Quarterly legal newsletter intended for accounting, management, and finance professionals, Number 24

June 1, 2014

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CONTENTS
Nominees in the context of litigation
Use of a nominee by limited partnerships and trusts for holding immovables
Voluntary registration for GST and QST purposes by a nominee
Immovables held by a nominee: Issues with respect to consumption taxes

NOMINEES IN THE CONTEXT OF LITIGATION
Léa Maalouf

In commercial matters, it frequently happens that two persons agree to hide their true intent from third parties and express such intent in a secret contract (or counter letter), while publicizing another contract, known as a fictional or apparent contract. This process is called simulation.

This practice is entirely legal unless it is used to break the law or allow a party to avoid liability, for instance, by removing an item of property from his patrimony in order to avoid the execution of a judgment. Simulation is governed by articles 1451 and 1452 of the Civil Code of Québec. A counter letter is subject to no condition as to form: it is valid whether it is in the verbal or written form.

A nominee agreement is one of the forms under which simulation may be carried out: when a person uses a third party to enter into a contract with another person, the third party is called a nominee.

With as many players at the table, it is interesting to review the issues related to the liability of the parties and the precedence of the contracts in the event a dispute occurs.

If a dispute occurs between the parties to the nominee agreement, the law is clear: the counter letter, whether verbal or written, prevails over the apparent contract. Either party cannot refuse to give effect to the nominee agreement. It is interesting to note that proof of the existence of a counter letter may be made by any mean, including testimony. This is rather exceptional, considering that the rules of evidence do not allow the parties to a written contract to use testimony to contradict or vary its terms. The reasoning of the courts is that the nominee agreement constitutes a contract by itself, which is separate from the apparent contract. This being so, testimony is not used to contradict the apparent contract but rather to establish the existence of a new contract.

However, if a third party institutes proceedings while being in good faith – meaning that the third party is unaware of the existence of the secret instrument, the Civil Code of Québec provides that the third party may, according to his interest, avail himself of the apparent contract or the counter letter. In principle, third parties do not need to prove fraudulent intent of the parties to the counter letter to rely on the secret instrument. However, according to some judgments, third parties should at least prove that they suffered some kind of harm as a result of the simulation. Once again, proof of the simulation may be made by any mean. Conversely, parties to a counter letter may decide to publish it to end the simulation: in that case, it will be more difficult for third parties to rely on the apparent contract. However, in a recent case¹, the Superior Court found liable both the nominees and true owners of an immovable, concluding that the parties had deliberately created confusion tantamount to abuse of right and that the theory of alter ego had also to be applied.

In closing, although it may look surprising at the outset, a fictive instrument, such as a nominee agreement, is entirely legal unless it is used for improper purposes.

However, parties to that fictive instrument must remember that a third party in good faith may set such instrument aside and rely on the apparent contract as being the true agreement between the parties, even if this does not constitute the initial intent of the contracting parties.

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¹ 9087-7135 Québec inc. c. Centre de santé et de services sociaux Lucille-Teasdale, 2013 QCCS 3856.

USE OF A NOMINEE BY LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS AND TRUSTS FOR HOLDING IMMOVABLES
Dominique Bélisle

Several legal arguments justify the practice that has developed in Quebec and in the common law provinces of registering the ownership title to immovables or real estate, acquired by a limited partnership or a real estate investment trust (“REIT”), in the name of a nominee.

One of these arguments is based on the fact that partnerships and trusts created under the Civil Code of Québec (“Civil Code”) do not benefit from legal personality and therefore are not separate «persons» distinct from their members, partners or beneficiaries. Indeed, historically, under the civil law, the patrimony was always considered to be attached to a natural or legal person. Over time, the concept developed which attributed a distinct patrimony to the partnership from the patrimonies of the partners, and which attributed a patrimony by appropriation to the trust, autonomous and distinct from the patrimonies of the settlor, trustee or beneficiary thereof.

In the case of trusts constituted under the Civil Code, including REITs, nominees have not been consistently used in practice and are less common. Indeed, article 1278 of the Civil Code states that the titles relating to the property of the trust are drawn up in the trustees’ names. On this basis, it is common to see the title to property held by a REIT registered in the land registry under the names of all the trustees acting in their capacity as trustees of the trust. Other legal advisers still register the title to the property directly in the name of the REIT, despite article 1278. For the time being, nothing indicates that this practice affects the validity of the property title.

In the above cases, however, a nominee is not used on the basis of the lack of legal personality of the trust because the Civil Code expressly recognizes that the parties involved have no real rights in the distinct patrimony. This recognition helps resolve the ambiguity caused by this lack of personality.

The advantage of a nominee for a REIT therefore lies elsewhere, such as, for example, in the flexibility offered for transfers of title between parties related to the trust, and in relation to the transfer duties that are triggered when these transfers are registered in the land register. Indeed, the exemptions provided for in section 19 of the Act respecting duties on transfers of immovables (Quebec) with respect to a corporate restructuring do not apply in the cases of a trust or partnership. Some exemptions contained in section 20 of that statute do apply to trusts, but in very specific cases.

In the case of a partnership, however, the use of a nominee is more common and warranted not only in connection with the Act respecting duties on transfers of immovables, but also due to the uncertainty caused in relation to the holding of title to property because of the partnership’s lack of legal personality. Indeed, in contrast to the situation pertaining to trusts, the Civil Code does not directly provide for the autonomous nature of the patrimony for partnerships, or that the partners hold no real right in the partnership’s property.

Furthermore, in the case of Ville de Québec c. Compagnie d’immeubles Allard ltée ¹, the Court of Appeal stated that since the limited partnership did not have a distinct legal personality from its members, it did not hold the partnership’s assets, and therefore found that the partners held an undivided real right in the property. In that case, the Court determined that the transfer by a partner of his interest in the partnership constituted a transfer of his undivided share, thereby triggering transfer duties (the parties having had the bad idea of registering the transfer…).

This decision has created some uncertainty surrounding the identity of the property owner. Is the property title really held in undivided co-ownership by each of the partners? And what about limited partnerships? The argument relied on by the Court of Appeal to justify its conclusions applies equally to limited partnerships. In practice, however, the partners in a limited partnership would certainly not intend to trigger a transfer in undivided co-ownership of the property each time a unit is transferred. This uncertainty has led to the commercial practice of registering the property title in the land register in the name of the general partner, or a nominee corporation.

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¹ [1996] RJQ 1566 (C.A.).

VOLUNTARY REGISTRATION FOR GST AND QST PURPOSES BY A NOMINEE
Diana Darilus

In an immovable property context, a person can act as a nominee for another person for the purpose of holding title to the property and handling the property management. This type of structure implies the existence of a mandatary-mandator relationship that is not disclosed to third parties.

In the context of this type of relationship, the mandator is the person considered to be carrying on commercial activities involving the property, and is therefore generally required to register for GST and QST purposes.

However, a nominee corporation holding title to immovable property on behalf of the true owner may wish to register voluntarily for several reasons, such as the following:

use of the nominee’s GST and QST registration numbers in the legal and administrative documentation, such as invoices or commercial leases, in order to preserve the confidentiality of the true owner of the property;
joint election by the mandator and mandatary provided for in subsection 177(1.1) of the Excise Tax Act (“ETA”) and section 41.0.1 of An Act respecting the Québec sales tax (“AQST”), which allows the mandatary to remit the GST and QST collected to the tax authorities on the mandator’s behalf; and
joint venture election provided for in sections 273 ETA and 346 AQST, which enables the co-venturers to designate an “operator” responsible for remitting the GST and QST collected to the tax authorities and claiming the input tax credits and input tax refunds (ITCs/ITRs) on behalf of the co-venturers.

A nominee corporation can only register voluntarily for GST and QST purposes if it carries on a commercial activity in Quebec. The definition of “commercial activity” is very broad and includes the carrying on of a business by a corporation without a reasonable expectation of profit, except to the extent to which the business involves the making of exempt supplies. As for the definition of the term “business”, this includes any undertaking of any kind whatever, whether or not engaged in for profit. In light of these definitions, it seems that a nominee corporation whose activities are limited to holding title to property on behalf of the true owner without receiving compensation for doing so, could be considered to be carrying on a commercial activity.

However, Revenu Québec has raised doubts in the past few years about the voluntary registration of certain nominee corporations in the form of “shell corporations” on the basis that they did not carry on any commercial activities, and retroactively canceled their registration numbers. To avoid such a dispute with the tax authorities, one should in our view be cautious when setting up a nominee corporation as part of a structure for holding immovable property in Quebec. We recommend that the following minimum measures be taken to reduce the risk of contestation by Revenu Québec:

monthly fees (plus applicable taxes) should be paid to the nominee corporation pursuant to terms of a written nominee agreement; and
the nominee corporation should open a bank account to receive its compensation.

We believe that if such measures are taken, it is more reasonable to consider that the nominee corporation is in fact carrying on a commercial activity, i.e., the taxable supply of services as a mandatary on behalf of a mandator or participants in a joint venture.

IMMOVABLES HELD BY A NOMINEE: ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO CONSUMPTION TAXES
Jean-Philippe Latreille

In the last few years, tax authorities have intensified their auditing efforts aimed at corporations holding immovables as nominees. In this context, the validity of some elections pertaining to joint ventures in respect of GST and QST has been questioned.

These elections allow the participants in a joint venture to designate one of them as “operator”, whose role is to remit taxes and claim input tax credits and input tax refunds in the name of the other participants. Now, in some circumstances, tax authorities adopt a position whereby a corporation which is solely used as a nominee is not a participant in the joint venture and thus, cannot validly be appointed as “operator”.

However, tax authorities recently announced that they gave instruction to their auditors not to assess when such a situation occurs. This administrative tolerance is conditional to all returns having been filed and all amounts due having been paid.

This measure is temporary since it only applies to reporting periods ending prior to January 1, 2015. Furthermore, tax authorities expect all participants in a joint venture relying on the tolerance to make valid elections in the future. Owners of immovables relying on a nominee should therefore now review their holding structure in the light of the positions published by tax authorities.

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The elected domicile appearing in the Québec Enterprise Register cannot provide a basis for the Superior Court’s territorial jurisdiction within the meaning of article 41(3) of the Code of Civil Proce

Introduction On July 11, 2024, the Court of Appeal1 rendered a decision that, for the first time, addresses the question of whether the elected domicile appearing in the Québec Enterprise Register (the “REQ”), established under the Act respecting the legal publicity of enterprises,2 can provide a basis for the Superior Court’s territorial jurisdiction within the meaning of article 41(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure.3 Upholding the decision rendered by the Superior Court,4 the Court of Appeal answered that it cannot. The Facts On April 25, 2023, Promark Electronics Inc. and Electrical Components International Inc. (collectively, “Promark”) filed a claim for damages against Bombardier Recreational Products Inc. (“BRP”) in the judicial district of Montréal, alleging that a letter of agreement had been terminated and related purchase orders cancelled. On June 22, 2023, BRP raised a declinatory exception asking the court to issue an order transferring the case to the judicial district of Bedford, where its head office is located. Promark argued that filing its claim in the judicial district of Montréal was warranted because of BRP’s elected domicile indicated in the REQ, which corresponded to the office of its counsel located in Montréal. On September 5, 2023, the Honourable Tiziana Di Donato, J.S.C. (the “Judge”) allowed BRP’s declinatory exception and issued an order referring the case to the judicial district of Bedford. On November 10, 2023, the Honourable Stephen W. Hamilton, J.C.A., granted leave to appeal the Judge’s decision, indicating that the courts have never settled the question of whether the domicile elected under section 33 ALPE is sufficient to make paragraph 3 of article 41 of the C.C.P. apply. He added that it appeared to him that the lower courts had rendered contradictory judgments in this regard.5 The Trial Judgement The Judge began by pointing out that, generally, for a purely personal action, the judicial district of the defendant’s domicile is the natural forum (article 41(1) C.C.P.) and that, in the case of a corporation, the domicile would be that of its head office. The Judge further clarified this principle by explaining that, where more than one judicial district has jurisdiction, the plaintiff may institute its proceedings before another court having territorial jurisdiction (article 42 C.C.P.), provided that it establishes that it is entitled to make such an election. In support of its contestation to the declinatory exception, Promark argued that it was entitled to institute the proceedings in the judicial district of Montréal because BRP had elected its domicile under the ALPE, and that, consequently, that district constituted an “elected domicile” under article 41(3) C.C.P., which reads as follows: So far as public order permits, the court of the defendant’s elected domicile, or the court designated by an agreement between the parties other than a contract adhesion, also has territorial jurisdiction. [Our emphasis] To render her decision, the Judge determined that article 41(3) C.C.Q. should be interpreted using modern rules of statutory interpretation, adding in particular that it is useful to refer to prior provisions of a law to ascertain the legislature’s intent. The Judge thus revisited the legislative history of article 41 C.C.P., affirming that it essentially restates the prior law, in particular article 68 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR c. C-25, which provided in paragraph 1, subparagraph 1 that “. . . a purely personal action may be instituted: (1) [b]efore the court of the defendant’s real domicile or, in the cases contemplated by article 83 of the Civil Code, before that of his elected domicile.” Although paragraph 3 of article 41 C.C.P. no longer specifically refers to article 83 of the Civil Code of Québec (the “C.C.Q.”)6 the Judge, following an interpretive analysis, found that said article still applies to determine whether a party has elected domicile, and stressed the fact that the election of domicile must be express and unequivocal. The Judge added that election of domicile is the exception and must be interpreted restrictively. As for the scope of an election of domicile under the ALPE, the Judge pointed out that subsection 33(1) ALPE indicates that a business may elect domicile and appoint a person to “receive documents for the purposes of this Act.” Article 98(5) ALPE also indicates that the domicile elected by a business under the ALPE is intended to inform third parties of the address where the business wishes to receive documents “for the purposes of this Act.” The Judge was thus of the opinion that sections 33(1) and 98(5) ALPE, as drafted, cannot have the scope that Promark seeks to ascribe to them, as they are clear and they do not need to be interpreted. In the case of an election of domicile under the ALPE, the purpose of the election is to provide an address where documents can be sent to the business, unless there is specific evidence to the contrary. For these reasons, the Judge allowed the declinatory exception and referred the case to the judicial district of Bedford. The Judgement on Appeal From the outset, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the Judge did not commit a reviewable error: (1) the domicile elected for purposes of attributing territorial jurisdiction under article 41 (3) C.C.P. is the domicile designated by the parties for the execution of their agreement within the meaning of article 83 C.C.Q., and (2) the domicile elected under the ALPE is elected for the purposes of applying the ALPE (para. 23). The Court of Appeal is of the opinion that the Judge’s decision is consistent with what the legislature had prescribed in article 68 of the former Code of Civil Procedure and upholds stability in the law, which is particularly important in matters of jurisdiction. After analyzing the parliamentary debates surrounding the enactment of article 41 C.C.P. and the Commentaires de la ministre de la justice, the Court indicated that there is a presumption of the survival of the existing legal rule and that, contrary to what the appellants claimed, the wording of article 41 C.C.P. and articles 33 and 98 ALPE do not give the courts territorial jurisdiction other than that of the defendant’s domicile. The removal of the reference to article 83 C.C.Q. in article 41 C.C.P. does not constitute a clear indication of the legislature’s intent to set aside the requirements of article 83 C.C.Q., under which, for the purposes of determining territorial jurisdiction, the parties must establish the elected domicile in their agreement. On that basis, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal without costs and confirmed the Judge’s reasoning that territorial jurisdiction of the courts under article 41(3) C.C.P. is established based on the election of domicile made under article 83 C.C.Q., and not on the election of domicile made by a corporation under the ALPE, whereby a business elects a domicile for the purposes of the application of that law. Conclusion This case serves as a reminder that the C.C.Q. establishes the general law in our province. It is therefore important to refer to it when interpreting other laws enacted by the Quebec legislature. Because the legislature is “deemed to know its legislative fabric as well as the existing law,”7 the Court cannot interpret a given law—such as the ALPE—in a way that would amend a substantive statutory provision of general application—in this case, the C.C.Q.—where there is no clearly expressed intention to that effect. Promark Electronics Inc. c. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., 2024 QCCA 906 CQLR, c. P-44.1 (the “ALPE”) CQLR, c. C-25.01 (the “C.C.P.”) Promark Electronics Inc. c. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., 2023 QCCS 3405 Promark Electronics Inc. c. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., 2023 QCCA 1427, para. 8 83. “The parties to a juridical act may, in writing, elect domicile with a view to the execution of the act or the exercise of the rights arising from it. Election of domicile is not presumed.” Promark Electronics Inc. c. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., 2024 QCCA 906, para. 24

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July 26, 2024

A tenderer’s failure to comply with the preliminary complaint process as part of a municipality’s public call for tenders leads to a fin de non-recevoir

Introduction On June 14, 2024, the Superior Court of Québec issued a decision1 interpreting section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec, which came into force in 2019. This provision gives a person interested in participating in the awarding process the opportunity to file a preliminary complaint about a requirement in the tender documents that they believe does not ensure the honest and fair treatment of tenderers. To our knowledge, this is the first time a court has considered the impact on a claim for damages for loss of profits2 when an unsuccessful tenderer fails to comply with this relatively new provision The Superior Court concluded that a tenderer’s failure to submit a complaint in a timely manner should be considered as [translation] “a form of fin de non-recevoir, or at the very least, a break in the chain of causation between the alleged fault and the damages claimed” (paragraph 40). Facts The dispute at hand pitted Transport Martin Forget Inc. (“Transport Forget”) against the Municipality of Saint-Alexis (the “Municipality”). On May 6, 2019, the Municipality issued a call for tenders for a snow clearing and salting contract. Transport Forget submitted the lowest bid, which was $150,000 below that of the winning tenderer. Transport Forget was excluded from the call for tenders given its failure to comply with the tender specifications requiring it to provide a Régie du bâtiment du Québec (“RBQ”) licence number, together with an attestation that its licence was in good standing. Further to the Municipality’s refusal to award the contract to Transport Forget, it claimed $300,000 in damages for alleged loss of profits. Transport Forget believed that its tender was compliant, that the RBQ licence requirement imposed by the Municipality was frivolous and unreasonable, that the Municipality failed to uphold the principle of equal treatment of tenderers and that the complaint process provided for in section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec did not deprive it of its rights. As for the Municipality, it considered the irregularity in Transport Forget’s tender to be major and Transport Forget’s failure to comply with the complaint process concerning this requirement—both reasonable and in the public interest—was fatal to its legal action. The evidence showed that the RBQ licence number provided in Transport Forget’s tender was invalid and that Transport Forget deliberately chose not to renew said licence before submitting its tender, as it was unsure as to whether it would win the bidding process and wished to avoid needlessly paying the $1,000 annual fee required for the licence renewal. Applicable principles In order to determine the outcome of this dispute, the Court analyzed the case based on the decision in Tapitec,3 a landmark ruling in tendering matters. It reiterated the Court’s view that the decisive factor in determining whether an irregularity is minor or major is the equal treatment of tenderers. It also pointed out that municipalities can set out conditions aimed at limiting the number of tenderers, provided that this is done for an important and legitimate purpose. As for section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec, the Court viewed it as a mechanism for monitoring all contracts awarded by public bodies which is designed to establish a process to ensure compliance with the principles of integrity needed to protect the public interest. According to the Court, the legislator’s intention is also to protect small municipalities such as the one in question (with a population of approximately 1,500) from potential legal action following the opening of tenders by ensuring that issues concerning the principle of equal treatment of tenderers are resolved prior to the tendering process. Tenderers that fail to comply with this requirement will not be entitled to claim damages for loss of profits, as in this case, except where there has been fraud or blatant bad faith, as in cases of collusion. The purpose of the provision in question is to prevent a tenderer that is aware of the requirements set out in the tender documents from contesting such requirements after the fact. Decision The Court found that the requirement to hold an RBQ licence number was a condition intended to limit the number of tenderers, which the Municipality was entitled to do. Although the Court recognized that there is no correlation between being able to perform snow clearing operations and holding an RBQ licence, it accepted the evidence that this condition was an appropriate and quick way for the Municipality to ascertain the credibility and organizational skills of tenderers, which was a important and legitimate objective. The Court therefore concluded that this requirement of the tender specifications was neither frivolous nor arbitrary. The Court considered the irregularity in Transport Forget’s tender to be major. Although the obligation to hold a valid RBQ licence is neither a requirement of public policy nor a substantive requirement, it is intended precisely to proscribe the lack of seriousness shown by Transport Forget when it opted not to pay the renewal fees for its RBQ licence before submitting its tender. The Municipality exercised its administrative discretion in a reasonable manner and ensured that all tenderers were treated equally. The Court found that the Municipality was right to reject Transport Forget’s tender. Although the Court dismissed the claim, it did nevertheless consider section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec. In the Court’s view, Transport Forget could have lodged a preliminary complaint about the validity of the condition imposed by the Municipality to hold an RBQ licence. Doing so would have given the Municipality the opportunity to amend its call for tenders before the opening of tenders. Transport Forget’s failure to do this rendered its claim for damages inadmissible. Commentary Tenderers for public calls for tenders issued by a municipality must be aware of section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec4 and understand how to apply it in a timely manner. As demonstrated by the Superior Court’s interpretation of this section in the judgment in question, an unsuccessful tenderer that has not complied with the complaint process set out in said section and who intends to sue for damages for an alleged loss of profits could have their claim turned down on grounds of a fin de non-recevoir. Transport Martin Forget Inc. c. Municipalité de Saint-Alexis, 2024 QCCS 2208 We came across the decision in Sintra inc. c. Municipalité de Noyan, 2019 QCCS 4293 (CanLII), which also deals with this provision, but in the context of an application for an interim injunction from the lowest tenderer attempting to prevent the awarding of the contract to a third party: the Court dismissed the claim, in particular because the tenderer had not lodged a complaint about the process provided for the awarding of the contract, in accordance with section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec, and concluded that the prima facie case requirement had not been met. Tapitec c. Ville de Blainville 2017 QCCA 317 We would also like to draw your attention to section 573.3.1.4 of the Cities and Towns Act, which is identical to section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec. We have not found any decisions interpreting this section, so we urge tenderers to be cautious and comply with the complaint process applicable to calls for tenders issued by cities and towns, to avoid having their claim turned down on grounds of a fin de non-recevoir.

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