A possible workaround to the long processing times at the Bureau d’évaluation médicale

January 17, 2024

In recent years, the job market has changed considerably, especially further to the pandemic and the impacts it has had.

Employers and employees in Quebec faced unprecedented situations, and these appear to have led to a significant increase in claims for recognition of psychological occupational injuries, such as adjustment disorders and depression.¹

Consequences of long processing times at the Bureau d’évaluation médicale

The increase in psychological injury cases is not without consequences for employers, and it is now common for the evaluation procedure at the Bureau d’évaluation médicale (BEM) to take several years. The considerable amount of time it takes to obtain an opinion from a member of the BEM has a major impact on the management of such occupational injury cases.

For example, many healthcare professionals (i.e., attending physicians) categorically refuse to confirm an injury when an employee is waiting for a expert medical opinion from the BEM, which can delay the resolution of a case for several years. Without a BEM opinion on the medical issue in dispute, it is impossible for employers to schedule hearings or even attempt settlement discussions.

Furthermore, in some cases, processing times can even lead to the deterioration of the employee’s health. Without an opinion from the BEM, it can be difficult for the employer in question to reintegrate the employee without a specific diagnosis or functional limitations having been established. This also makes it difficult for the employer to put proper measures in place to safely reintegrate the employee in the workplace.

Like many other Quebec organizations, the BEM is currently lacking personnel, especially psychiatric experts.² This specific problem causes many issues for Quebec employers in their management of occupational injury cases, and also generates enormous costs. However, another option to speed up the process is now available.

The Paccar Canada (Usine de Ste-Thérèse) case

Just recently, the occupational health and safety division of the Administrative Labour Tribunal (ALT) rendered a very interesting decision that provides Quebec employers with a way to obtain a medical expert opinion more quickly as part of a BEM procedure.

In this case,³ a worker was injured when she fell in the parking lot of the plant where she works. The CNESST accepted her claim for an occupational injury having caused a contusion to her elbow and wrist, a cervical sprain and a mild concussion. A few months later, the worker’s attending physician diagnosed her with major depression, which the CNESST subsequently recognized as being linked to the initial event. The employer challenged this decision. However, a hearing date cannot be set as long as the procedure is still under way at the BEM, in particular as concerns the diagnosis to be used to rule on whether the psychological injury is admissible.

After receiving a medical certificate from the worker’s attending physician confirming the major depression diagnosis, the employer mandated a psychiatrist to assess her. The psychiatrist’s medical opinion differed from that of the attending physician, in particular where the diagnosis was involved. In May 2021, the employer asked the CNESST to request an opinion from the BEM. In June 2021, the CNESST applied the BEM to obtain the opinion of a member, more specifically the opinion of a psychiatrist.

A month later, having still not received a notice to report from a member of the BEM, the employer asked the CNESST to designate a health professional so that they could render a medical opinion that would be binding on the parties, asking the CNESST to apply paragraph 3 of section 224.1 of the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases (AIAOD), which states the following:

224.1. Where a member of the Bureau d’évaluation médicale gives an opinion pursuant to section 221 within the time prescribed in section 222, the Commission is bound by that opinion and shall render a decision accordingly.

Where the member of the Bureau d’évaluation médicale fails to give his opinion within the time prescribed in section 222, the Commission is bound by the report obtained from the health professional it designated, where that is the case.

If the Commission has not obtained such a report, it may request, from the health professional it designates, a report on the matter mentioned in any of subparagraphs 1 to 5 of the first paragraph of section 212 which is the subject of the contestation; in that case, the Commission is bound by the opinion of the member of the Bureau d’évaluation médicale or the report of the health professional it has designated, whichever it receives first, and shall render a decision accordingly.

The Commission shall file in the worker’s record any opinion or report it receives even though it is not bound thereby.

Section 222 of the AIAOD stipulates that the member of the BEM must render their opinion within 30 days of the date on which the record was transmitted to them and send it without delay to the Minister, with copies to the CNESST and to the parties.

We understand from section 224.1 of the AIAOD that the CNESST is bound by the medical opinion of the designated health professional and must render a decision accordingly, which may then be contested by the employer or worker, as the case may be. This would ultimately allow the parties to be heard by the ALT, which would then render a decision on the merits.

In the Paccar case, the CNESST denied the employer’s request for an administrative review of the CNESST’s refusal to refer the case to a health professional, in spite of paragraph 3 of section 224.1 of the AIAOD. This refusal was the crux of the dispute.

Thus, the ALT had to determine whether the CNESST should have granted the employer’s request. The ALT did indeed determine that the CNESST should have done so, given the BEM’s inability to appoint a psychiatrist within a reasonable time.

The decision

The CNESST argued that paragraph 3 of section 224.1 3 of the AIAOD provides discretionary power, as the section indicates that the CNESST may request a report from health professional it designates. In the CNESST’s opinion, the word “may” gives it discretionary power, and it is thus not obliged to designate a health professional in all cases.

The ALT explained that considering the objectives of the AIAOD, the BEM procedure must be carried out swiftly and efficiently. Thus, if the BEM is unable to appoint a psychiatrist from among its members within a reasonable amount of time, the objectives of the AIAOD cannot not be achieved, and the result of it becoming impossible to complete the BEM procedure would be entirely inconsistent.

Clearly, this was not the government’s intention. In this context, it would be difficult for the CNESST to justify not using its power to designate a health professional, because if it did not do so, the case would no longer move forward, and this would not be good for any of the parties involved, including the CNESST.

The ALT concluded that in accordance with section 9 of the Act to establish the Administrative Labour Tribunal,⁴ it had the power to enforce paragraph 3 of section 224.1 of the AIAOD.In the Paccar decision, the CNESST had undertaken during the hearing to designate a health professional within a short time should the ALT so rule, who would proceed to assess the worker and render a decision accordingly.

Practical information to make the process easier

At this stage, it is very difficult to predict how the CNESST will apply section 224.1 of theAIAOD in the future. However, we have every reason to believe that many employers will unfortunately find themselves in the same situation as the employer in the Paccar case, if they aren’t already, especially where psychological injuries are involved.

It is reasonable to assume that the CNESST will not apply paragraph 3 of section 224.1 of the AIAOD as long as an employer does not formally request that it do so.

In the future, we recommend that you closely follow the progress of your BEM request with the CNESST:

Once 30 days have passed since you made your request, we recommend that you contact the CNESST agent assigned to your case to find out how far they have gotten in processing your request.
If your request has not yet been submitted to the BEM, we recommend that you send a letter to the CNESST in which you request that it apply paragraph 3 of section 224.1 of the AIAOD, and more specifically that it designate a health professional. Remember to ask the CNESST to render a formal decision on your request so that you can apply for its review if it is not in your favour.

If you are facing this type of situation, we invite you to consult our team of employment law professionals, who can help you manage your case.

For example, in 2021, the Commission des normes, de l’équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du travail (CNESST) reported a 9% increase in recognized stress-related injuries (1,679 cases in 2021). See portrait-violence-stress-harcelement-2018-2021.pdf (gouv.qc.ca, in French only).
AI_M20222152_stat-diverses-bem_MTESS.pdf (quebec.ca, in French only). The BEM has compiled organizational statistics for the period from 2017 to 2022. In particular, the BEM has reported a decrease in the number of opinions it issues, down from 11,045 in 2017–2018 to 9,651 in 2021–2022. The BEM also recorded a considerable increase in the average time taken to process a case (from 69.7 days in 2017–2018 to 138.7 days in 2021–2022).
Paccar Canada (Usine de Ste-Thérèse), 2023 QCTAT 3989.
T-15.1.

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Carl Lessard
Partner, Lawyer
Camille Ouellet
Lawyer

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October 29, 2024

Employers’ Right to Require Medical Certificates: New Restrictions as of January 1, 2025

Quebec is currently facing a major shortage of physicians. To remedy the situation, several ministers in the CAQ government announced in early 2024 that significant changes would be implemented to reduce physicians’ administrative burden. In this context, on October 9, 2024, the National Assembly assented to Bill 68, An Act mainly to reduce the administrative burden of physicians.1 The provisions of the Act The new Act comprises 11 sections, many of which introduce amendments to the Act respecting labour standards2 (ALS) by restricting the right of employers to require documents attesting to the reasons for certain absences. Under the current legislation, an employer may be entitled to require a document from an employee who misses work owing to sickness in order to assess the reasons for the absence, its duration, or the employee’s ability to return to work. This is because, under the terms of a contract of employment,3every employer is entitled to expect their employee to fully perform the work agreed upon. Depending on the circumstances, the supporting document provided must in some instances indicate a specific medical diagnosis, an estimated duration of absence and other details relevant to handling the employee’s absence. In keeping with these principles, section 79.2 of the ALS provided that an employer informed of an absence owing to sickness, an organ or tissue donation, an accident, domestic violence, sexual violence or a criminal offence may, “[i]f it is warranted by the duration of the absence or its repetitive nature, for instance, [...] request that the employee furnish a document attesting to those reasons.” According to arbitral jurisprudence4 and that of the Administrative Labour Tribunal5, unwarranted refusal to provide such a document may constitute valid grounds for imposing an administrative or disciplinary measure, depending on the circumstances. That said, the new Act as adopted changes this balance. Indeed, a paragraph has been added to section 79.2 of the ALS specifying that “[...] no employer may request the document referred to in the first paragraph for the first three periods of absence not exceeding three consecutive days taken over a period of 12 months.” It will therefore be prohibited to require a supporting document, including a medical certificate, for the first three short-term absences (less than four days) occurring over the 12 preceding months. According to the comments of the Minister of Labour, such calculation of absences is to begin with the first absence during the year rather than as of January 1st of each year.6 The Act does not provide for an exception in cases where absences are excessive or otherwise questionable. Under which conditions will employers be entitled to require a medical certificate? Under the Act, employers retain the right to require a medical certificate where the absence is likely to last four consecutive days or more. What is more, the provision does not deny employers the right to investigate situations that appear questionable. The aforementioned prohibition will also apply to employers whose employees are governed by the Act respecting labour relations, vocational training and workforce management in the construction industry.7 Furthermore, the Act includes an amendment to the provisions relating to family or parental leave and absences. The third paragraph of section 79.7 of the ALS is amended so as to prevent employers from requiring a medical certificate to justify such absences. However, we believe this amendment in no way affects their right to require any other type of documentation, particularly as regards obligations relating to daycare services or educational institutions. Where an offence is committed, the penal provisions already included in sections 139 to 147 of the ALS apply. As these amendments are of public order and take precedence over any contract, policy or collective agreement, any measure imposed on an employee that would contravene any of these new obligations may be deemed invalid or result in a prohibited practice complaint. How will the Act affect insurers and employee benefit plan administrators? On another note, the Act mainly to reduce the administrative burden of physicians also introduces a new prohibition applicable to insurers and employee benefit plan administrators. They will no longer be entitled to require that a medical service, such as a consultation, be received in order to reimburse the cost of services or a technical aid, nor will they be entitled to require that a medical service be received at a predetermined frequency different from that considered appropriate by the attending physician for the purpose of maintaining the payment of disability benefits. Coming into force The amendments to the ALS will come into force as of January 1, 2025. The amendments concerning insurers and employee benefit plan administrators will apply subsequently at a date or dates to be set by the Government. S.Q., 2024, c. 29. CQLR, c. N-1.1. Civil Code of Québec, CQLR, c. CCQ-1991, art. 2085. See in particular the case law cited in Linda Bernier, Guy Blanchet and Éric Séguin, Les mesures disciplinaires et non disciplinaires dans les rapports collectifs du travail, 2nd ed. Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, loose-leaf, updated to May 30, 2024, paras. 1.055 et seq. See in particular : Marchessault et CPE Les Petits Adultes, 2019 QCTAT 1632, paras. 37–38; Labourdette et Protecteur du citoyen, 2019 QCTAT 4831, para. 52. COMMITTEE ON LABOUR AND THE ECONOMY, Clause-by-clause consideration of Bill 68, An Act mainly to reduce the administrative burden of physicians, October 1, 2024. CQLR, c. R-20.

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October 2, 2024

Proof of incapacity: analysis of CIUSSS de L’Ouest-de-L’île-de-Montréal (ST. Mary’s Hospital Center) c. R.C.

PROOF OF INCAPACITY: ANALYSIS OF CIUSSS DE L’OUEST-DE-L’ÎLE-DE-MONTRÉAL (ST. MARY’S HOSPITAL CENTER) c. R.C.1 Summary The authors comment on this decision rendered on September 20, 2024, in which the Court of Appeal ruled on the capacity to consent to care in the presence of a psychiatric disorder. The Court of Appeal overturned the first instance decision, which had found the respondent capable of refusing treatment with antipsychotic medications even though he had refuted his diagnosis, because he understood the benefits that antipsychotic medications could afford him and refused to take them because of their side effects. The Court of Appeal rather concluded that the trial judge had misapplied the five criteria to be used to assess whether a person is capable of consenting to care, particularly in the context where (i) the trial judge’s conclusion ran counter to the uncontradicted opinion of an expert; and (ii) there was much evidence supporting the fact that the respondent was incapable of making an informed decision. INTRODUCTION In this case, the Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’Ouest-de-l'Île-de-Montréal (the “CIUSSS”) appealed a decision rendered by the Superior Court on March 14, 2024, dismissing its application for an authorization to provide care to R.C., a 51-year-old man. The Superior Court had concluded that the CIUSSS had not proven that the respondent was incapable of consenting to care. The Court of Appeal was thus called upon to review the trial judge’s answer to the first question (incapacity to consent) in the analytical framework2 surrounding the test that has now been used for three decades.3 THE FACTS R.C. has a complex medical history. He was hospitalized several times between 2007 and 2019 for mental health issues, including suicidal ideation and personality disorders. In 2021, he was admitted to the CHUM for COVID-19-related complications having resulted in brain damage caused by hypoxia. From 2022 onwards, he made repeated visits to the emergency room, often to obtain benzodiazepines, leading him to become addicted. Even though he adhered to treatment with antipsychotic medication for a time, R.C. stopped taking his medication because of undesirable side effects. In January 2024, after an episode of confusion, he was taken to hospital where he was diagnosed with late-onset schizophrenia. However, R.C. refuted the diagnosis, claiming that his health problems were caused by an artificial intelligence device he believed had been implanted in his body. The psychiatrists who assessed him concluded that he was incapable of consenting to care. On February 16, 2024, the CIUSSS filed an application for authorization to re-hospitalize R.C. and administer antipsychotic medications, despite his categorical refusal. After analyzing the evidence, which essentially consisted of R.C.’s testimony and that of the CIUSSS psychiatrist, the Superior Court concluded that R.C. understood the nature of his condition and the benefits of the proposed treatment, despite his refusal to accept his diagnosis. The Court was of the opinion that the CIUSSS psychiatrists, in their analysis of R.C.’s capacity, had erroneously and repeatedly carried over his rejection of the diagnosis in a cascading fashion in their analysis of the five criteria from the decision in A.G.,4 thereby making the same error as the one that the Court of Appeal had identified in the M.H. decision.5 Despite the absence of a second opinion on R.C.’s capacity, the Superior Court had determined that he was able to consent to his care. According to the trial judge, in keeping with the teachings of the Court of Appeal in the F.D. decision,6 he therefore lacked jurisdiction to order care. For this reason, he dismissed the application for an authorization to provide care. THE COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION The Court of Appeal began by reiterating the five criteria for assessing a person’s capacity, namely: Does the person understand the nature of the illness for which treatment is proposed? Does the person understand the nature and purpose of the treatment? Does the person understand the risks and benefits involved in undergoing the treatment? Does the person understand the risks involved in not undergoing the treatment? ls the capacity to consent to treatment affected by the patient's illness?7 It pointed out that the criteria are not cumulative and that it is incumbent upon the trier to assess them as a whole.8 Moreover, the mere fact that a person refuses care that would be in their best interest is not enough to conclude that the person is incapable,9 nor is their mere rejection of their diagnosis.10 In this case, the Court of Appeal considered that the Superior Court judge had committed a palpable and overriding error making its intervention warranted. It stated that the trial judge was obliged to express an opinion on whether the evidence proffered was sufficient, adding that the judge had a proactive role to play in protecting the interests of the person involved. If the trial judge felt that a point that had not been the subject in a genuine adversarial debate raised a problem in his view, it was up to him to ask questions.11 Subsequently, the court took extracts from the evidence consisting of a psychiatric report and the testimony of its author and went on to note that the evidence did not allow the trial judge to conclude that R.C. was capable of consenting or refusing the proposed treatment plan, on the contrary. Based on the same evidence, the Court declared R.C. incapable of consenting to care and sent the case back to the Superior Court so that it could determine whether there was indeed categorical refusal and assess the terms of the treatment plan sought. AUTHORS’ COMMENTS This decision of the Court of Appeal follows approximately 20 other decisions12 respecting orders authorizing care handed down by this same court, which have all further established and clarified the guiding principles surrounding such orders since the F.D. decision of 2015.13 These successive decisions have not only added to case law, they have refined the assessment criteria and legal requirements pertaining to applications for authorization to provide care. Such a development in case law shows that the courts are committed to circumscribing complex healthcare situations. Doing so involves striking a balance between the rights to freedom and self-determination and the protection of those who are vulnerable or otherwise unable to consent. On July 6, 2015, the Court of Appeal of Quebec marked a decisive turning point where orders authorizing care are involved by rendering a decision that sent a clear message to the Superior Court, namely F.D. c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria).14 In that decision, an analytical framework was established to ensure compliance both with the provisions of the law and the spirit of the law. Since then, the Court has handed down some 20 other significant decisions, each shedding additional light. The guiding principles derived from these decisions can be summarized under the following themes: Rights relating to the judicial process Every person has the fundamental right to contest an application for a order authorizing care, to be heard and to be represented.15 The judge must proactively protect the user’s interests and ensure that they are represented by a lawyer.16 Scope of the care plan Requiring a definite care plan does not mean dictating which medication should be administered in a limitative way.17 A judge may remove certain substances from a treatment plan if they deem that to be in the patient’s best interest.18 It is crucial to draw a distinction between preventive care and a treatment plan that includes various alternatives as the situation evolves.19 For a future hospitalization clause to be valid, there must be a reasonable foreseeability of hospitalization.20 When a patient is to be placed, the application for authorization must indicate where they are to be placed.21 Physical restraint may only be used if it is necessary to avoid serious harm, and must be limited to the minimum.22 A parent’s refusal to consent to a treatment plan may not be warranted if the plan is in the child’s best interests.23 Duration of the authorization When the person concerned is not cooperating and access to their previous medical records is not available, the judge must be especially careful in assessing whether the proposed care plan is legal, in particular in terms of its duration and scope.24 The duration of the care order should be as short as reasonably possible, without compromising the effectiveness of the treatment.25 When a future hospitalization is contemplated, the judge must take into account the time required to stabilize the patient.26 The 30-day period for a future hospitalization should not be considered an absolute limit, as a longer period may be deemed necessary after a thorough analysis.27 The evidence The mere fact that a relationship exists between an expert and a party does not make the expert’s testimony inadmissible: The circumstances surrounding the expert’s role must be reviewed.28 An expert who does not know a patient’s reasons for refusing treatment is not deemed to have breached their duty to inform.29 An expert may testify to reported facts without the possibility of anyone opposing them; however, this does not mean that reported facts are proven, as the rules of evidence remain stringent in this context.30 An expert report may suffice as testimony; the judge need not require the patient’s testimony if the patient cannot understand the issues at hand.31 Applications for safeguard orders may be unsuccessful where there is no expert report and it is not demonstrated that the matter is urgent.32 This review highlights the significant advances that the courts have made in overseeing applications for orders authorizing care and protecting vulnerable people. The analytical framework established in the F.D. decision remains relevant, and subsequent decisions have further refined its questions. The decision that the Court of Appeal handed down in Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’Ouest-de-l'Île-de-Montréal c. R.C. is milestone in the jurisprudence on court orders authorizing care. By overturning the lower court’s judgment, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the need for a thorough assessment of the capacity to consent, emphasizing that the work of medical teams and applications made by healthcare institutions are important to ensure appropriate care. This decision not only underscores the fact that it is important to protect the rights of users, but also that the work of the court is crucial, for it must ensure that the criteria are met without substituting its opinion for that of the experts heard. CONCLUSION The decision discussed in this paper is part of a series of decisions that have clarified and enhanced the guiding principles established since the F.D. decision was handed down in 2015.33 The Court of Appeal has provided valuable guidelines for judges, institutions and healthcare professionals to use in their assessment of applications for authorization to provide care. Through a careful review of the circumstances of each case, the courts have shown that they are committed to effectively circumscribing complex health situations by ensuring that institutions have the tools they need to respond appropriately. Lastly, we must recognize that while progress has been made, there are still unresolved issues that need to be addressed. Recent court decisions, including the one that led to the R.C. decision,34 illustrate the importance of constant dialogue between those involved in the legal aspect of cases and those dealing with clinical realities. As jurisprudence continues to develop, paying close attention to future developments will be key to ensuring that healthcare institutions can act effectively in consideration of patients’ needs. 2024 QCCA 1231. F.D.c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. See the landmark decision, Institut Philippe Pinel de Montréal c. A.G., 1994 CanLII 6105 (QC CA). Institut Philippe Pinel de Montréal c. A.G., 1994 CanLII 6105 (QC CA). M.H. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2018 QCCA 1948, para. 57. F.D. c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. This decision, para. 13; with reference to Institut Philippe Pinel de Montréal c. A.G., 1994 CanLII 6105 (QC CA), pp. 28 to 33. This decision, para. 14; with reference to M. B. c. Centre hospitalier Pierre-le-Gardeur, 2004 CanLII 29017 (QC CA), para. 45; M.C. c. Service professionnel du Centre de santé et de services sociaux d’Arthabaska-et-de-L’Érable, 2010 QCCA 1114, para. 13. This decision, para. 14; with reference to M. B. c. Centre hospitalier Pierre-le-Gardeur, 2004 CanLII 29017 (QC CA), para. 46. This decision, para. 14, with reference to Starson v. Swayze, 2003 SCC 32, para. 79 and M.H. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2018 QCCA 1948, paras. 61–62. This decision, para. 18. We have excluded the following decisions from our analysis: Bédard c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Nord-de-l’Île-de-Montréal, 2023 QCCA 508; M.G. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2019 QCCA 203; S.F. c. CIUSSS de Centre-Ouest-de-l’île-de-Montréal – Hôpital général juif – Sir Mortimer B. Davis, 2021 QCCA 1531; P.L. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de la Montérégie-Centre, 2018 QCCA 318; N.G. c. Sir Mortimer B. Davis Jewish General Hospital, 2021 QCCA 1892; F.D. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2017 QCCA 1206. F.D.c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. Ibid. M.H.c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale, 2018 QCCA 1948, paras. 68 and 69. A.N. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Nord-de-l’île-de-Montréal, 2022 QCCA 1167 , para. 30. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Capitale-Nationale c. D.M., 2017 QCCA 1333, para. 25. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean c. O.G., 2018 QCCA 345, paras. 15 and 16. C.R.c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux du Bas-St-Laurent, 2017 QCCA 328, para. 28. G.J. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de Laval, 2021 QCCA 1944, paras. 24 to 26. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de la Mauricie-et-du-Centre-du-Québec (CIUSSS MCQ) c. J.B., 2017 QCCA 1638,, paras. 30 to 35. X.Y.c. Hôpital général du Lakeshore, 2017 QCCA 1465, para. 20. A.P. c. Centre hospitalier universitaire Sainte-Justine, 2023 QCCA 58, para. 19. L.C. c. Centre hospitalier de l’Université de Montréal (CHUM), 2015 QCCA 1139, paras. 4 and 5. D.A. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux des Laurentides, 2016 QCCA 1734, para. 31. T.F. c. CIUSSS de l’Est-de-l’île-de-Montréal , 2022 QCCA 1306, para. 25. N.M. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux de la Montérégie-Centre, 2022 QCCA1567, para. 17. M.G. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Centre-Sud-de-l’Île-de-Montréal , 2021 QCCA 1326, para. 11. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux de l’Ouest-de-l’île-de-Montréal (Douglas Mental Health University Institute) c. I.A., 2023 QCCA 1100, para. 30. Institut universitaire en santé mentale Douglas c. W.M., 2016 QCCA 1081, para. 5 A.D. c. Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Centre-Sud-de-l’île-de-Montréal, 2023 QCCA 1240, paras. 50, 56–57. A.F. c. Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux des Laurentides, 2021 QCCA 928, para. 50. F.D. c. Centre universitaire de santé McGill (Hôpital Royal-Victoria), 2015 QCCA 1139. CIUSSS de l'Ouest-de-l'Île-de-Montréal (St. Mary’s Hospital Center) c. R.C.,2024 QCCA 1231.

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August 1, 2024

Major change to the Canada Labour Code with new anti-replacement-worker provisions

Bill C-58, An Act to amend the Canada Labour Code and the Canada Industrial Relations Board Regulations, 2012, was passed on June 20, 2024, introducing anti-replacement-worker provisions to the Canada Labour Code. While anti-replacement-worker legislation has existed in Quebec since 1977, nothing of the sort existed for federal jurisdiction employers. Before Bill C-58, federal legislation only stipulated that an employer or a person acting on behalf of an employer could not use replacement workers “for the demonstrated purpose of undermining a trade union’s representational capacity rather than the pursuit of legitimate bargaining objectives.” Unions faced a heavy burden of proof to demonstrate that replacement workers were being used for this purpose. As a result, union activists have been pushing for decades for more protection during labour disputes. New anti-replacement-worker provisions Bill C-58 adds a new subsection to section 94 of the Canada Labour Code on unfair practices, which limits and regulates the use of replacement workers during strikes and lockouts. The new provisions no longer require unions to demonstrate the employer’s intention to undermine the union’s representational capacity and they prevent federal jurisdiction employers from using the services of any of the following persons to perform the duties of an employee who is in the bargaining unit on strike or locked out: Any employee hired after the day on which notice to bargain collectively was given. Any person who performs management functions or who is employed in a confidential capacity in matters related to industrial relations, if the person was hired after the day on which notice to bargain collectively was given. Any contractor, other than a dependent contractor, or any employee of another employer whose services were not being used on the day on which notice to bargain collectively was given. If, before the day on which notice to bargain collectively was given, an employer was using the services of a contractor or an employee of another employer and those services were the same as or substantially similar to the duties of an employee in the bargaining unit, they may continue to use those services during a labour dispute, so long as they do so in the same manner, to the same extent and in the same circumstances as they did before the notice was given. Any employee whose normal workplace is a workplace other than that at which the strike or lockout is taking place or who was transferred to the workplace at which the strike or lockout is taking place after the day on which notice to bargain collectively was given. Any volunteer, student or member of the public. Any employee who is in a bargaining unit on strike or locked out. However, the new provisions allow employers to use the services of such persons during a strike or lockout as long as the services are used solely to deal with a situation that presents or could reasonably be expected to present one of the following imminent or serious threats: A threat to the life, health or safety of any person. A threat of destruction of, or serious damage to, the employer’s property or premises. A threat of serious environmental damage affecting the employer’s property or premises. The use of the services must be necessary in order to deal with the situation because the employer is unable to use the services of the employees on strike or locked out. As in Quebec’s Labour Code, an employer may only rely on the services of a person referred to above for conservation purposes, and not for the purpose of continuing the supply of services or production of goods by the employer. Finally, the bill specifies that the employer must first offer these conservation duties to the employees who are on strike or locked out. The bill also includes provisions applicable to employers who contravene the anti-replacement-worker provisions. These offences can result in fines of up to $100,000 per day. The government may also ensure compliance with the new provisions by adopting regulations to establish an administrative framework with financial penalties. New provisions regarding the maintenance of activities during a strike or lockout In order to prevent imminent and serious threats to public health and safety, Bill C-58 provides that the union and employer must reach an agreement on the activities to be maintained in the event of a labour dispute. If no activities need to be maintained, the parties must still enter into an agreement to this effect. An employer and a union must enter into this agreement no later than 15 days after the day on which notice to bargain collectively was given to the Minister of Labour and the Canada Industrial Relations Board. If the parties do not reach an agreement, the matter will be brought before the Board at the request of one of the parties. The 72-hour strike or lockout notices referred to in section 87.2 of the Canada Labour Code may be given only once this agreement has been reached and a copy has been filed with the Minister and the Board, or if no agreement has been reached, if the Board has determined an application made by one of the parties. Coming into force Bill C-58 will come into force on June 20, 2025. Until then, the new anti-replacement-worker provisions will undoubtedly cause federal jurisdiction employers to seriously consider their bargaining power and level of preparedness for possible labour disputes. Our team is here to help you through this process.

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July 23, 2024

Requirements to Prevent and Reduce the Risk of Forced Labour or Child Labour: What Businesses Need to Know to Comply

On May 11, 2023, the Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act, S.C. 2023, c. 9 (the “Act”) was passed. The purpose of this Act is to implement Canada’s international commitment to contribute to the fight against forced labour and child labour, and to require certain entities to report on the measures they have taken to reduce the use of forced labour and child labour. The Act came into force on January 1, 2024, and reporting entities and federal institutions were required to submit their first report under the Act by May 31, 2024. In addition, Public Safety Canada (the “Government”) released the Guidance for reporting entities. Scope of the Act The Act applies to government institutions and to any corporation, partnership, trust or other unincorporated organization that (i) is listed on a stock exchange in Canada or (ii) has a place of business in Canada, does business in Canada or has assets in Canada and that, based on its consolidated financial statements, meets at least two of the following conditions for at least one of its two most recent financial years: (a) it has at least $20 million in assets (b) it has generated at least $40 million in revenue (c) it employs an average of at least 250 employees (collectively, the “entities”) Or (iii) is prescribed by regulations. The obligation to report applies to any entity (a) producing, selling or distributing goods in Canada or elsewhere; (b) importing into Canada goods produced outside Canada; or (c) controlling an entity engaged in any of these activities. Entities are considered to be operating in Canada if they produce, sell or distribute goods in Canada. They may also be considered to be operating in Canada if they have employees, if they make deliveries, purchases or payments in Canada, or if they have bank accounts in Canada. It is important to note that doing business in Canada does not require having a place of business in Canada. Forced Labour vs. Child Labour For the purposes of this Act, child labour is defined as labour provided by minors that (i) is provided or offered to be provided in Canada under circumstances that are contrary to the laws applicable in Canada; (ii) is provided or offered to be provided under circumstances that are physically, socially or morally dangerous to them; (iii) interferes with their schooling; or (iv) constitutes the worst forms of child labour, as defined in article 3 of the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention.1 Forced labour is labour provided by a person (i) in circumstances in which it would be reasonable to believe that their safety or that of a person known to them would be threatened if they failed to provide such labour; or (ii) in circumstances which constitute forced or compulsory labour, as defined in article 2 of the Forced Labour Convention.2 Entities With Reporting Obligations Any entity required to report annually to the Government under the Act must include in its report the steps taken during its previous financial year to prevent and reduce the risk of forced labour and child labour. In order to comply with the obligations imposed by the Act, the entity must also include in its report information on its structure, its activities relating to the production, sale, distribution or importation of goods, as well as the type of goods and place of operation, and the countries or regions involved in its supply chains. Lastly, the report must include a brief explanation of the entity’s due diligence policies and processes regarding forced labour and child labour, information on the training provided to employees, and the parts of its business that carry a risk of forced labour or child labour. Given that the steps taken to prevent and reduce forced labour and child labour can result in a loss of income for vulnerable families, the Act requires entities to identify the measures taken to mitigate such impact on these families. Publication of Reports Entities must not only comply with the format, approval and attestation requirements for their report before submitting it to the Government but also make it available to the public by publishing it on a prominent place on their website. They can submit their report in one of the two official languages, although the Government recommends that reports be published in both English and French. In addition, the Act requires entities incorporated under the Canada Business Corporations Act or any other federal law to provide a copy of the report to each shareholder at the same time as their annual financial statements. Offences and Fines Reporting entities that fail to submit their report or make it available to the public are liable to a fine of not more than $250,000 per offence.3 The senior executives, directors and employees of an entity are also liable to fines and criminal prosecution should the entity contravene the Act.4 Any offence committed by an entity may also entail reputational risk. Our Advice Introducing policies, procedures, audit tools and other rules—or improving existing ones—to prevent and reduce modern slavery is essential. Such policies and rules may include procedures for reporting and an investigation process to address concerns, as well as a whistleblower protection system (whistleblower policy or similar measures). Businesses should think about how they select suppliers and whether they should adopt rules for monitoring the activities of their suppliers and partners. They should also consider updating their agreements with existing suppliers or partners to ensure compliance with the requirements of the Act, in particular by including provisions prohibiting the use of forced labour or child labour in suppliers’ business activities. Other measures may include raising awareness and training staff, directors and officers on how to implement company policies and procedures aimed at identifying and preventing forced labour and child labour. Our team has developed tools to help reporting entities identify the parts of their business that carry a risk of forced labour or child labour. We will be monitoring upcoming government publications in response to the first reports that reporting entities submit and, if need be, we will release another article to clarify reporting obligations. For any questions or advice relating to your obligations under the Act, do not hesitate to contact our team. Section 1 of the Act; see also the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, adopted in Geneva on June 17, 1999, article 3: Link Section 1 of the Act; see also the Forced Labour Convention, adopted in Geneva on June 28, 1930, article 2: Link Section 19 of the Act. Section 20 of the Act.

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