if the plan is in the child’s best interests.23 Duration of the authorization When the person concerned is not cooperating and access to their previous medical records is not available, the judge must be especially careful in assessing whether the proposed care plan is legal, in particular in terms of its duration and scope.24 The duration of the care order should be as short as reasonably possible, without compromising the effectiveness of the treatment.25 When a future hospitalization is contemplated, the judge must take into account the time required to stabilize the patient.26 The 30-day period for a future hospitalization should not be considered an absolute limit, as a longer period may be deemed necessary after a thorough analysis.27 The evidence The mere fact that a relationship exists between an expert and a party does not make the expert’s testimony inadmissible: The circumstances surrounding the expert’s role must be reviewed.28 An expert who does not know a patient’s reasons for refusing treatment is not deemed to have breached their duty to inform.29 An expert may testify to reported facts without the possibility of anyone opposing them; however, this does not mean that reported facts are proven, as the rules of evidence remain stringent in this context.30 An expert report may suffice as testimony; the judge need not require the patient’s testimony if the patient cannot understand the issues at hand.31 Applications for safeguard orders may be unsuccessful where there is no expert report and it is not demonstrated that the matter is urgent.32 This review highlights the significant advances that the courts have made in overseeing applications for orders authorizing care and protecting vulnerable people. The analytical framework established in the F.D. decision remains relevant, and subsequent decisions have further refined its questions. The decision that the Court of Appeal handed down in Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’Ouest-de-l'Île-de-Montréal c. R.C. is milestone in the jurisprudence on court orders authorizing care. By overturning the lower court’s judgment, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the need for a thorough assessment of the capacity to consent, emphasizing that the work of medical teams and applications made by healthcare institutions are important to ensure appropriate care. This decision not only underscores the fact that it is important to protect the rights of users, but also that the work of the court is crucial, for it must ensure that the criteria are met without substituting its opinion for that of the experts heard. CONCLUSION The decision discussed in this paper is part of a series of decisions that have clarified and enhanced the guiding principles established since the F.D. decision was handed down in 2015.33 The Court of Appeal has provided valuable guidelines for judges, institutions and healthcare professionals to use in their assessment of applications for authorization to provide care. Through a careful review of the circumstances of each case, the courts have shown that they are committed to effectively circumscribing complex health situations by ensuring that institutions have the tools they need to respond appropriately. Lastly, we must recognize that while progress has been made, there are still unresolved issues that need to be addressed. Recent court decisions, including the one that led to the R.C. decision,34 illustrate the importance of constant dialogue between those involved in the legal aspect of cases and those dealing with clinical realities. As jurisprudence continues to develop, paying close attention to future developments will be key to ensuring that healthcare institutions can act effectively in consideration of patients’ needs. 2024 QCCA 1231. F.D.c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. See the landmark decision, Institut Philippe Pinel de Montréal c. A.G., 1994 CanLII 6105 (QC CA). Institut Philippe Pinel de Montréal c. A.G., 1994 CanLII 6105 (QC CA). M.H. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2018 QCCA 1948, para. 57. F.D. c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. This decision, para. 13; with reference to Institut Philippe Pinel de Montréal c. A.G., 1994 CanLII 6105 (QC CA), pp. 28 to 33. This decision, para. 14; with reference to M. B. c. Centre hospitalier Pierre-le-Gardeur, 2004 CanLII 29017 (QC CA), para. 45; M.C. c. Service professionnel du Centre de santé et de services sociaux d’Arthabaska-et-de-L’Érable, 2010 QCCA 1114, para. 13. This decision, para. 14; with reference to M. B. c. Centre hospitalier Pierre-le-Gardeur, 2004 CanLII 29017 (QC CA), para. 46. This decision, para. 14, with reference to Starson v. Swayze, 2003 SCC 32, para. 79 and M.H. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2018 QCCA 1948, paras. 61–62. This decision, para. 18. We have excluded the following decisions from our analysis: Bédard c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Nord-de-l’Île-de-Montréal, 2023 QCCA 508; M.G. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2019 QCCA 203; S.F. c. CIUSSS de Centre-Ouest-de-l’île-de-Montréal – Hôpital général juif – Sir Mortimer B. Davis, 2021 QCCA 1531; P.L. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de la Montérégie-Centre, 2018 QCCA 318; N.G. c. Sir Mortimer B. Davis Jewish General Hospital, 2021 QCCA 1892; F.D. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2017 QCCA 1206. F.D.c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. Ibid. M.H.c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2018 QCCA 1948, paras. 68 and 69. A.N. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Nord-de-l’île-de-Montréal, 2022 QCCA 1167 , para. 30. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale c. D.M., 2017 QCCA 1333, para. 25. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean c. O.G., 2018 QCCA 345, paras. 15 and 16. C.R.c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux du Bas-St-Laurent, 2017 QCCA 328, para. 28. G.J. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de Laval, 2021 QCCA 1944, paras. 24 to 26. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Mauricie-et-du-Centre-du-Québec (CIUSSS MCQ) c. J.B., 2017 QCCA 1638,, paras. 30 to 35. X.Y.c. Hôpital général du Lakeshore, 2017 QCCA 1465, para. 20. A.P. c. Centre hospitalier universitaire Sainte-Justine, 2023 QCCA 58, para. 19. L.C. c. Centre hospitalier de l’Université de Montréal (CHUM), 2015 QCCA 1139, paras. 4 and 5. D.A. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux des Laurentides, 2016 QCCA 1734, para. 31. T.F. c. CIUSSS de l’Est-de-l’île-de-Montréal , 2022 QCCA 1306, para. 25. N.M. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de la Montérégie-Centre, 2022 QCCA1567, para. 17. M.G. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Centre-Sud-de-l’Île-de-Montréal , 2021 QCCA 1326, para. 11. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’Ouest-de-l’île-de-Montréal (Douglas Mental Health University Institute) c. I.A., 2023 QCCA 1100, para. 30. Institut universitaire en santé mentale Douglas c. W.M., 2016 QCCA 1081, para. 5 A.D. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Centre-Sud-de-l’île-de-Montréal, 2023 QCCA 1240, paras. 50, 56–57. A.F. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux des Laurentides, 2021 QCCA 928, para. 50. F.D. c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. CIUSSS de l'Ouest-de-l'Île-de-Montréal (St. Mary’s Hospital Center) c. R.C.,2024 QCCA 1231.

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March 5, 2024

Labour shortage: Revised ratios of qualified staff members in child care centres

At a time when the pandemic is continuing to have repercussions and we are experiencing a severe labour shortage, the educational childcare sector is facing unprecedented challenges. These circumstances have led to a reassessment of the standards relating to the presence of qualified childcare staff with children. The purpose of this bulletin is to shed light on the regulatory amendments that have been made to the Educational Childcare Regulation1 (the “ECR”), and more specifically to the required ratio of qualified staff members. Enacted by Order in Council 102-2024,2 these amendments came into force on March 1, 2024. Childcare providers should imperatively take cognizance of these regulatory amendments, as they will help them optimize their operations and improve their ability to respond to the challenges they are facing in attracting and retaining qualified childcare staff. Background On July 22, 2021, in response to the impact of the pandemic on educational childcare services, amendments were made to the requirements respecting the ratio of qualified staff members provided for in the ECR. During the first 9 months that followed the end of the public health emergency, the ratio was reduced to one qualified staff member out of three. During the 12 months after that, it was increased to one in two. The ratio applicable to childcare services was expected to return to pre-pandemic levels, or a ratio of two qualified staff members out of three, on March 1, 2024.3 However, faced with the labour shortage,4 which is particularly affecting the childcare sector, the government estimated that many childcare providers would not be able to comply with a qualified childcare staff ratio of two out of three, as was initially required for that date. As a result, the legislator amended the ECR once again so as to address ongoing problems and prevent service closures or disruptions. These amendments are summarized below. New ratio requirements for childcare services Section 23 of the ECR has been amended to reaffirm the general standard stipulating that the ratio of qualified childcare staff must be two out of three. However, section 23.1 of the ECR now provides for certain exceptions to the previously established rule on the ratio of qualified childcare staff. The notable exceptions are as follows: A ratio of one qualified childcare staff member out of two may be maintained during the provision of childcare until March 31, 2027. A ratio of one qualified childcare staff member out of three will be authorized while childcare is being provided during the first and last business hour of the permit holder’s core hours. A ratio of one qualified childcare staff member out of three will also be authorized during the first five years following: the initial issuance of a day care centre permit; the modification of a day care centre permit to increase, by 8 or more, the maximum number of children that may be provided with childcare in the permit holder’s facility; or the conclusion of a first subsidy agreement between the Ministère de la Famille and the holder of a day care centre permit, provided that the agreement was entered into after October 31, 2023. Conclusion The changes described above, came into force on March 1, 2024, are intended to address the current shortage of qualified staff in the childcare sector in Quebec. Although the temporary flexibility and the exceptions to the qualified staff ratio will help childcare providers guarantee the continuity and accessibility of their services, compliance with prescribed ratios is still mandatory. Note that failure to comply with these requirements may lead to administrative penalties or penal sanctions, as well as a decision by the Ministère de la Famille suspending, revoking or not renewing a permit. The members of the Lavery team are available to answer your questions. The information and comments contained herein do not constitute legal advice. They are intended solely to enable readers, who assume full responsibility, to use them for their own purposes. Chapter S-4.1.1, r. 2. Regulation to amend the Educational Childcare Regulation, O.C. 102-2024 (G.O. II) Regulation to amend the Educational Childcare Regulation, O.C. 879-2021 (G.O. II). Ministère de la Famille, Mémoire au conseil des ministres : Projet de règlement modifiant le Règlement sur les services de garde éducatifs à l’enfance, tabled on September 20, 2023; Ministère de la Famille, Portrait de la main-d’œuvre du réseau des services de garde éducatifs à l’enfance, 2022–2023, October 2023.

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January 31, 2024

An employer’s criminal negligence upheld on appeal

On August 11, 2023, the Court of Appeal of Quebec handed down a decision in CFG Construction inc. c. R.,1 dismissing the appeal of the guilty verdict against an employer, CFG Construction inc. (“CFG”), for criminal negligence having caused the death of one of its employees. This decision serves as a reminder of the potential criminal liability of an employer, depending on its legal form, for the death or bodily injury of its employees in the workplace. More specifically, the case provides unique insight into the sanctioning of an “organization,” a term that includes a body corporate or an association of persons,2 for faults committed by a “senior officer” under the Criminal Code (“Cr.C.”). The facts The decision stems from a fatal accident that occurred on September 11, 2012, on the site of a wind farm in Saint-Ferréol-les-Neiges, involving a heavy container truck owned by CFG. The truck flipped over on a downhill curve, killing the driver, a CFG employee with 25 years of experience as a truck driver. At the trial, emphasis was placed on the maintenance of the truck and its braking system. The case A number of decisions were rendered in this case. Regarding criminal liability, the Court of Québec handed down two judgments, one finding CFG guilty and the other establishing the sentence. On February 14, 2019, CFG was found guilty of criminal negligence causing the death of the aforementioned truck driver. Essentially, the Court found that CFG’s failure to perform maintenance on the truck, which it had a legal obligation to do, constituted a [translation] “marked and significant departure from the conduct expected of a reasonable person, given the nature and circumstances of the activity in question”.3 For instance, the truck involved in the accident had 14 major pre-existing defects, all of which related to its braking system.4 The Court was decisive in establishing CFG’s liability through its foreman-mechanic, whom it considered to be a “senior officer” within the meaning of the Cr.C., and whose faults could be ascribed to CFG in this case,5 as explained below. On December 3, 2019, CFG was fined $300,000, plus a victim surcharge of 15% of the fine, and placed on a three-year probation with many conditions. This decision brings to light the factors to consider in sentencing an organization, as well as the only penalty that may be imposed, namely a fine of any amount in the case of a criminal act.6 Among these factors, the court must consider “any advantage realized by the organization as a result of the offence”.7 In this regard, failure to incur the necessary expenses to perform maintenance on a vehicle driven by an employee may be construed as an “advantage” for the employer-owner and is considered an aggravating factor in sentencing.8 Case law on this subject is “tenuous”, but fines ranging from $100,000 to $750,000 have been given in various situations.9 The notion of “senior officer” set out in the Criminal Code In its decision, the Court of Appeal provides the historical context that led to the inclusion of a legal mechanism in the Cr.C. governing the liability of organizations for death and bodily injury in the workplace. In 2003, Parliament passed Bill C-45, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (criminal liability of organizations) further to the 1992 tragedy at the Westray mine in Nova Scotia, where 26 miners were killed after methane detectors were disconnected with mine supervisors’ knowledge.10 Among the key amendments central to the CFG case, sections 217.1 and 22.1 of the Cr.C. provide not only for the legal obligation of any person who directs or has the authority to direct how another person does work or performs a task to take reasonable steps to prevent bodily harm to that person, but also for the possibility of holding an organization “liable” for an offence of negligence by reason of the actions of certain persons working for it, either a “representative” or a “senior officer,” as these terms are defined in section 2 of the Cr.C. The CFG case as a whole is an example of how the aforementioned legal mechanism applies where an employee considered to be a “senior officer” departs from the reasonable standard of care expected in the circumstances. As mentioned above, CFG was found guilty because of the important role that the head mechanic played, in that he had the authority to carry out the maintenance required on vehicles, including on the defective truck.11 As a result, CFG was legally obliged to ensure that the mechanic had the skills to do the work and provide him with the necessary instructions and equipment, as well as an adequate work environment.12 In short, it is important to remember that: The term “senior officer” refers to “a representative who plays an important role in the establishment of an organization’s policies or is responsible for managing an important aspect of the organization’s activities and, in the case of a body corporate, includes a director, its chief executive officer and its chief financial officer”.13 This definition [translation] “does not only include senior executives and a company’s board of directors”.14 Ultimately, an employee will be considered as a “senior officer” according to the functions s/he performs and the responsibilities s/he assumes in a given organization.15 Finally, the Court of Appeal points out that failure to fulfill the legal obligation set out in section 217.1 of the Cr.C. does not, in and of itself, constitute an offence.16 In the circumstances of this case, failure to comply with the aforementioned section along with the provisions on criminal negligence causing death provide the basis for CFG’s guilt, which constitutes the defining characteristic of this “positive” obligation in criminal law. In this regard, section 22.1 of the Cr.C. serves as the basis for CFG’s liability insofar as the organization was a “party to the offence” given the role that its mechanic played in the matter. Conclusion The CFG case shows how criminal negligence in the workplace is condemned outside of the penal provisions applicable under Quebec’s labour laws. Incidentally, the notion of “senior officer” within the meaning of these laws should not be confused with that codified in the Cr.C. While the former is limited in scope, the term “senior officer” in the Cr.C. is defined more broadly to include, in addition to directors and senior executives, other persons who play a significant role in leading or managing a given area of activity within an organization. Note that in this case, CFG’s guilt could have resulted from the conduct of more than one representative or senior officer.17 It is also important to remember that the extent to which proceedings in such matters involve natural persons rather than organizations, or extend to every person who may be held liable, is a matter of prosecutorial discretion. 2023 QCCA 1032. “organization,” section 2 of the Cr.C. Supra note 1 at para. 10 (as the Court of Appeal pointed out, the analytical framework for determining criminal negligence was updated further to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Javanmardi, 2019 SCC 54). R. c. CFG Construction inc., 2019 QCCQ 1244, para. 141. Ibid, paras. 255 and 285. R. c. CFG Construction inc., 2019 QCCQ 7449, paras. 84 and 149. Section 718.21a) of the Cr.C. Supra note 6, para. 91. Ibid, paras. 163 to 167. Supra note 1, paras. 60 and 62. Supra note 4, para. 35. Ibid, para. 381. “senior officer”, section 2 of the Cr.C. Supra note 4, para. 256. Ibid. Supra, note 1, para. 73. Ibid, para. 72; see also supra note 6, para. 14.

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January 25, 2024

Serious Illness Insurance Coverage: An Applicant Hides His True Health Condition in Order to Deceive the Insurer

Recently,1 Justice Isabelle Germain of Quebec’s Superior Court ruled on a case involving insurance fraud in the matter of Paul-Hus v. Sun Life Canada, compagnie d’assurance-vie2. This ruling illustrates that applicants must answer the insurer’s questions honestly; should an applicant try to mislead the insurer, he will have to face the consequences. In this case, the plaintiff Daniel Paul-Hus (Paul-Hus) claimed an amount of $150,000 from Sun Life Canada by way of benefits as set out in the serious illness insurance policy taken out by his company (of which he was the sole shareholder and director) in 2015, along with $50,000 for the trouble and inconvenience caused by Sun Life’s refusal to honour its contractual undertakings. Paul-Hus claimed that he suffered from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) diagnosed on February 1, 2018. The claim form was submitted by him on August 16, 2018. Sun Life refused his claim since an assessment of his medical records revealed that his prior medical history was inconsistent with the information he had provided during a telephone interview on March 17, 2015. Sun Life considered the contract null and void due to Paul-Hus’s false declarations while filling out the questionnaire he was required to complete when taking out the policy. Essentially, it was Sun Life’s position that Paul-Hus had not answered certain questions correctly in the questionnaire and that, if he had, the insurer would not have issued the serious illness policy. It was brought into evidence that, during the telephone interview of March 17, 2015, Paul-Hus had to answer questions on his lifestyle habits, his current health condition and his prior medical history. Some of the questions in Sun Life’s medical questionnaire sought to ascertain whether Paul-Hus felt weakness in his arm and whether a doctor had ever recommended any tests or if he was awaiting any test results. These questions were answered in the negative by Paul-Hus. However, a review of the file reveals that these answers were inaccurate. The insurance policy was issued on March 17, 2015, while the evidence indicated that Paul-Hus had consulted his neurologist a few weeks before, on February 24, 2015, due to weakness in his left hand, the symptoms having appeared progressively since August 2013. At that time, additional tests were prescribed (cervical and brain imaging, magnetic resonance imaging and numerous blood tests). Nonetheless, in his Originating Application, Paul-Hus asserts that, at the time the policy was issued, he had not noticed or suspected any symptoms of disease and contends that, according to the doctors, the disease had developed suddenly. In her judgment, Justice Germain reiterated the principles governing declarations of risk in the insurance sector, pointing out that false declarations can result in the nullification of the contract.3 However, in this case, the policy had been in force for over two years at the time of the claim for indemnification, so that the insurer was required to prove fraud in order to nullify the contract4 (Paul-Hus’s intention to hide his true health condition). Justice Germain found that Sun Life had discharged the burden of demonstrating Paul-Hus’s fraudulent dealings. In addition to his medical records, Sun Life produced a recording of the telephone interview held on March 17, 2015, as well as a transcription of the interview. In the Court’s view, it was clear that Paul-Hus was under neurological investigation due to weakness in his left arm at the time he was completing the questionnaire. Although in his testimony at trial,5 he claimed not to know that this information could have had an impact on the insurer’s decision, Justice Germain did not side with this version. For Justice Germain, the evidence presented by the insurer demonstrated that it had been Paul-Hus’s intention to deceive Sun Life. This being said, in accordance with the requirements of article 2408 C.C.Q., Sun Life had to demonstrate not only that it would not have covered this risk had it been aware of the new information resulting from the claim, based on its own underwriting standards, but that any reasonable insurer would have refused to issue the serious illness insurance policy under the circumstances. Sun Life also discharged this burden and completed this “evidence of materiality” by presenting the testimony of an underwriting expert. Finally, and in addition to the above, Paul-Hus claimed that he had been diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), which he was unable to support with evidence. Under cross-examination, Paul-Hus admitted that he had never received any such diagnosis. Instead, he suffered from a lower motoneuron disease, which did not qualify as a “serious illness” under the policy. In conclusion, in the Court’s opinion, the policyholder knowingly misled the insurer and falsified his risk assessment in order to obtain coverage. Moreover, given that Paul-Hus was not insurable for serious illness coverage in the eyes of a reasonable insurer, the Court concluded that the contract should be nullified ab initio and terminated. This decision reminds us of how important it is for policyholders to answer insurers’ questionnaires honestly when making their initial declaration of risk : [TRANSLATION] [55] In the Court’s opinion, Paul-Hus failed to answer the questionnaire sincerely. He did not act as would have a reasonable insured. He was aware of the importance of giving honest answers to the questions asked during the telephone interview. An insurance contract is one requiring the utmost good faith, particularly as far as the assessment of risk is concerned. It is of interest that in this matter, Paul-Hus gave his testimony at the hearing by way of videoconference, which Justice Germain comments as follows: [TRANSLATION] [49] One notes that, while giving his testimony via videoconference at the hearing, Paul-Hus referred to a document, which would be obtained and filed by Sun Life. The document is Sun Life’s letter of refusal of December 28, 2018, which he annotated with the words “good faith” and “answered no in all good faith I was not awaiting anything no results”. It seems odd, to say the least, that he should make the effort to write down these words as a reminder and should feel the need to repeat them several times during his testimony and when cross-examined. [50] However, it is not enough to repeat that one acted in good faith to justify such omissions. Paul-Hus appealed Justice Germain’s decision. Sun Life filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal, which was dismissed on January 15th, 20246. We will therefore have to wait and see what happens before the Court of appeal. To sum up… Insurance contracts are essentially characterized by the risks they cover and by what risks the insurer is willing to tolerate for a given premium. The Civil Code of Québec recognizes two specific instances in which the actual declaration of risk is fundamental: the initial declaration of risk before the contract is drawn up7 and any increase in the risk level during the term of the contract.8 The declaration of risk is essential to the insurer when it comes to accurately determining the extent of the risk and the premium that will be charged if the insurer agrees to provide coverage. As a general rule, the policyholder’s utmost good faith should be in evidence during the initial declaration stage given that this declaration paves the way for the prospective contractual relationship and its various terms and conditions. A policyholder will be deemed to have properly met their obligation “if the representations are such as a normally provident insured would make, if they were made without material concealment and if the facts are substantially as represented.”9 Since Policyholders are responsible for informing the insurer about any relevant factors that might change its risk assessment, i.e., a positive disclosure requirement, it stands to reason that the Civil Code sets out consequences in the event that this requirement is not fulfilled by the policyholder. A policyholder who makes false statements can therefore see his insurance contract nullified ab initio.10 In other words, the contract would be deemed to have never existed because the basis on which it rests, the initial declaration of risk, was flawed. It should also be noted that nullification will only be relative and that the insurer may elect not to assert it. Consequently, the Court, after having heard the evidence, cannot rule ex officio that the contract is null and void. The insurer has two (2) years after the effective date of the contract to request nullification ab initio based on false statements or unwillingness to fully disclose risk.11 Set against that backdrop, the insurer’s burden of proof amounts to demonstrating that the policyholder made false statements or concealed relevant facts. Insurance fraud Once the two (2) year window of opportunity has closed, the insurer faces an additional burden of proof: it must also demonstrate that the policyholder committed fraud.12 Fraud is distinguished from false declarations or concealment. Among other things, it results from the misrepresentation or omission of a fact in the knowledge that, if the truth were disclosed, the insurer would not issue the policy under the negotiated conditions. Therefore, the policyholder must have intentionally deceived the insurer in order to obtain an advantage that would not have otherwise been obtained. Insurers, therefore, have a heavy burden of proof if the two-year threshold has been crossed. This is because fraud cannot be presumed; it must be established on the balance of probabilities. Burden of proof Whether or not the two (2) year period is still running, the insurer must (1) demonstrate that it would not have entered into the contract based on its own underwriting criteria; and (2) that a reasonable insurer in the same circumstances (i.e., dealing with false declarations, concealment or fraud) would have also declined to issue coverage.13 To recap, before the expiry of the two (2) year period, insurers seeking a contract’s nullification ab initio must prove that: The policyholder made false declarations or concealed information when making the initial declaration of risk. The insurer would not have entered into the contract based on its own underwriting criteria if it had been apprised of the concealed information. A reasonable insurer in the same circumstances would have also declined to take on the risk. After the expiry of the two (2) year period following the effective date of the policy, insurers requesting the contract’s nullification ab initio must prove that: The policyholder made false declarations or concealed information when making the initial declaration of risk AND intended to deceive the insurer. The insurer would not have entered into the contract based on its own underwriting criteria if it had been apprised of the concealed information. A reasonable insurer in the same circumstances would have also declined to take on the risk. Judgment handed down on October 3, 2023; the hearing was held on May 25 and 26, 2023. 2023 QCCS 3890; this ruling was appealed from (200-09-010693-239). A motion to dismiss the appeal was filed by the insurer and arguments were heard on January 15, 2024. That same day, the Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer’s motion to dismiss the appeal. The matter therefore continues before the Court of Appeal. Art. 2410 C.C.Q. Art. 2424 C.C.Q. Via videoconference. Paul-Hus v. Sun Life Canada, compagnie d'assurance-vie, 2024 QCCA 46 Arts. 2408 and 2409 C.C.Q. Arts. 2466 et seq. C.C.Q. Art. 2409 C.C.Q. If the false statement deals exclusively with the policyholder’s age, the contract cannot be declared null and void (art. 2410 C.C.Q.) unless the policyholder’s actual age is outside the insurable range established by the insurer (art. 2411 C.C.Q.). Art. 2424 C.C.Q. Civil Code, art. 2424, para. 1 C.C.Q. CGU compagnie d’assurance du Canada v. Paul, 2005 QCCA 315, para. 2 and art. 2408 C.C.Q.

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