Legal newsletter for business entrepreneurs and executives, Number 2

September 1, 2009

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Breakdown in negotiations — the binding effect of a letter of intent
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Bid-rigging - a Lesser known Offence in Competition Law

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September 19, 2024

Financing Quebec’s Energy Transition: Unlocking the Potential of Flow-Through Shares

Quebec has set ambitious energy transition and industrial decarbonization targets. The shift to greener practices has to be taken in a context where our energy consumption could rapidly grow under the combined effect of a number of factors, such as the reindustrialization of our economy, population growth, transport electrification and the potential for artificial intelligence to consume vast amounts of energy. Investing in the development of energy infrastructure is therefore critically important, as an abundance of energy is key to economic prosperity. The problem is that public finances are already stretched to the limit with the need to renovate our aging infrastructure, among other things. Encouraging private equity investment is thus vital, and tax incentives can be very effective in this respect. The American example In 2022, the United States passed its Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), with the goal of stimulating investment in the renewable energy sector, in particular. More specifically, the IRA altered or created a number of tax credits to encourage private investment.1 Over the past two years, US businesses have announced a total of almost US$276 billion in new investments in clean energy generation and the capturing or elimination of carbon dioxide and other forms of industrial decarbonization, an increase of 34% on the two years previous.2 The IRA is effective in that it takes the respective situations of various energy sector stakeholders into account in a creative, flexible and pragmatic way, especially where taxation is involved. Energy project promoters often have to wait many years for their projects to generate income and profits, even though the banks and other investment funds they solicit financing from can be presumed to be operating profitable businesses. The tax losses that occur in the years during which such projects are designed and built are therefore of little interest to developers, but of immediate interest to investors. And so, a tax equity market has emerged, in which businesses subject to taxes can invest in the shares of entities set up to develop such projects so as to benefit from tax credits and faster depreciation. Typically, the entity that cashes in the investment and develops the project distributes 99% of income, losses and tax credits to investors until a predetermined return is achieved. Once that return is achieved, the investor’s share of the benefits decreases, and the developer has the option of buying out the investor’s residual share. The IRA has transformed how federal clean energy tax credits are monetized, and it is now possible to buy and sell such credits without having to make a long-term investment. For businesses, this new way of doing things is an additional and attractive way to participate in the growing tax credit market.3 In 2023, the volume of the tax equity market for American projects was around US$20 to 21 billion, up about US$18 billion from the previous year.4 It appears that the trend will continue. It is estimated that the value of the current market, which is particularly attractive to banks, is set to double to US$50 billion a year by 2025.5 The equivalent of flow-through shares The Quebec and Canadian tax deductions mechanism that most closely resembles the US tax equity market is probably flow-through shares. Through these, businesses in the mining and renewable energy sectors can transfer their mining exploration expenses and other expenses—specifically designated as eligible—to investors, who can then deduct them from their own taxable incomes.6 These businesses can thus issue shares at a higher price than they would receive for common shares to finance their exploration and development operations. Investors are willing to pay a higher price in return for the tax deductions afforded by the eligible expenses incurred by the issuing businesses, which can amount to a maximum of 120% of the equity invested in the shares.7 Investors can also claim a 15% or 30% federal tax credit. However, because tax incentives cannot be transferred, our mechanism is more rigid than the American one, and it can only be applied to mineral exploration and development expenses and certain specific expenditures related to renewable energy and energy conservation projects, such as electricity generation using renewable sources like wind, solar energy and geothermal energy.8 With ambition and innovation comes the need to take action Quebec could draw inspiration from the IRA to increase the attractiveness of flow-through shares and broaden their scope of application, thereby creating a new tool to finance the energy transition. The renewable energy sector is similar to the mining sector in many respects, not least in terms of the considerable amount of capital required to build the infrastructure needed to operate a mine or energy generation facility. The flow-through share mechanism, which is well-established and popular with investors,9 could be just as successful in our energy transition context. Making such incentives easier to transfer would also drive the emergence of a market similar to the US tax equity market. A number of Québec flagship companies, such as Hydro-Québec,10 Innergex11 and Boralex,12 are also very ambitious when it comes to developing large-scale energy projects. They face major financing challenges, as do those in the industrial decarbonization and infrastructure renewal sectors. Innovation is necessary to meet these challenges and make the transition to a more sustainable, but just as prosperous, world, and to do so in good time.13 Link Rhodium Group and MIT’s Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR), Clean Investment Monitor, link Brandon Hill, How to take advantage of tax credit transferability though the Inflation Reduction Act, Thomson Reuters Institute, April 16, 2024, link Allison Good, Renewables project finance to keep pace in 2024, but tax equity rule looms, S&P Global, January 12, 2024, link Lesley Hunter and Mason Vliet, The Risk Profile of Renewable Energy Tax Equity Investments, American Council on Renewable Energy, December 2023, link Link, page in French only Link Link Prospectors & Developers Association of Canada, Flow-through shares & the mineral exploration tax credit explained, link Link Link Link The authors would like to acknowledge the participation and the work done by Sophie Poirier in this publication

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August 9, 2024

The elected domicile appearing in the Québec Enterprise Register cannot provide a basis for the Superior Court’s territorial jurisdiction within the meaning of article 41(3) of the Code of Civil Proce

Introduction On July 11, 2024, the Court of Appeal1 rendered a decision that, for the first time, addresses the question of whether the elected domicile appearing in the Québec Enterprise Register (the “REQ”), established under the Act respecting the legal publicity of enterprises,2 can provide a basis for the Superior Court’s territorial jurisdiction within the meaning of article 41(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure.3 Upholding the decision rendered by the Superior Court,4 the Court of Appeal answered that it cannot. The Facts On April 25, 2023, Promark Electronics Inc. and Electrical Components International Inc. (collectively, “Promark”) filed a claim for damages against Bombardier Recreational Products Inc. (“BRP”) in the judicial district of Montréal, alleging that a letter of agreement had been terminated and related purchase orders cancelled. On June 22, 2023, BRP raised a declinatory exception asking the court to issue an order transferring the case to the judicial district of Bedford, where its head office is located. Promark argued that filing its claim in the judicial district of Montréal was warranted because of BRP’s elected domicile indicated in the REQ, which corresponded to the office of its counsel located in Montréal. On September 5, 2023, the Honourable Tiziana Di Donato, J.S.C. (the “Judge”) allowed BRP’s declinatory exception and issued an order referring the case to the judicial district of Bedford. On November 10, 2023, the Honourable Stephen W. Hamilton, J.C.A., granted leave to appeal the Judge’s decision, indicating that the courts have never settled the question of whether the domicile elected under section 33 ALPE is sufficient to make paragraph 3 of article 41 of the C.C.P. apply. He added that it appeared to him that the lower courts had rendered contradictory judgments in this regard.5 The Trial Judgement The Judge began by pointing out that, generally, for a purely personal action, the judicial district of the defendant’s domicile is the natural forum (article 41(1) C.C.P.) and that, in the case of a corporation, the domicile would be that of its head office. The Judge further clarified this principle by explaining that, where more than one judicial district has jurisdiction, the plaintiff may institute its proceedings before another court having territorial jurisdiction (article 42 C.C.P.), provided that it establishes that it is entitled to make such an election. In support of its contestation to the declinatory exception, Promark argued that it was entitled to institute the proceedings in the judicial district of Montréal because BRP had elected its domicile under the ALPE, and that, consequently, that district constituted an “elected domicile” under article 41(3) C.C.P., which reads as follows: So far as public order permits, the court of the defendant’s elected domicile, or the court designated by an agreement between the parties other than a contract adhesion, also has territorial jurisdiction. [Our emphasis] To render her decision, the Judge determined that article 41(3) C.C.Q. should be interpreted using modern rules of statutory interpretation, adding in particular that it is useful to refer to prior provisions of a law to ascertain the legislature’s intent. The Judge thus revisited the legislative history of article 41 C.C.P., affirming that it essentially restates the prior law, in particular article 68 of the former Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR c. C-25, which provided in paragraph 1, subparagraph 1 that “. . . a purely personal action may be instituted: (1) [b]efore the court of the defendant’s real domicile or, in the cases contemplated by article 83 of the Civil Code, before that of his elected domicile.” Although paragraph 3 of article 41 C.C.P. no longer specifically refers to article 83 of the Civil Code of Québec (the “C.C.Q.”)6 the Judge, following an interpretive analysis, found that said article still applies to determine whether a party has elected domicile, and stressed the fact that the election of domicile must be express and unequivocal. The Judge added that election of domicile is the exception and must be interpreted restrictively. As for the scope of an election of domicile under the ALPE, the Judge pointed out that subsection 33(1) ALPE indicates that a business may elect domicile and appoint a person to “receive documents for the purposes of this Act.” Article 98(5) ALPE also indicates that the domicile elected by a business under the ALPE is intended to inform third parties of the address where the business wishes to receive documents “for the purposes of this Act.” The Judge was thus of the opinion that sections 33(1) and 98(5) ALPE, as drafted, cannot have the scope that Promark seeks to ascribe to them, as they are clear and they do not need to be interpreted. In the case of an election of domicile under the ALPE, the purpose of the election is to provide an address where documents can be sent to the business, unless there is specific evidence to the contrary. For these reasons, the Judge allowed the declinatory exception and referred the case to the judicial district of Bedford. The Judgement on Appeal From the outset, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the Judge did not commit a reviewable error: (1) the domicile elected for purposes of attributing territorial jurisdiction under article 41 (3) C.C.P. is the domicile designated by the parties for the execution of their agreement within the meaning of article 83 C.C.Q., and (2) the domicile elected under the ALPE is elected for the purposes of applying the ALPE (para. 23). The Court of Appeal is of the opinion that the Judge’s decision is consistent with what the legislature had prescribed in article 68 of the former Code of Civil Procedure and upholds stability in the law, which is particularly important in matters of jurisdiction. After analyzing the parliamentary debates surrounding the enactment of article 41 C.C.P. and the Commentaires de la ministre de la justice, the Court indicated that there is a presumption of the survival of the existing legal rule and that, contrary to what the appellants claimed, the wording of article 41 C.C.P. and articles 33 and 98 ALPE do not give the courts territorial jurisdiction other than that of the defendant’s domicile. The removal of the reference to article 83 C.C.Q. in article 41 C.C.P. does not constitute a clear indication of the legislature’s intent to set aside the requirements of article 83 C.C.Q., under which, for the purposes of determining territorial jurisdiction, the parties must establish the elected domicile in their agreement. On that basis, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal without costs and confirmed the Judge’s reasoning that territorial jurisdiction of the courts under article 41(3) C.C.P. is established based on the election of domicile made under article 83 C.C.Q., and not on the election of domicile made by a corporation under the ALPE, whereby a business elects a domicile for the purposes of the application of that law. Conclusion This case serves as a reminder that the C.C.Q. establishes the general law in our province. It is therefore important to refer to it when interpreting other laws enacted by the Quebec legislature. Because the legislature is “deemed to know its legislative fabric as well as the existing law,”7 the Court cannot interpret a given law—such as the ALPE—in a way that would amend a substantive statutory provision of general application—in this case, the C.C.Q.—where there is no clearly expressed intention to that effect. Promark Electronics Inc. c. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., 2024 QCCA 906 CQLR, c. P-44.1 (the “ALPE”) CQLR, c. C-25.01 (the “C.C.P.”) Promark Electronics Inc. c. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., 2023 QCCS 3405 Promark Electronics Inc. c. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., 2023 QCCA 1427, para. 8 83. “The parties to a juridical act may, in writing, elect domicile with a view to the execution of the act or the exercise of the rights arising from it. Election of domicile is not presumed.” Promark Electronics Inc. c. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., 2024 QCCA 906, para. 24

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July 26, 2024

A tenderer’s failure to comply with the preliminary complaint process as part of a municipality’s public call for tenders leads to a fin de non-recevoir

Introduction On June 14, 2024, the Superior Court of Québec issued a decision1 interpreting section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec, which came into force in 2019. This provision gives a person interested in participating in the awarding process the opportunity to file a preliminary complaint about a requirement in the tender documents that they believe does not ensure the honest and fair treatment of tenderers. To our knowledge, this is the first time a court has considered the impact on a claim for damages for loss of profits2 when an unsuccessful tenderer fails to comply with this relatively new provision The Superior Court concluded that a tenderer’s failure to submit a complaint in a timely manner should be considered as [translation] “a form of fin de non-recevoir, or at the very least, a break in the chain of causation between the alleged fault and the damages claimed” (paragraph 40). Facts The dispute at hand pitted Transport Martin Forget Inc. (“Transport Forget”) against the Municipality of Saint-Alexis (the “Municipality”). On May 6, 2019, the Municipality issued a call for tenders for a snow clearing and salting contract. Transport Forget submitted the lowest bid, which was $150,000 below that of the winning tenderer. Transport Forget was excluded from the call for tenders given its failure to comply with the tender specifications requiring it to provide a Régie du bâtiment du Québec (“RBQ”) licence number, together with an attestation that its licence was in good standing. Further to the Municipality’s refusal to award the contract to Transport Forget, it claimed $300,000 in damages for alleged loss of profits. Transport Forget believed that its tender was compliant, that the RBQ licence requirement imposed by the Municipality was frivolous and unreasonable, that the Municipality failed to uphold the principle of equal treatment of tenderers and that the complaint process provided for in section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec did not deprive it of its rights. As for the Municipality, it considered the irregularity in Transport Forget’s tender to be major and Transport Forget’s failure to comply with the complaint process concerning this requirement—both reasonable and in the public interest—was fatal to its legal action. The evidence showed that the RBQ licence number provided in Transport Forget’s tender was invalid and that Transport Forget deliberately chose not to renew said licence before submitting its tender, as it was unsure as to whether it would win the bidding process and wished to avoid needlessly paying the $1,000 annual fee required for the licence renewal. Applicable principles In order to determine the outcome of this dispute, the Court analyzed the case based on the decision in Tapitec,3 a landmark ruling in tendering matters. It reiterated the Court’s view that the decisive factor in determining whether an irregularity is minor or major is the equal treatment of tenderers. It also pointed out that municipalities can set out conditions aimed at limiting the number of tenderers, provided that this is done for an important and legitimate purpose. As for section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec, the Court viewed it as a mechanism for monitoring all contracts awarded by public bodies which is designed to establish a process to ensure compliance with the principles of integrity needed to protect the public interest. According to the Court, the legislator’s intention is also to protect small municipalities such as the one in question (with a population of approximately 1,500) from potential legal action following the opening of tenders by ensuring that issues concerning the principle of equal treatment of tenderers are resolved prior to the tendering process. Tenderers that fail to comply with this requirement will not be entitled to claim damages for loss of profits, as in this case, except where there has been fraud or blatant bad faith, as in cases of collusion. The purpose of the provision in question is to prevent a tenderer that is aware of the requirements set out in the tender documents from contesting such requirements after the fact. Decision The Court found that the requirement to hold an RBQ licence number was a condition intended to limit the number of tenderers, which the Municipality was entitled to do. Although the Court recognized that there is no correlation between being able to perform snow clearing operations and holding an RBQ licence, it accepted the evidence that this condition was an appropriate and quick way for the Municipality to ascertain the credibility and organizational skills of tenderers, which was a important and legitimate objective. The Court therefore concluded that this requirement of the tender specifications was neither frivolous nor arbitrary. The Court considered the irregularity in Transport Forget’s tender to be major. Although the obligation to hold a valid RBQ licence is neither a requirement of public policy nor a substantive requirement, it is intended precisely to proscribe the lack of seriousness shown by Transport Forget when it opted not to pay the renewal fees for its RBQ licence before submitting its tender. The Municipality exercised its administrative discretion in a reasonable manner and ensured that all tenderers were treated equally. The Court found that the Municipality was right to reject Transport Forget’s tender. Although the Court dismissed the claim, it did nevertheless consider section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec. In the Court’s view, Transport Forget could have lodged a preliminary complaint about the validity of the condition imposed by the Municipality to hold an RBQ licence. Doing so would have given the Municipality the opportunity to amend its call for tenders before the opening of tenders. Transport Forget’s failure to do this rendered its claim for damages inadmissible. Commentary Tenderers for public calls for tenders issued by a municipality must be aware of section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec4 and understand how to apply it in a timely manner. As demonstrated by the Superior Court’s interpretation of this section in the judgment in question, an unsuccessful tenderer that has not complied with the complaint process set out in said section and who intends to sue for damages for an alleged loss of profits could have their claim turned down on grounds of a fin de non-recevoir. Transport Martin Forget Inc. c. Municipalité de Saint-Alexis, 2024 QCCS 2208 We came across the decision in Sintra inc. c. Municipalité de Noyan, 2019 QCCS 4293 (CanLII), which also deals with this provision, but in the context of an application for an interim injunction from the lowest tenderer attempting to prevent the awarding of the contract to a third party: the Court dismissed the claim, in particular because the tenderer had not lodged a complaint about the process provided for the awarding of the contract, in accordance with section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec, and concluded that the prima facie case requirement had not been met. Tapitec c. Ville de Blainville 2017 QCCA 317 We would also like to draw your attention to section 573.3.1.4 of the Cities and Towns Act, which is identical to section 938.1.2.2 of the Municipal Code of Québec. We have not found any decisions interpreting this section, so we urge tenderers to be cautious and comply with the complaint process applicable to calls for tenders issued by cities and towns, to avoid having their claim turned down on grounds of a fin de non-recevoir.

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July 3, 2024

Environmental claims about a product, a service or business activities: stricter rules to combat greenwashing

Greenwashing is a form of marketing that misrepresents a product, service or practice as having positive environmental effects,1 thereby misleading consumers and preventing them from making an informed purchasing decision.2 Several initiatives have been launched around the world to counter this practice. In California, a law requires business entities to disclose information in support of environmental claims.3 In France, ads featuring environmental claims such as “carbon-neutral” and “net zero” must include a quick response (QR) code that links to the studies and data supporting such claims.4 Within the European Union, a proposal for a directive was published with a view to possibly banning generic terms like “environmentally friendly.”5 In South Korea, the Korea Fair Trade Commission proposed an amendment to its Guidelines for Review of Environment-Related Labeling and Advertising that would simplify the process of issuing fines to businesses engaged in greenwashing.6 The Parliament of Canada seemingly followed suit by tabling Bill C-597 on November 30, 2023, which introduces a provision into the Competition Act8aimed at improving the means to fight greenwashing. Amended on May 28, 2024, Bill C-59 finally received royal assent on June 20, 2024, date on which it partially came into force. Because the provision will apply to “any person,” all businesses will be subject to it, regardless of their size or legal form. Amendments to the Competition Act regarding environmental claims The Competition Act now allows9 the Commissioner of the Competition Bureau (the “Bureau”) to inquire into10 the conduct of a person who promotes 1) a product by making an environmental claim or warranty11 or 2) any business interest by making representations about the environmental benefits of a business or business activity. Claim concerning a product or service Insofar as a business or person is unable to demonstrate a product’s benefits for protecting the environment or mitigating the environmental and ecological effects of climate change, the Commissioner of Competition will be entitled to apply to a court for an order requiring such business or person to (i)cease promoting the product on the basis of a non-compliant environmental claim or warranty, (ii)publish a corrective notice and (iii)pay an administrative monetary penalty12 of up to, for a legal person, the greater of $10 million and three times the value of the benefit derived from the deceptive conduct, or, if that amount cannot be reasonably determined, 3% of the legal person’s annual worldwide gross revenue. The penalty for each subsequent offence could be as high as $15 million. A “product” within the meaning of the Competition Act may be an article (real or personal property of every description) or a service.13 This new provision expressly requires any person or business to base their environmental claims on “an adequate and proper test”.14 A “test” within the meaning of this Act consists in an analysis, verification or assessment intended to demonstrate the result or alleged effect of a product. It does not necessarily have to be a scientific method nor do the results need to meet a test of certainty, as the courts have generally interpreted the term “proper” to mean fit, apt, suitable or as required by the circumstances.15 With regard to misleading claims, the courts16 have clarified the nature of the criteria that must be considered to determine whether a particular test is “adequate and proper.” Thus, an adequate and proper test depends on the claim made as understood by the common person. The test must also meet the following criteria: It must be reflective of the risk or harm which the product is designed to prevent or assist in preventing. It must be done under controlled circumstances or in conditions which exclude external variables or take account in a measurable way for such variables. It must be conducted on more than one independent sample wherever possible (e.g., destruction testing may be an exception). The results need not be measured against a test of certainty, but must be reasonable given the nature of the harm at issue and establish that it is the product itself which causes the desired effect in a material manner. It must be performed regardless of the size of the seller’s organization or the anticipated volume of sales.17 Representations accompanying product that come from a person outside Canada are deemed to be made by the person who imports the product into Canada.18 General claims about a company’s activities While Bill C-59 was initially intended to cover only environmental statements, warranties or guarantees regarding products, the assented version of the bill provides that any representation made regarding the benefits of a business or business activity for protecting or restoring the environment or mitigating the environmental and ecological causes or effects of climate change are subject to a Bureau inquiry.19 As an example cited by the Bureau, a company’s claims about being “carbon neutral” or that it commits to becoming so within a certain number of years20 would constitute “representations of the benefits of a business or business activity in mitigating the causes of climate change.” The company making such claims must be able to demonstrate that they are based on “adequate and proper substantiation” obtained using an “internationally recognized methodology”.21 The Competition Act does not specify which internationally recognized methods may be used for this purpose. Should the substantiation the company uses be inadequate, improper or obtained using a method that is not recognized internationally, it will be subject to the same consequences as those mentioned in the previous section.22 Regardless of whether the claims concern a product or service or a business activity, the persons concerned are allowed to defend themselves under the Competition Act by establishing that they exercised due diligence.23 What impact will these amendments really have? Notwithstanding the proposed legislative amendment, the Competition Act already covers false or misleading representations with respect to green advertising.24 The current provisions already prohibit making representations to the public that are false or misleading in a material respect.25 In recent years, several complaints of greenwashing have been lodged with the Bureau on that basis, prompting it to open a number of investigations. Some have led to major settlements involving companies having made representations regarding their products.26/27/28/29 In all of these cases, the heavy burden of establishing that the business’s environmental claim was false or misleading fell on the Bureau. The proposed amendments to the Competition Act would change this by shifting the burden of proof onto businesses. The onus would therefore be on them to demonstrate that their product benefits the environment in some way or mitigates the environmental and ecological effects of climate change or that its claims are based on adequate and proper substantiation obtained using an internationally recognized method. These new legislative provisions now confirm what was already a general standard since 1999, and they ease the Bureau’s burden of proof. In addition to the Competition Act, other laws applicable in Quebec provide a general framework for greenwashing, such as the Consumer Protection Act.30Under this Act, no merchant, manufacturer or advertiser may, by any means whatsoever, make false or misleading claims to a consumer, which implicitly includes greenwashing.31 To determine whether a representation constitutes a prohibited practice, the general impression it gives, and, as the case may be, the literal meaning of the terms used therein must be taken into account. In particular, it is prohibited to falsely ascribe particular advantages to a product or service, or to claim that a product has a particular feature or ascribe certain characteristics of performance to it.33 Offences are subject to criminal34 and civil35 penalties. Private remedies Another new measure to combat greenwashing in the Competition Act is the possibility for any person (individual, organization, competitor, etc.) to apply directly to the Competition Tribunal for an order against a business making environmental claims or representations about a product, service or activities without adequate substantiation.36 In the first version of Bill C-59, only the Commissioner of Competition could institute such proceedings before the Tribunal.37 However, the Competition Tribunal must first give leave to make such an application.38 The Tribunal’s power to give leave is largely discretionary, meaning that the Tribunal may grant it if it deems that it is in the public interest to do so.39 This new measure will come into force in one year on June 20, 2025.40 Best practices It is crucial for a company to adopt and display a realistic image of its environmental impact based on credible data and facts. Making sure that claims are legally compliant is not all that’s at stake. A business’s failure to do the above is likely to seriously harm not only its reputation, but also its relationship with its stakeholders. Thus, before claiming to be “green,” businesses must consider the following questions. Are the real motivations behind the business’s sustainability commitments clear, legitimate and convincing? Is sustainable development an integral part of the business strategy? Is it applied when addressing key business issues and taking new actions? Does the company have a sustainable development policy that is credible and based on relevant issues? Was it developed collaboratively with and approved by its Board of Directors? Has the company set specific, clear, measurable and achievable objectives and targets? Considerations for public companies As concerns public companies subject to continuous disclosure obligations under Canadian securities legislation (“reporting issuers”), these considerations are set against a backdrop of increasing pressure from investors, including institutional investors, and others for greater transparency on climate-related issues. Although climate-related disclosure requirements for Canadian reporting issuers are still relatively limited, many issuers choose to voluntarily disclose such information, for example in sustainability reports. Reporting issuers must pay particular attention to their communications, which could constitute greenwashing within the meaning of the Competition Act and give rise to the penalties and other consequences mentioned above. This is another risk to add to reporting issuers’ liability in the secondary market for misrepresentation and failure to make disclosures within prescribed time limits. As far as climate issues are concerned, the risk arises in particular from overestimating or inadequately disclosing how activities contribute to protecting the environment or how they mitigate the environmental and ecological effects of climate change. The current move towards standardized methodologies and frameworks and the forthcoming adoption of binding rules on climate-related disclosures should help to limit greenwashing in this context. In the meantime, reporting issuers can reduce the risk of greenwashing by following a well-established international methodology and by including disclaimers for forward-looking statements adapted to the risks and uncertainties inherent to the climate-related information they provide. Conclusion The new provisions of the Competition Act are already having an impact. As a precaution, some companies have removed ads, promotional documents and websites containing claims that certain activities were undertaken specifically to mitigate the causes of climate change. Parliament’s message could not be clearer: Shifting the burden of proof onto businesses means closing the door on an era when products, services and business activities could be marketed as green in the absence of tangible evidence. Definition of the Autorité des marchés financiers: 8 questions and answers about carbon credits and related concepts | AMF (lautorite.qc.ca). Definition of the Competition Bureau: Environmental claims and greenwashing (canada.ca). Assembly Bill No. 1305: Voluntary carbon market disclosures, California, 2023. Read it here: Bill Text – AB-1305 Voluntary carbon market disclosures. Décret no 2022-539 du 13 avril 2022 relatif à la compensation carbone et aux allégations de neutralité carbone dans la publicité, Journal officiel de la République française, 2022. Read it here: Légifrance – Publications officielles – Journal officiel – JORF n° 0088 du 14/04/2022 (legifrance.gouv.fr). Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU as regards empowering consumers for the green transition through better protection against unfair practices and better information, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 2022. Read it here: pdf(europa.eu). Read it here: KFTC Proposes Amendment to Review Guidelines Regarding Greenwashing – Kim & Chang (kimchang.com). An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session. Read it here: Government Bill (House of Commons) C-59 (44-1) – First Reading – Fall Economic Statement Implementation Act, 2023 – Parliament of Canada. The Bill is currently at second reading in the House of Commons. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34. These provisions came into force on June 20, 2024. This power to make inquiry would be available, as the Competition Act already provides, upon receipt of a complaint signed by six persons who are not less than 18 years of age or in any situation where the Commissioner has reason to believe that a person has contravened section 74.01 of the Competition Act (see R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, ss. 9 and 10). An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, section 236. Read it here: Government Bill (House of Commons) C-59 (44-1) – First Reading – Fall Economic Statement Implementation Act, 2023 – Parliament of Canada; section 236 of this Act adds paragraphs b.1 and b.2 to subsection 74.01(1) of the Competition Act. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, article 74.1. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, subsection 2(1). An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, para. 236(1). Read it here: Government Bill (House of Commons) C-59 (44-1) – First Reading – Fall Economic Statement Implementation Act, 2023 – Parliament of Canada The Commissioner of Competition v. Imperial Brush Co. Ltd. and Kel Kem Ltd. (c.o.b. as Imperial Manufacturing Group), 2008 CACT 2, paras. 122 et seq. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, section 74.09: “courts” means the Competition Tribunal, the Federal Court and the superior court of a province. The Commissioner of Competition v. Imperial Brush Co. Ltd. and Kel Kem Ltd. (c.o.b. as Imperial Manufacturing Group), 2008 CACT 2. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, subsections 74.03(1) and (2). An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, section 236. Read it here: Government Bill (House of Commons) C-59 (44-1) – First Reading – Fall Economic Statement Implementation Act, 2023 – Parliament of Canada; paragraph b.2 of section 74.01 of the Competition Act was added by amendment adopted on May 28, 2024. Letter from Anthony Durocher and Bradley Callaghan to the Honourable Pamela Wallin dated May 31, 2024. Read it here: BANC_Follow-up_CompetitionBureau_e.pdf (sencanada.ca). An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, section 236. Read it here: Government Bill (House of Commons) C-59 (44-1) – First Reading – Fall Economic Statement Implementation Act, 2023 – Parliament of Canada. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, article 74.1. Competition Act, subsection 74.1(3). Louis-Philippe Lampron, “L’encadrement juridique de la publicité écologique fausse ou trompeuse au Canada : une nécessité pour la réalisation du potentiel de la consommation écologique?” Revue de Droit de l’Université de Sherbrooke, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2005, p. 474. Read it here: A:\lampron.wpd (usherbrooke.ca). Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, paragraph 74.01(1)(a). Amanda Stephenson, Des groupes écologistes misent sur la Loi sur la concurrence(Environmental groups banking on the Competition Act), October 1, 2023, La Presse. Read it here: Des groupes écologistes misent sur la Loi sur la concurrence | La Presse. Brenna Owen, Un groupe accuse Lululemon d’« écoblanchiment » et demande une enquête (A group accuses Lululemon of “greenwashing” and calls for an investigation) February 13, 2024, La Presse. Read it here: Un groupe accuse Lululemon d’« écoblanchiment » et demande une enquête | La Presse. Martin Vallières, “Gare aux tromperies écologiques” (Beware of greenwashing), January 26, 2022, La Presse. Read it here: Écoblanchiment | Gare aux tromperies écologiques | La Presse; Keurig Canada to pay $3 million penalty to settle Competition Bureau’s concerns over coffee pod recycling claims – Canada.ca. The Commissioner of Competition v. Volkswagen Group Canada Inc. and Audi Canada Inc., 2018 Competition Tribunal 13. Consumer Protection Act, CQLR c. P-40.1, ss. 219, 220 and 221. Definition of the Competition Bureau: Environmental claims and greenwashing (canada.ca). Richard v. Time Inc., 2012 SCC 8, paras. 46 to 57. Consumer Protection Act, CQLR c. P-40.1, ss. 220 and 221. Consumer Protection Act, CQLR c P-40.1, ss. 277 to 279: Fines range from $600 to $15 000 in the case of a natural person and $2 000 to $100 000 in the case of a legal person. Offenders convicted a second time are liable to fines twice as high as those prescribed. Id. at ss. 271 to 276: Consumers may request that the contract be annulled, that the merchant’s obligation be performed or that their obligation be reduced, among other things. For civil matters only; An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, subsection 254(1). See subsection 103.1(1) of the Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, effective before June 20, 2024. An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, subsection 254(1). Id. at 254(4). An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023, 44th Parliament, 1st Session, section 272.

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