Copyrights

Overview

The expression of an idea, such as a visual art or musical piece can be protected by copyrights.

Our services relating to such protection include:

  • availability and registrability searches,
  • drafting, filing and prosecuting of applications in Canada and abroad,
  • status verification, and
  • infringement and validity opinions,

In addition to IP advice and our services in litigation and arbitration and contracts, titles and due diligence reviews related to copyrights.

  1. Bill C-244: unlocking the right to repair

    On November 7, 2024, Bill C-244, An Act to amend the Copyright Act (diagnosis, maintenance and repair)1 received royal assent, adding a new exception to the provisions governing technological protection measures (TPM) in the Copyright Act (CA). This legislative amendment adds section 41.121 to the CA, making it legal to circumvent TPMs for product maintenance, repair and diagnosis. What it means The new section 41.121 is expected to have a limited impact on the Canadian repair market. Although repairers can now circumvent TPMs to diagnose, maintain or repair a customer’s device, it is still forbidden for repairers to use the services of a TPM circumvention specialist, and specialized circumvention equipment is still prohibited. Furthermore, the absence of a fair dealing exception in this amendment poses ongoing risks of copyright infringement for these purposes. A number of questions remain unanswered, including the scope the courts will assign to the terms “maintenance” and “repair.” Does upgrading a device with improved technology fall within the definition of maintenance, or are repairers restricted to servicing devices according to original specifications? For example, if a connected device becomes obsolete after a new security standard is adopted, would replacing its software constitute maintenance? In short, the adoption of Bill C-244 represents but a small step toward the right to repair goods, and it serves as a prime example of how reconciling property rights with intellectual property rights can be challenging. Amendments made by C-244 Section 41.121, as introduced by C-244, has three paragraphs: Diagnosis, maintenance and repair 41.121 (1) Paragraph 41.1(1)(a) does not apply to a person who circumvents a technological protection measure for the sole purpose of maintaining or repairing a product, including any related diagnosing, if the work, performer’s performance fixed in a sound recording or sound recording to which the technological protection measure controls access forms a part of the product. For greater certainty (2) For greater certainty, subsection (1) applies to a person who circumvents a technological protection measure in the circumstances referred to in that subsection for another person. Non-application (3) A person acting in the circumstances referred to in subsection (1) is not entitled to benefit from the exception under that subsection if the person does an act that constitutes an infringement of copyright. Under the new section, the protection afforded to TPMs is set aside for maintenance and repair purposes, including the related diagnosing. Subsection 41.121(2) adds that the exception also applies to a person, such as a professional repairer, who repairs a product for another person. Subsection 41.121(3) further adds that the exception applies only to situations where there is no copyright infringement; for example, copyright infringement would be a person circumventing TPMs to repair a product, but taking advantage of the situation to make an illicit copy of a computer program. Bill C-244 reintroduced certain provisions of Bill C-272,2 which had been tabled in September 2020 but abandoned after the 2021 federal election. However, unlike the original text, the amendment passed on November 7, 2024, does not allow a person to manufacture, import or distribute TPM-circumvention devices to be used to perform repairs. It is rather limited to making the act of circumvention itself legal. Origin of the problem Bill C-272 was partly introduced in response to the decision in Nintendo of America Inc. v. King,3 which had considerably dampened the TPM-containing-device repair industry. In that case, the Federal Court awarded Nintendo of America Inc. $11.7 million in statutory damages following the circumvention of its TPMs, with $20,000 awarded for each of the 585 affected games, and an additional $1 million in punitive damages. Technological Protection Measures (TPMs), also known as digital locks or digital rights management (DRM) technologies, are mechanisms used to safeguard copyrights and sensitive information in the digital domain. They regulate access to or the copying, alteration and redistribution of digital content, such as audio and video files, software and e-books. TPMs can take various forms, including access codes, passwords, encryption keys, watermarks, digital signatures, encryption methods, and integrated hardware-based protections. These measures may be embedded in the files themselves, or in the devices that read, store or distribute them. DVD encryption and video game cartridge protections are well-known examples. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) first proposed a framework for protecting TPMs in 1996, anticipating that increased internet usage might escalate copyright infringement.4 In 1999, the United States ratified the framework by passing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), followed by Canada’s enactment of the Copyright Modernization Act5 in 2014. This legislative amendment introduced section 41.1 and related provisions to the Copyright Act (CA), prohibiting the circumvention of TPMs. Today, TPMs are ubiquitous, appearing in cars, tractors, medical implants, printer cartridges, game consoles, and various electronic devices. The $11.7 million award to Nintendo of America Inc. pursuant to this provision had a chilling effect on the repair industry.6 In response to the Nintendo decision, Bill C-272 proposed exceptions to the prohibition on circumventing TPMs for diagnosis, maintenance, and repair activities, as specified in paragraph 41.1(1)(a) of the CA. It also included an exception for the manufacture, importation, or distribution of products designed to circumvent TPMs for these purposes, addressing the restrictions noted in paragraph 41.1(1)(c) of the CA. Harmonization with the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement The scope of the new section 41.121 introduced by Bill C-244 was significantly narrowed to prevent conflicts with the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA). Article 20.66 of CUSMA requires member countries to enforce three categories of prohibitions related to TPMs: a prohibition on offering TPM circumvention services, a prohibition on the manufacture, import, or distribution of devices intended for TPMs circumvention, and a prohibition on the act itself of circumventing TPMs. Paragraph 5 of Article 20.66 specifies certain exceptions to these prohibitions, particularly for purposes such as interoperability, encryption research (security), and government activities (most of which are addressed under sections 41.11 and following of the CA), but it does not include an exception for the repair of goods. The exception provided in section 41.121 was thus limited to the third CUSMA category which involves the prohibition on circumventing TPMs themselves, as outlined in paragraph 41.1(1)(a) of the CA. As such, the prohibitions on offering TPM circumvention services, and manufacturing, importing or distributing TPM circumvention devices, set out in paragraphs 41.1(1)(b) and 41.1(1)(c), respectively, remain unchanged, even if the purpose of circumvention is to repair a device. Introduction of ambiguous wording Legal professionals may recognize that the changes made to the definitions in section 41 present new challenges. In an attempt to clarify how the new provision’s application, the legislator has added two conflicting expressions to the definitions of “circumvent” and “technological protection measure,” which may not have been necessary. Before After Technical protection measures and information on the rights mechanism Definitions 41 The following definitions apply in this section and in sections 41.1 to 41.21. circumvent means, a)        (a) in respect of a technological protection measure within the meaning of paragraph (a) of the definition technological protection measure, to descramble a scrambled work or decrypt an encrypted work or to otherwise avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate or impair the technological protection measure, unless it is done with the authority of the copyright owner; and Technical protection measures and information on the rights mechanism Definitions 41 The following definitions apply in this section and in sections 41.1 to 41.21. circumvent means, a)        (a) in respect of a technological protection measure within the meaning of paragraph (a) of the definition technological protection measure, to descramble a scrambled work or computer program, or decrypt an encrypted work or computer program or to otherwise avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate or impair the technological protection measure, unless it is done with the authority of the copyright owner; and b)        … b)        … technological protection measure means any effective technology, device or component that, in the ordinary course of its operation, a)        controls access to a work, to a performer’s performance fixed in a sound recording or to a sound recording and whose use is authorized by the copyright owner; or technological protection measure means any effective technology, device or component that, in the ordinary course of its operation, a)        controls access to a work, including a computer program, to a performer’s performance fixed in a sound recording or to a sound recording and whose use is authorized by the copyright owner; b)        … b)        … In the first instance, the legislator specifies that definition applies to “a work or computer program,” which suggests that a computer program is not considered a work. However, the second definition uses the phrase “a work, including a computer program,” implying the opposite. These clarifications were unnecessary, since the definition of “work” already includes literary works, and section 2 of the CA expressly states that literary works include computer programs. It is unfortunate that the text was adopted in its current form despite the numerous comments on this issue during parliamentary reviews.7 Striking a balance between property rights and intellectual property rights The debates surrounding these legislative changes illustrate the inherent challenges in striking a balance between the reduction of property rights, including the right to repair goods, and the promotion of intellectual property rights. For example, the Entertainment Software Association of Canada has advocated for excluding game consoles from the new exception.8 Paul Fogolin, the association’s Vice President of Policy and Government Affairs, argued that broadly opening the right to repair goods could jeopardize the video game industry by making it almost impossible for rights holders to pursue legal action against those tampering with their protection measures.9 Charles Bernard, Lead Economist for the Canadian Automobile Dealers Association,expressed concerns about increased auto theft risks.10 Catherine Lovrics, Chair of the Copyright Policy Committee, Intellectual Property Institute of Canada, anticipated cybersecurity risks.11 Several industry stakeholders believe that making documents, software, parts, and tools available for repair could elevate the risk of cyberattacks. Industry representatives in the United States have highlighted similar risks. For instance, the Association of Equipment Manufacturerssuggests that enabling the circumvention of TPMs could compromise emission controls on equipment, potentially leading to violations of environmental laws and risks to human life.12 Others have raised concerns about product liability issues.13 According to Apple and Panasonic, today’s electronics are too complex for non-specialists to repair and, thus, broadening the right to repair could compromise consumer safety.14 Concerns about safety, security, and liability are certainly legitimate; however, it is also valid to question whether intellectual property law is the appropriate vehicle to address these issues. During review of C-244, Shannon Sereda, Director of Government Relations, Policy, and Markets for Alberta Wheat and Barley Commissions, highlighted the potential difficulties farmers face when they cannot swiftly repair their equipment. She argued that “[t]he current legislative environment in Canada supports equipment repair monopolies by allowing OEMs to prohibit the bypassing of TPMs.”15 Anthony D. Rosborough, a researcher in the Law Department of the European University Institute, corroborated this viewpoint, stating that TPMs “function principally to protect technologies, rather than works or the rights of authors.” In his view, the industry sometimes relies on copyrights for what should be more appropriately protected with patents or trade secrets.16 The relaxation of TPM rules in Canada aligns with similar measures already implemented in the United States. On October 28, the Librarian of Congress renewed a series of exceptions to section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), including provisions that allow the circumvention of certain protection measures for repairs.17 These exceptions are subject to renewal every three years and have so far been renewed twice since 2018.18 Over the past few years, the United States has taken several steps to promote the right to repair goods. In May 2021, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a detailed report19 on anti-competitive practices related to the right to repair. On July 9, 2021, shortly after the report was released, the U.S. President issued an Executive Order to combat such practices and encourage the development of a third-party or owner repair market.20 Since then, multiple states have enacted laws supporting the right to repair.21 On January 8, 2023, John Deere pledged to enable independent repairers to service its equipment.22 Apple Inc., historically opposed to expanding the right to repair, shifted its stance in 2022 by launching a self-service repair program and publicly supporting California’s new right-to-repair law.23 Last year, WIPO reported that 40 states had introduced legislation in favour of the right to repair.24 Here in Canada, the adoption of Bill C-244 represents another step in establishing the right to repair goods. This measure builds on another federal bill, C-59,25 which also received assent last June and amended the Competition Act to empower courts to compel suppliers to sell diagnosis or repair tools. At the provincial level, Quebec became the first province to enact right-to-repair legislation last year. 26 In the coming months, it remains to be seen whether the new section 41.121 of the Copyright Act (CA) will unlock the repair market. For the moment, the measure strikes us as somewhat timid.27 Parliament of Canada, LEGISinfo: C-244: An Act to amend the Copyright Act (diagnosis, maintenance and repair), Parliament of Canada, online: https://www.parl.ca/legisinfo/en/bill/44-1/c-244. Parliament of Canada, LEGISinfo: C-272, An Act to amend the Copyright Act (diagnosis, maintenance and repair), Parliament of Canada, online: https://www.parl.ca/legisinfo/en/bill/43-2/c-272. Nintendo of America Inc. v. King, 2017 FC 246, [2018] 1 FCR 509. WIPO Copyright Treaty, December 20, 1996, article 11, online: https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/textdetails/12740. Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20, assented to on 2012-06-29, online: https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/AnnualStatutes/2012_20/FullText.html; Canada Gazette, Vol. 146,No. 23 – November 7, 2012, SI/2012-85 Order Fixing Various Dates as the Dates on which Certain Provisions of the Act Come into Force, P.C. 2012-1392, October 25, 2012, online: https: //canadagazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2012/2012-11-07/html/si-tr85-fra.html. Graham J. Reynolds, “Of Lock-Breaking and Stock Taking - IP, Climate Change, and the Right to Repair in Canada,” in 2023 101-1 Canadian Bar Review 32, 2023 CanLIIDocs 1144, p. 54, online: https://canlii.ca/t/7n4cj. Committee on Industry and Technology, 5 December 2022, Catherine Lovrics, Open Parliament, online: https://openparliament.ca/committees/industry/44-1/49/catherine-lovrics-2/; Committee on Industry and Technology, 15 February 2023, Viviane Lapointe, Open Parliament, online: https://openparliament.ca/committees/industry/44-1/59/viviane-lapointe-5/; Committee on Industry and Technology, 15 February 2023, Andy  Fillmore, Open Parliament, online: https://openparliament.ca/committees/industry/44-1/59/andy-fillmore-6/; Committee on Industry and Technology, 15 february 2023, Patrick Blanar, online: https://openparliament.ca/committees/industry/44-1/59/patrick-blanar-1/. Entertainment Software Association of Canada, Bill C-244 – An Act to amend the Copyright Act (diagnosis, maintenance and repair), online: https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/441/INDU/Brief/BR12209146/br-external/EntertainmentSoftwareAssociationOfCanada-e.pdf. Committee on Industry and Technology, February 8, 2023, Paul Fogolin, online: https://openparliament.ca/committees/industry/44-1/57/paul-fogolin-1/. Committee on Industry and Technology, February 8, 2023, Charles Bernard, online: https://openparliament.ca/committees/industry/44-1/57/charles-bernard-1/. Industry and Technology Committee, December 5, 2022, Catherine Lovrics, online: https://openparliament.ca/committees/industry/44-1/49/catherine-lovrics-2/. Emma Fillman, “Comprehensive Right to Repair:The Fight Against Planned Obsolescence in Canada,” (2023) 32 Dalhousie J Legal Stud 123, p. 145. online https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/djls/vol32/iss1/5/. Irene Calboli, “The right to repair: Recent Developments in the USA,” World Intellectual Property Organization Magazine, August 2023, online: https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine_digital/en/2023/article_0023.html. Emma Fillman, “Comprehensive Right to Repair:The Fight Against Planned Obsolescence in Canada,” (2023) 32 Dalhousie J Legal Stud 123, pp. 142 and following, online https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/djls/vol32/iss1/5/. Committee on Industry and Technology, February 8, 2023, Shannon Sereda, online: https://openparliament.ca/committees/industry/44-1/57/shannon-sereda-1/. Committee on Industry and Technology, February 8, 2023, Anthony D. Rosborough, online: https://openparliament.ca/committees/industry/44-1/57/anthony-d-rosborough-1/. Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, Federal Register, October 28, 2024, online: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/28/2024-24563/exemption-to-prohibition-on-circumvention-of-copyright-protection-systems-for-access-control. Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, Federal Register, October 26, 2018, online: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/10/26/2018-23241/exemption-to-prohibition-on-circumvention-of-copyright-protection-systems-for-access-control. Federal Trade Commission, Nixing the Fix: An FTC Report to Congress on Repair Restrictions, May 2021, online: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/nixing-fix-ftc-report-congress-repair-restrictions/nixing_the_fix_report_final_5521_630pm-508_002.pdf. The White House, Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy, July 9, 2021, online: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/07/09/executive-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/. X, Jon Campbell, December 29, 2022, online: https://twitter.com/JonCampbellNY/status/1608327624526548993; Colorado General Assembly, Consumer Right to Repair Agricultural Equipment, April 25, 2023, online: https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/hb23-1011; Minnesota Legislature, Minnesota Session Laws, 93rd Legislature, Chapter 57 – S.F. No. 2744, online: https://www.revisor.mn.gov/laws/2023/0/Session+Law/Chapter/57/; Sidley, “California Becomes Third U.S.State to Join the Right-to-Repair Movement,” October 24, 2023, online: https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2023/10/california-becomes-third-us-state-to-join-the-right-to-repair-movement. John Deere, Memorandum of Undestanding, January 8, 2023, online: https://www.fb.org/files/AFBF_John_Deere_MOU.pdf. The Verge, “Surprise:Apple now supports California’s right to repair,” August 23, 2023, online: https://www.theverge.com/2023/8/23/23843506/apple-california-right-to-repair-sb-244. Irene Calboli, “The right to repair: Recent Developments in the USA,” World Intellectual Property Organization Magazine, online: https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine_digital/en/2023/article_0023.html. Parliament of Canada, LEGISinfo: C-59: An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023; Parliament of Canada, online:https://www.parl.ca/legisinfo/en/bill/44-1/c-59. Québec National Assembly, Bill 29, An Act to protect consumers from planned obsolescence and to promote the durability, repairability and maintenance of goods, online: https://www.assnat.qc.ca/en/travaux-parlementaires/projets-loi/projet-loi-29-43-1.html. The author would like to thank Laura Trépanier-Champagne for her work in supporting the writing of this publication.

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  2. Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO): Fee Increase

    CIPO has announced an increase in their fees as of January 1, 2024. Their current fees will be increased by at least 25%. This increase will apply not only to trademarks, but also to patents, industrial designs and copyrights. For example, the anticipated official fee to file an application for registration of a trademark is being increased from $347.35 to $458.00 for the first class, and from $105.26 to $139.00 for each additional class. A majority of CIPO’s other fees are subject to a similar adjustment. As such, this increase will have an impact not only upon filing an application for registration, but also during the registration process and upon renewal. We therefore recommend that you review your intellectual property portfolio to determine if new applications should be filed or renewals effected before the end of the year. CIPO indicates that the increase will contribute to supporting its strategy on intellectual property which is aimed at offering services comparable to those offered worldwide. We hope that it will also reduce turnaround times!

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  3. Artificial intelligence in business: managing the risks and reaping the benefits?

    At a time when some are demanding that artificial intelligence (AI) research and advanced systems development be temporarily suspended and others want to close Pandora’s box, it is appropriate to ask what effect chat technology (ChatGPT, Bard and others) will have on businesses and workplaces. Some companies support its use, others prohibit it, but many have yet to take a stand. We believe that all companies should adopt a clear position and guide their employees in the use of such technology. Before deciding what position to take, a company must be aware of the various legal issues involved in using this type of artificial intelligence. Should a company decide to allow its use, it must be able to provide a clear framework for it, and, more importantly, for the ensuing results and applications. Clearly, such technological tools have both significant advantages likely to cause a stir—consider, for example, how quickly chatbots can provide information that is both surprising and interesting—and the undeniable risks associated with the advances that may arise from them. This article outlines some of the risks that companies and their clients, employees and partners face in the very short term should they use these tools. Potential for error and liability The media has extensively reported on the shortcomings and inaccuracies of text-generating chatbots. There is even talk of “hallucinations” in certain cases where the chatbot invents a reality that doesn’t exist. This comes as no surprise. The technology feeds off the Internet, which is full of misinformation and inaccuracies, yet chatbots are expected to “create” new content. They lack, for the time being at least, the necessary parameters to utilize this “creativity” appropriately. It is easy to imagine scenarios in which an employee would use such technology to create content that their employer would then use for commercial purposes. This poses a clear risk for the company if appropriate control measures are not implemented. Such content could be inaccurate in a way that misleads the company’s clients. The risk would be particularly significant if the content generated in this way were disseminated by being posted on the company’s website or used in an advertising campaign, for example. In such a case, the company could be liable for the harm caused by its employee, who relied on technology that is known to be faulty. The reliability of these tools, especially when used without proper guidance, is still one of the most troubling issues. Defamation Suppose that such misinformation concerns a well-known individual or rival company. From a legal standpoint, a company disseminating such content without putting parameters in place to ensure that proper verifications are made could be sued for defamation or misleading advertising. Thus, adopting measures to ensure that any content derived from this technology is thoroughly validated before any commercial use is a must. Many authors have suggested that the results generated by such AI tools should be used as aids to facilitate analysis and decision-making rather than to produce final results or output. Companies will likely adopt these tools and benefit from them—for competitive purposes, in particular—faster than good practices and regulations are implemented to govern them. Intellectual property issues The new chatbots have been developed as extensions to web search engines such as Google and Bing. Content generated by chatbots may be based on existing copyrighted web content, and may even reproduce substantial portions of it. This could lead to copyright infringement. Where users limit their use to internal research, the risk is limited as the law provides for a fair dealing exception in such cases. Infringement of copyright may occur if the intention is to distribute the content for commercial purposes. The risk is especially real where chatbots generate content on a specific topic for which there are few references online. Another point that remains unclear is who will own the rights to the answers and results of such a tool, especially if such answers and results are adapted or modified in various ways before they are ultimately used. Confidentiality and privacy issues The terms and conditions of use for most chatbots do not appear to provide for confidential use. As such, trade secrets and confidential information should never be disclosed to such tools. Furthermore, these technologies were not designed to receive or protect personal information in accordance with applicable laws and regulations in the jurisdictions where they may be used. Typically, the owners of these products assume no liability in this regard. Other issues There are a few other important issues worth considering among those that can now be foreseen. Firstly, the possible discriminatory biases that some attribute to artificial intelligence tools, combined with the lack of regulation of these tools, may have significant consequences for various segments of the population. Secondly, the many ethical issues associated with artificial intelligence applications that will be developed in the medical, legal and political sectors, among others, must not be overlooked. The stakes are even higher when these same applications are used in jurisdictions with different laws, customs and economic, political and social cultures. Lastly, the risk for conflict must also be taken into consideration. Whether the conflict is between groups with different values, between organizations with different goals or even between nations, it is unclear whether (and how) advances in artificial intelligence will help to resolve or mitigate such conflicts, or instead exacerbate them.   Conclusion Chat technologies have great potential, but also raises serious legal issues. In the short term, it seems unlikely that these tools could actually replace human judgment, which is in and of itself imperfect. That being said, just as the industrial revolution did two centuries ago, the advent of these technologies will lead to significant and rapid changes in businesses. Putting policies in place now to govern the use of this type of technology in your company is key. Moreover, if your company intends to integrate such technology into its business, we recommend a careful study of the terms and conditions of use to ensure that they align with your company’s project and the objectives it seeks to achieve with it.

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  4. SOCAN Decision: Online music distributors must only pay a single royalty fee

    In Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Entertainment Software Association1 (the “SOCAN Decision”), the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on the obligation to pay a royalty for making a work available to the public on a server, where it can later be streamed or downloaded. At the same time, it clarified the applicable standard of review for appeals where administrative bodies and courts share concurrent first instance jurisdiction and revisited the purpose of the Copyright Act2and its interpretation in light of the WIPO Copyright Treaty3. The Supreme Court also took the opportunity to reiterate the importance of the principle of technological neutrality in the application and interpretation of the Copyright Act. This reminder can also be applied to other artistic mediums and is very timely in a context where the digital visual arts market is experiencing a significant boom with the production and sale of non-fungible tokens (“NFTs”). In 2012, Canadian legislators amended the Copyright Act by adopting the Copyright Modernization Act4. These amendments incorporate Canada’s obligations under the Treaty into Canadian law by harmonizing the legal framework of Canada’s copyright laws with international rules on new and emerging technologies. The CMA introduced three sections related to “making [a work] available,” including section 2.4(1.1) of the CMA. This section applies to original works and clarifies section 3(1)(f), which gives authors the exclusive right to “communicate a work  to the public by telecommunication”: 2.4(1.1) Copyright Act. “For the purposes of this Act, communication of a work or other subject-matter to the public by telecommunication includes making it available to the public by telecommunication in a way that allows a member of the public to have access to it from a place and at a time individually chosen by that member of the public.” Before the CMA came into force, the Supreme Court also found that downloading a musical work from the Internet was not a communication by telecommunication within the meaning of section 3(1)(f) of the CMA5, while streaming was covered by this section.6 Following the coming into force of the CMA, the Copyright Board of Canada (the “Board”) received submissions regarding the application of section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act. The Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada (“SOCAN”) argued, among other things, that section 2.42.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act required users to pay royalties when a work was published on the Internet, making no distinction between downloading, streaming and cases where works are published but never transmitted. The consequence of SOCAN’s position was that a royalty had to be paid each time a work was made available to the public, whether it was downloaded or streamed. For each download, a reproduction royalty also had to be paid, while for each stream, an additional performance royalty had to be paid. Judicial history The Board’s Decision7 The Board accepted SOCAN’s interpretation that making a work available to the public is a “communication”. According to this interpretation, two royalties are due when a work is published online. Firstly,  when the work is made available to the public online, and secondly, when it is streamed or downloaded. The Board’s Decision was largely based on its interpretation of Section 8 of the Treaty, according to which the act of making a work available requires separate protection by Member States and constitutes a separately compensable activity. Federal Court of Appeal’s Decision8 Entertainment Software Association, Apple Inc. and their Canadian subsidiaries (the “Broadcasters”) appealed the Board’s Decision before the Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”). Relying on the reasonableness standard, the FCA overturned the Board’s Decision, affirming that a royalty is due only when the work is made available to the public on a server, not when a work is later streamed. The FCA also highlighted the uncertainty surrounding the applicable review standard in appeals following Vavilov9 in cases where administrative bodies and courts share concurrent first instance jurisdiction. SOCAN Decision The Supreme Court dismissed SOCAN’s appeal seeking the reinstatement of the Board’s Decision. Appellate standards of review The Supreme Court recognized that there are rare and exceptional circumstances that create a sixth category of issues to which the standard of correctness applies, namely concurrent first instance jurisdiction between courts and administrative bodies. Does section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act entitle the holder of a copyright to the payment of a second royalty for each download or stream after the publication of a work on a server, making it publicly accessible? The copyright interests provided by section 3(1) of the Copyright Act The Supreme Court began its analysis by considering the three copyright interests protected by the Copyright Act, or in other words, namely the rights provided for in section 3(1): to produce or reproduce a work in any material form whatsoever; to perform the work in public; to publish an unpublished work. These three copyright interestsare distinct and a single activity can only engaged one of them. For example, the performance of a work is considered impermanent, allowing the author to retain greater control over their work than reproduction. Thus, “when an activity allows a user to experience a work for a limited period of time, the author’s performance right is engaged. A reproduction, by contrast, gives a user a durable copy of a work”.10 The Supreme Court also emphasized that an activity not involving one of the three copyright interests under section 3(1) of the Copyright Act or the author’s moral rights is not protected by the Copyright Act. Accordingly, no royalties should be paid in connection with such an activity. The Court reiterated its previous view that downloading a work and streaming a work are distinct protected activities, more precisely  downloading is considered reproduction, while streaming is considered performance. It also pointed out that downloading is not a communication under section 3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act, and that making a work available on a server is not a compensable activity distinct from the three copyright interests.11 Purpose of the Copyright Act and the principle of technological neutrality The Supreme Court criticized the Board’s Decision, opining that it violates the principle of technological neutrality, in particular by requiring users to pay additional fees to access online works. The purpose of the CMA was to “ensure that [the Copyright Act] remains technologically neutral”12 and thereby show, at the same time, Canada’s adherence to the principle of technological neutrality. The principle of technological neutrality is further explained by the Supreme Court: [63] The principle of technological neutrality holds that, absent parliamentary intent to the contrary, the Copyright Act should not be interpreted in a way that either favours or discriminates against any form of technology: CBC, at para. 66. Distributing functionally equivalent works through old or new technology should engage the same copyright interests: Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 326, at para. 43; CBC, at para. 72. For example, purchasing an album online should engage the same copyright interests, and attract the same quantum of royalties, as purchasing an album in a bricks-and-mortar store since these methods of purchasing the copyrighted works are functionally equivalent. What matters is what the user receives, not how the user receives it: ESA, at paras. 5-6 and 9; Rogers, at para. 29. In its summary to the CMA, which precedes the preamble, Parliament signalled its support for technological neutrality, by stating that the amendments were intended to “ensure that [the Copyright Act] remains technologically neutral”. According to the Supreme Court, the principle of technological neutrality must be observed in the light of the purpose of the Copyright Act, which does not exist solely for the protection of authors’ rights. Rather, the Act seeks to strike a balance between the rights of users and the rights of authors by facilitating the dissemination of artistic and intellectual works aiming to enrich society and inspire other creators. As a result, “[w]hat matters is what the user receives, not how the user receives it.”13 Thus, whether the reproduction or dissemination of the work takes place online or offline, the same copyright applies and leads to the same royalties. What is the correct interpretation of section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act? Section 8 of the Treaty The Supreme Court reiterated that international treaties are relevant at the context stage of the statutory interpretation exercise and they can be considered without textual ambiguity in the statute.14 Moreover, wherethe text permits, it must be interpreted so as to comply with Canada’s treaty obligations, in accordance with the presumption of conformity, which states that a treaty cannot override clear legislative intent.15 The Court concluded that section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act was intended to implement Canada’s obligations under Section 8 of the Treaty, and that the Treaty must therefore be taken into account in interpreting section 2.4(1.1) of the Act. Although Section 8 of the Treaty gives authors the right to control making works available to the public, it does not create a new and protected “making available” right that would be separately compensable. In such cases, there are no “distinct communications” or in other words, “distinct performances”.16 Section 8 of the Treaty creates only two obligations: “protect on demand transmissions; and give authors the right to control when and how their work is made available for downloading or streaming.”17 Canada has the freedom to choose how these two objectives are implemented in the Copyright Act, either through the right of distribution, the right of communication to the public, the combination of these rights, or a new right.18 The Supreme Court concluded that the Copyright Act gives effect to the obligations arising from Section 8 of the Treaty through a combination of the performance, reproduction, and authorization rights provided for in section 3(1) of the Copyright Act, and by respecting the principle of technological neutrality.19 Which interpretation of section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act should be followed? The purpose of section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act is to clarify the communication right in section 3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act by emphasizing its application to on-demand streaming. A single on-demand stream to a member of the public thus constitutes a “communication to the public” within the meaning of section 3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act.20 Section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act states that a work is performed as soon as it is made available for on-demand streaming.21 Therefore, streaming is only a continuation of the performance of the work, which starts when the work is made available. Only one royalty should be collected in connection with this right: [100] This interpretation does not require treating the act of making the work available as a separate performance from the work’s subsequent transmission as a stream. The work is performed as soon as it is made available for on-demand streaming. At this point, a royalty is payable. If a user later experiences this performance by streaming the work, they are experiencing an already ongoing performance, not starting a new one. No separate royalty is payable at that point. The “act of ‘communication to the public’ in the form of ‘making available’ is completed by merely making a work available for on?demand transmission. If then the work is actually transmitted in that way, it does not mean that two acts are carried out: ‘making available’ and ‘communication to the public’. The entire act thus carried out will be regarded as communication to the public”: Ficsor, at p. 508. In other words, the making available of a stream and a stream by a user are both protected as a single performance — a single communication to the public. In summary, the Supreme Court stated and clarified the following in the SOCAN Decision: Section 3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act does not cover download of a work. Making a work available on a server and streaming the work both involve the same copyright interest to the performance of the work. As a result, only one royalty must be paid when a work is uploaded to a server and streamed. This interpretation of section 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act is consistent with Canada’s international obligations for copyright protection. In cases of concurrent first instance jurisdiction between courts and administrative bodies, the standard of correctness should be applied. As artificial intelligence works of art increase in amount and as a new market for digital visual art emerges, driven by the public’s attraction for the NFT exchanges, the principle of technological neutrality is becoming crucial for understanding the copyrights attached to these new digital objects and their related transactions. Fortunately, the issues surrounding digital music and its sharing and streaming have paved the way for rethinking copyright in a digital context. It should also be noted that in decentralized and unregulated digital NFT markets, intellectual property rights currently provide the only framework that is really respected by some market platforms and may call for some degree of intervention on the part of the market platforms’ owners. 2022 SCC 30. R.S.C. (1985), c. C-42 (hereinafter the “Copyright Act”). Can. T.S. 2014 No. 20, (hereinafter the “Treaty”). S.C. 2012, c. 20 (hereinafter the “CMA”). Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 34. Rogers Communications Inc. v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 35. Copyright Board of Canada, 2017 CanLII 152886 (hereinafter the “Board’s Decision”). Federal Court of Appeal, 2020 FCA 100 (hereinafter the “FCA’s Decision”). Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65. SOCAN Decision, par. 56. Ibid, para. 59. CMA, Preamble. SOCAN Decision, para. 70, emphasis added by the SCC. Ibid, paras. 44-45. Ibid, paras. 46-48. Ibid, paras. 74-75. Ibid, para. 88. Ibid, para. 90. Ibid, paras. 101 and 108. Ibid, paras. 91-94. Ibid, paras. 95 and 99-100.

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