On February 12, 2024, the Court of Appeal of Quebec handed down its decision in Société d’assurance Beneva inc. c. Bordeleau,1 dealing in particular with the burden of proof incumbent on an insurer when it denies coverage on the basis of an insured’s intentional fault, and an award of damages against an insurer for breach of its duty of good faith. The facts This decision was rendered further to a dispute between Société d’assurance Beneva inc. (hereinafter the “Insurer") and some of its insureds, including Mr. Michel Bordeleau, the owner of a multi-storey rental building that was damaged by fire. He lived in one of the units with his parents. According to the uncontested expert evidence presented, the fire originated in one of the storage spaces in the basement of the building, which was assigned to a lessee couple. Access to the basement and all storage spaces was locked. The cause of the fire was deemed to be intentional, given the traces of accelerant found in the area of the fire’s origin. The instigator or instigators were not identified. On November 21, 2016, 60 days after the fire, the Insurer denied coverage because of the intentional nature of the fire, which it attributed to its insured, Mr. Bordeleau. A few months later, on March 22, 2017, it reached an agreement with Mr. Bordeleau’s hypothecary creditor. The subrogation release provides for the Insurer’s payment of the balance of the hypothecary debt of $149,720.99, and subrogation to the creditor’s rights up to the amount paid. Mr. Bordeleau, in his belief that he had been harmed by the Insurer’s decision, instituted legal proceedings to recover the insurance benefit to which he claimed to be entitled, while also claiming damages. The Insurer filed a cross-application for recovery of the balance paid to the hypothecary creditor. The trial The trial judge, relying on the evidence, concluded that although the fire was intentional in nature, the Insurer had not discharged its burden of establishing the insured’s involvement in the fire. Taking this conclusion into account, she then proceeded to analyze the plaintiffs’ claim and to weigh the damages in light of the evidence and the limits of the insurance policy. In particular, she ruled in favour of Mr. Bordeleau’s claim for damages for the building, the amount of which was admitted. In addition, she ordered the Insurer to pay $15,000.00 in damages for nuisance and inconvenience caused by its conduct, which she considered faulty. This conclusion was based on the Insurer’s duty to act in good faith, to consider the facts and act on their basis, and to conduct a full investigation, duty which the Insurer had breached by failing to sufficiently follow-up on leads that could have identified who was responsible for the fire. In order to deny coverage, clear and compelling evidence of the insured’s involvement, going beyond mere suspicion, was necessary. Given the sometimes implausible and sometimes contradictory testimonies of the people met during the investigation, there was no such evidence. In other words, the claims adjuster had jumped to conclusions. In light of her conclusions, the trial judge dismissed the Insurer’s cross-application, which she deemed to be unfounded, without giving further reasons. The appeal The Court of Appeal first refrained from intervening in light of the Superior Court’s conclusions regarding the failure to demonstrate Mr. Bordeleau’s involvement in the fire. It did however intervene on the damages awarded for nuisance and inconvenience suffered by the insureds, and pointed out the following: [40] [translation] Firstly, apart from the strict mathematical calculation of the amounts payable, and perhaps other technical aspects not requiring the exercise of judgment, the processing of a claim is an obligation of means, not one of result. The fact that a court found at the end of a trial held many years after the incident that an insurer should have covered in the first place obviously does not mean that the insurer necessarily committed a fault other than its refusal to pay, making it civilly liable, let alone that it acted in bad faith. [41] In this case, there was nothing in the evidence to support a finding of fault or breach of the duty of good faith. [42] On the contrary, there is enough evidence to conclude that the investigation by the appellant and its experts, which led to the denial of coverage, was not botched. . . . In the opinion of the Court of Appeal, the evidence showed that the Insurer’s investigation had been done in a conscientious manner, in particular because it had transferred the claim file to a special investigative unit, mandated a fire origin and cause expert and external investigators, and interviewed many witnesses who could have provided information on the circumstances of the incident. Moreover, it had no allegations that the Insurer had failed to consider exculpatory evidence against its insured. In this context, although it took several years for the insured to obtain his due, with all the inconveniences of going through proceedings, the Insurer’s conduct could not be considered offending or revealing of bad faith. No damages could be awarded. Lastly, the Court of Appeal took a closer look at the question of the Insurer’s subrogation to the hypothecary creditor’s rights, which was little discussed in the judgment under appeal. Reiterating the fundamental principle in property and casualty insurance that the indemnification of an insured cannot result in enrichment, the Court of Appeal concluded that dismissing the Insurer’s cross-application would have such an effect. In addition to receiving an insurance benefit for the damages sustained, Mr. Bordeleau would also have had seen his hypothecary debt discharged. This would have given him a clear advantage. In this case, the benefit paid to the hypothecary creditor needed to be deducted from the damages claimed by the insured. The trial judge’s finding were thus revised accordingly. Conclusion Despite the clear principles addressed in this case, the Court of Appeal’s analysis points to practical difficulties that insureds and insurers can encounter when dealing with similar claims. It points to the coexistence of two factors that can be difficult to balance: First, the burden of proof where coverage is denied on the basis of the insured's intentional fault, and second, the insurer’s obligation of means in processing the associated claim. The dismissal of a coverage defence does not in itself warrant awarding damages. Société d’assurance Beneva inc. c. Bordeleau, 2024 QCCA 171

On June 7, 2023, the Minister of Finance of Quebec tabled and presented Bill 30 before the National Assembly, an omnibus bill entitled An Act to amend various provisions mainly with respect to the financial sector (hereinafter the “Bill”).  The Bill includes certain amendments to the provisions of the Insurers Act (“IA”) and the Act respecting the distribution of financial products and services (“DA”).  Although the Bill may evolve through the stages of the legislative process as Parliament resumes, here is an overview of the main amendments that are expected to have implications for the insurance industry. Proposed legislative changes As indicated, the legislative changes will affect both the IA and the DA. Below are the main amendments that will be made to each of these Acts should the Bill be assented to: Insurers Act The Bill proposes that associations constituted under the Civil Code of Québec be allowed to apply for authorization to carry on insurer activities among their members as a reciprocal union,1 and it sets out several provisions relating to the organization and governance of such an entity. The Bill clarifies the meaning of a reciprocal union, defining it as a group of parties that, under the terms of the contract constituting the union, join together to pool sums enabling them to be reciprocally bound by damage insurance contracts.2 The restriction preventing reciprocal unions from accepting a risk that would require them to pay, after reinsurance, an amount that exceeds 10% of the net value of their assets will also be lifted and replaced with a more general obligation to reserve sufficient sums to carry on their insurer activities.3 Life and health insurers will become subject to a new obligation to take the necessary means (which may be specified by regulation) to obtain certain information in order to determine whether an amount they have committed to pay under a life insurance contract is payable.4 As such, life and health insurers that know that a sum is payable will be bound, for a period of three years from the date the sum is payable, to take the necessary means (which may be specified by regulation) to inform beneficiaries that a sum is payable and provide them with support in making their claim. Act respecting the distribution of financial products and services Under the Bill, a person employed by a firm, an independent partnership or a claims adjuster will be allowed to carry out activities under the supervision of a claims adjuster in certain situations.5 The restriction preventing claims adjusters from acting in a sector other than claims adjustment will also be lifted.6 Section 424 of the ARDFPS will be amended to remove vehicle replacement insurance from products that can be distributed without a representative, which will particularly affect vehicle dealers.7 The directors and officers of a regulated entity will become solidarily liable with that entity for the payment of a monetary administrative penalty, unless they establish that they exercised due care and diligence. It will be possible to secure the payment of such monetary administrative penalty by a legal hypothec on the debtor’s movable and immovable property.8 What to expect It is important to note that the Bill is in its first stage of the legislative process and may be subject to change. Anyone wishing to comment on it may do so online on the National Assembly website. We will continue to follow the progress of this Bill. Do not hesitate to contact a member of Lavery’s insurance team if you have questions on the subject matter of this article. Section 1 of the Bill, amending section 6 of the IA Section 2 of the Bill, amending section 7 of the IA Section 21 of the Bill, amending section 188 of the IA Section 74 of the Bill, introducing section 72.1 in the IA Section 90 of the Bill, amending section 10 of the ARDFPS Section 92 of the Bill, striking out section 45 of the ARDFPS Sections 105 and 106 of the Bill, amending section 424 of the ARDFPS Section 71 of the Bill, introducing sections 115.2.1 and 115.2.2 in the ARDFPS

On January 30, 2023, the Court of Appeal of Quebec rendered a decision in Commission scolaire De La Jonquière c. Intact Compagnie d’assurance.1 The key issues in this case are the potential for conflicts arising from liability insurance policies and the obligation to disclose documents where insurers’ duty to defend conflicts with their duty to indemnify insureds. The facts This case is part of a class action in which all Quebec school boards—now referred to as school service centres (SSCs)—were accused of violating the right to free elementary and secondary education. As part of this class action, the SSCs brought an action in warranty against their insurers, seeking compensation for any amount they may be required to pay. The insurers acknowledged their obligation to defend the appellants in the main proceedings; however, they argued that the claim was not covered by the insurance contract. Following negotiations, the parties to the class action reached a settlement. The action in warranty against the insurers is still pending. At the examination for discovery stage of the action in warranty, the insurers asked to obtain a copy of all communications exchanged between the appellants and their counsel since the beginning of the main proceedings. The SSCs objected to this request on the basis of professional secrecy and litigation privilege. The Court therefore had to rule on the merits of the objection. The trial Drawing on the decision in Domtar2, the Superior Court dismissed the SSCs’ objection, holding that they had waived their right to assert solicitor-client privilege regarding anything relating to the reasonableness of the settlement. It appears that the Court inferred this waiver from certain allegations made and from the disclosure of certain documents as part of the action in warranty. The Court concluded that the appellants had to provide the insurers with the documents, risk analyses, letters, exchanges with the appellants and expert opinions having related to the reasonableness of the settlement since the beginning of the main proceedings. However, according to the Court of Appeal, the Court failed to provide a framework for such disclosure of information and to grant the SSCs the right to raise new objections in relation to said documents. The appeal The Court of Appeal considered the conflicts that may arise from the dual responsibility of insurers: their duty to defend insureds and their duty to indemnify them. In this regard, it described liability insurers and their role as follows: [20] The liability insurer is effectively a two-headed hydra: A type of two-headed creature with a single corporate identity, but where one head handles the insured’s defence and the other protects the insurer’s financial interests by ensuring that it only pays out for covered losses.[21] Each head must base its decisions on the interest it is defending and the information available to it. The two heads must remain separate in order to give effect to the insurance contract. […] The risk of a conflict of interest is therefore very real, which is why the insurer must put measures in place to ensure that it complies with the coverage provided by the policy, while also ensuring the full and complete defence of the insured.] As for the ethical obligations of the lawyer mandated by the insurer to represent the insured, the Court stated that the lawyer becomes the insured’s counsel in all respects and owes the insured absolute loyalty. As such, the right to professional secrecy in the insured’s relationship with the lawyer can be set up against the insurer. That being said, the lawyer must report on the progress of the case to the head of the hydra handling the insured’s defence. The Court then stated that it was essential in this context that the information thus obtained be accessible only to that head, and that the insurer put in place the necessary measures to keep the two heads separate. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did not err in concluding that the SSCs were required to provide the evidence necessary to examine the reasonableness of the settlement reached with the insurers. However, in order to do so, an exemption mechanism could be implemented, giving the SSCs the possibility to object to the disclosure of certain information. The Court also confirmed that there was no basis for concluding that the appellants had waived solicitor-client or litigation privilege with respect to all of their exchanges with their counsel. This information must remain protected by professional secrecy and therefore cannot be disclosed to the person at the insurer’s office in charge of the compensation file. The same goes for the accounts for fees, reports, opinions and other documents sent to the person at the insurer’s office handling the defence, unless the insured waives this right. Conclusion This case highlights the conflicts that can arise from the duality of insurers’ responsibilities and the distinction between insurers’ obligation to defend insureds and their obligation to indemnify them. Although the Court ruled that evidence aimed at verifying the reasonableness of a settlement from a qualitative and quantitative standpoint should be disclosed, it concluded that certain information and documents that are strictly relevant to insureds’ defence need not be disclosed. In so doing, it reiterated insurers’ dual responsibility and the importance of keeping the two heads separate when an insurer agrees to take on an insured’s defence, but maintained its refusal to indemnify the insured. Commission scolaire De La Jonquière c. Intact Compagnie d’assurance, 2023 QCCA 124. Chubb Insurance company of Canada c. Domtar, 2017 QCCA 1004.

In early 2022, the Autorité des marchés financiers (the “AMF”) conducted specific consultations on financial products offered on the Internet. Further to these consultations, the AMF published explanations on the Regulation respecting Alternative Distribution Methods (the “RADM”) in late December 2022.1 Here are some key points that the AMF has clarified: Definitions The AMF has elaborated on the meaning of certain terms and expressions included in the RADM, thereby clarifying the obligations incumbent on firms as concerns insurance products offered on the Internet: “Providing” or “presenting” information: This implies delivering, giving or handing over information to a client without them having to take any action. A client should not have to search for the information to find it. As such, making the information accessible or referring to a policy is not enough.2 “Making visible at all times”: The information should be visible to the client at all times, regardless of the page the client is on. A representative’s contact information is the only information that must be visible on the digital transactional space at all times. Websites that are accessible to people who are blind or use a voice assistant must also have means to present this information.3 “Making a representative available”: The AMF only requires that representatives be available during regular business hours.4 “Making information readily accessible”: A client must have the option of taking cognizance of the information and be able to easily find it. The information must be accessible in one or two clicks. Including a hyperlink or an icon, for example, are ways of making information accessible.5 Under this obligation, a hyperlink may be used to redirect a client to a website or document external to the digital space.6 External documents that are accessible through hyperlinks, such as sample insurance policies, must be up to date. Summary of the complaint processing policy The AMF specifies that the summary of the complaint processing policy referred to in the RADM must be that of the firm running the transactional website, not of a third party. Thus, a property and casualty insurance brokerage cannot refer to an insurer’s policy summary.7 Identification of the firm A firm may display partner logos on its digital space only if doing so does not cause confusion. A client must know which firm runs the space and must be able to distinguish it from partners that do not offer the products or services.8 Product coverage, exclusions and limitations Further to its supervisory activities, the AMF has confirmed that product coverage appears to be well presented in digital spaces. However, exclusions and sometimes limitations are not as well presented. Given that exclusions and limitations constitute information that is necessary for a client to make an informed decision, the AMF urges firms to pay attention to these and to select them based on a proper analysis.9 Suspension of transactions The AMF has clarified how to apply the criteria under section 14 of the RADM, more specifically paragraph 3 of this section, which provides that a firm must suspend a transaction initiated through a digital space when no representative can immediately intervene with a client who asks to deal with a representative and there is a risk that the client will not be able to make an informed decision. The AMF specifies that it is up to the firm to assess and manage its risk. In order to determine whether such a risk exists, the AMF has proposed the following solutions: The firm may caution the client as follows: “Do you wish to continue the process even though no representative is available at this time?” The firm could post its representatives’ availability. If a client decides to enter into a contract through a digital space, the firm could ensure that a representative contacts them within 24 hours. A transaction does not have to be suspended immediately; it can be done at the end of the transaction, before the contract is concluded. Moreover, stopping or temporarily suspending a transaction may also be necessary if a contradiction or irregularity in the information the client provides could lead to an error.10 The digital space must be set up to detect such a contradiction automatically. The AMF considers it preferable to discontinue a transaction if contradictions are detected. It can also be temporarily suspended while the client is informed of the consequences of making false statements and the importance of knowing their entire situation, for example, and to allow them to make corrections, if necessary.11 To better understand the obligations of the RADM, we invite you to consult our bulletin Bill 141: Checklist on insurance products offered via the internet and distribution without a representative. These are only available in French at this time; Regulation respecting Alternative Distribution Methods, CQLR, c. D-9.2, r. 16.1. Autorité des marchés financiers, Explications à l’égard du règlement – Le RMAD expliqué article par article (hereinafter the “Explanations”), ss. 7, 9, 11, 12 and 12.2. The terms “explaining information” or “providing information” under section 12.1 of the RADM should be interpreted in the same manner. Explanations, s. 8. Explanations, s. 8. Explanations, ss. 8 and 10. Explanations, ss. 8 and 10. A representative’s contact information does not have to appear on external documents and websites at all times. It is important to note that under section 9 of the RADM, a document that is to be “provided” or “presented” to a client cannot be located on an external website. Explanations, s. 8. Explanations, s. 8, para. 1. Explanations, s. 9. For example, a client declaring they have no children yet selecting insurance for their children constitutes a contradiction. Explanations, s. 14.