Smart product liability: issues and challenges

October 19, 2023

Introduction

In 2023, where do we stand in terms of liability where smart products are concerned?

The rules governing product liability set out in the Civil Code of Québec were introduced early in the 20^thcentury in response to the industrial revolution and the growing number of workplace accidents attributable to tool failures.¹ Needless to say, the legislator at the time could not have anticipated that, a century later, the tools to which this legislation applied would be equipped with self-learning capabilities enabling them to perform specific tasks autonomously.

These “smart products,” whether they are intangible or integrated into tangible products, are subject to the requirements of general law, at least for the time being.

For the purposes of our analysis, the term “smart products” refers to products that have:

Self-learning capabilities, meaning that they can perform specific tasks without being under a human being’s immediate control.
Interconnectivity capabilities, meaning that they can collect and analyze data from their surroundings.
Autonomy capabilities, meaning that they can adapt their behaviour to perform an assigned task more efficiently (optional criterion).²

These capabilities are specific to what is commonly referred to as artificial intelligence (hereinafter referred to as “AI”).

Applying general law rules of liability to smart products

Although Canada prides itself on being a “world leader in the field of artificial intelligence,”³ it has yet to enact its first AI law.

The regulation of smart products in Quebec is still in its infancy. To this day, apart from the regulatory framework that applies to autonomous vehicles, there is no legislation in force that provides for distinct civil liability rules governing disputes relating to the marketing and use of smart products.

There are two factors that have a major impact on the liability that applies to smart products, namely transparency and apportionment of liability, and both should be considered in developing a regulatory framework for AI.⁴

But where does human accountability come in?

Lack of transparency in AI and product liability

When an autonomous product performs a task, it is not always possible for either the consumer or the manufacturer to know how the algorithm processed the information behind that task. This is what researchers refer to as “lack of transparency” or the “black box” problem associated with AI.⁵

The legislative framework governing product liability is set out in the Civil Code of Québec⁶ and the Consumer Protection Act.⁷ The provisions therein require distributors, professional sellers and manufacturers to guarantee that the products sold are free from latent defects. Under the rules governing product liability, the burden of proof is reversed, as manufacturers are presumed to have knowledge of any defects.⁸

Manufacturers have two means to absolve themselves from liability:⁹

A manufacturer may claim that a given defect is the result of superior force or a fault on the part of the consumer or a third party; or
A manufacturer may argue that, at the time that the product was brought to market, the existence of the defect could not have been known given the state of scientific knowledge.

This last means is specifically aimed at the risks inherent to technological innovation.¹⁰

That being said, although certain risks only become apparent after a product is brought to market, manufacturers have an ongoing duty to inform, and how this is applied depends on the evolution of knowledge about the risks associated with the product.¹¹ As such, the lack of transparency in AI can make it difficult to assign liability.

Challenges in apportioning liability and human accountability

There are cases where the “smart” component is integrated into a product by one of the manufacturer’s subcontractors.In Venmar Ventilation,¹² the Court of Appeal ruled that the manufacturer of an air exchanger could not be exempted from liability even though the defect in its product was directly related to a defect in the motor manufactured by a subcontractor.

In this context, it would be reasonable to expect that products’ smart component would be likely to result many similar calls in warranty, resulting in highly complex litigation cases, which could further complicate the apportionment of liability.

Moreover, while determining the identity of the person who has physical custody of a smart product seems obvious, determining the identity of the person who exercises actual control over it can be much more difficult, as custody and control do not necessarily belong to the same “person.”

There are two types of custodians of smart products:

The person who has the power of control, direction and supervision over a product at the time of its use (frontend custody);
The person who holds these powers over the algorithm that gives the product its autonomy (backend custody)¹³.

Either one of these custodians could be held liable should it contribute to the harm through its own fault.

As such, apportioning liability between the human user and the custodians of the AI algorithm could be difficult. In the case of a chatbot, for example, determining whether the human user or the AI algorithm is responsible for defamatory or discriminatory comments may prove complex.

C-27: canadian bill on artificial intelligence

Canada’s first AI bill (“Bill C-27”) was introduced in the House of Commons on June 16, 2022.¹⁴ At the time of publication, the Standing Committee on Industry and Technology was still reviewing Bill C-27. Part 3 of Bill C-27 enacts the Artificial Intelligence and Data Act.

If adopted in its current form, the Act would apply to “high-impact AI systems” (“Systems”) used in the course of international and interprovincial trade.¹⁵

Although the government has not yet clearly defined the characteristics that distinguish high-impact AI from other forms of AI, for now, the Canadian government refers in particular to “Systems that can influence human behaviour at scale” and “Systems critical to health and safety.”¹⁶ We have reason to believe that this type of AI is what poses a high risk to users’ fundamental rights.

In particular, Bill C-27 would make it possible to prohibit the conduct of a person who “makes available” a System that is likely to cause “serious harm” or “substantial damage.”¹⁷

Although the Bill does not specifically address civil liability, the broad principles it sets out reflect the best practices that apply to such technology. These best practices can provide manufacturers of AI technology with insight into how a prudent and diligent manufacturer would behave in similar circumstances. The Bill’s six main principles are set out in the list below.¹⁸

Transparency: Providing the public with information about mitigation measures, the intended use of the Systems and the “content that it is intended to generate”.
Oversight: Providing Systems over which human oversight can be exercised.
Fairness and equity: Bringing to market Systems that can limit the potential for discriminatory outcomes.
Safety: Proactively assessing Systems to prevent “reasonably foreseeable” harm.
Accountability: Putting governance measures in place to ensure compliance with legal obligations applicable to Systems.
Robustness: Ensuring that Systems operate as intended.

To this, we add the principle of risk mitigation, considering the legal obligation to “mitigate” the risks associated with the use of Systems.¹⁹

Conclusion

Each year, the Tortoise Global AI Index ranks countries according to their breakthroughs in AI.²⁰ This year, Canada ranked fifth, ahead of many European Union countries.

That being said, current legislation clearly does not yet reflect the increasing prominence of this sector in our country.

Although Bill C-27 does provide guidelines for best practices in developing smart products, it will be interesting to see how they will be applied when civil liability issues arise.

Jean-Louis Baudouin, Patrice Deslauriers and Benoît Moore, La responsabilité civile, Volume 1: Principes généraux, 9^thedition, 2020, 1-931.
Tara Qian Sun, Rony Medaglia, “Mapping the challenges of Artificial Intelligence in the public sector: Evidence from public healthcare”, Government Information Quarterly, 2019, 36(2), pp. 368–383, online EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Civil Law Rules on Robotics, European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2017 with recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)), available online at TA (europa.eu).
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, The Artificial Intelligence and Data Act (AIDA) – Companion document, online.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, White Paper on Artificial Intelligence: a European approach to excellence and trust, COM. (2020), p. 3.
Madalina Busuioc, “Accountable Artificial Intelligence: Holding Algorithms to Account”, Public Administration Review2020, online.
Civil Code of Québec (CQLR, c. C-1991, art. 1726 et seq.
Consumer Protection Act, CQLR c. P-40.1, s. 38.
General Motors Products of Canada v. Kravitz, 1979 CanLII 22 (SCC), p. 801. See also: Brousseau c. Laboratoires Abbott limitée, 2019 QCCA 801, para. 89.
Civil Code of Québec (CQLR, c. CCQ-1991, art. 1473; ABB Inc. v. Domtar Inc., 2007 SCC 50, para. 72.
Brousseau, para. 100.
Brousseau, para. 102.
Desjardins Assurances générales inc. c. Venmar Ventilation inc., 2016 QCCA 1911, para. 19 et seq.
Céline Mangematin, Droit de la responsabilité civile et l’intelligence artificielle, https://books.openedition.org/putc/15487?lang=fr#ftn24; See also Hélène Christodoulou, La responsabilité civile extracontractuelle à l’épreuve de l’intelligence artificielle, p. 4.
Bill C-27, An Act to enact the Consumer Privacy Protection Act, the Personal Information and Data Protection Tribunal Act and the Artificial Intelligence and Data Act and to make consequential and related amendments to other Acts, Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry.
Bill C-27, summary and s. 5(1).
The Artificial Intelligence and Data Act (AIDA) – Companion document, Government of Canada, online. The Artificial Intelligence and Data Act (AIDA) – Companion document canada.ca.
Bill C-27, s. 39(a).
AIDA, Companion document
Bill C-27, s. 8.
TORTOISE MEDIA, The Global AI Index 2023, available at tortoisemedia.com.

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July 9, 2024

Presumptive Evidence of an Insured’s Intentional Fault: The Superior Court Dismisses Proceedings Instituted Against an Insurer

Introduction On July 2, 2024, the Superior Court rendered a decision in Lallier c. Société d’assurance Beneva inc.,1 ruling on an insured’s claim against his insurer for an insurance benefit further to a loss, as the insurer had denied coverage, alleging the insured’s intentional fault. Despite the absence of hard evidence of the insured’s intentional fault, the Court ruled in favour of the insurer based on evidence established by presumption. The facts During the night of August 2 to 3, 2020, a fire destroyed the home of Plaintiff, Mr. Réjean Lallier (hereinafter “the Insured”). His version is that he accidentally left a candle burning in the bathroom before running errands with his son. When he returned, the Insured saw that the house was on fire. Having no telephone, he rushed to a convenience store to call the fire department, rather than asking a nearby resident for help. After the loss, the Insured contacted his insurer Société d’assurance Beneva inc., the defendant in the case (“the Insurer”), to obtain compensation for the damage to his property. The claims adjuster that the Insurer had assigned to the case and who had been tasked with investigating the loss and compensating the Insured raised several anomalies in the Insured’s deposition. These included the Insured’s precarious financial situation, the fact that the residence was poorly maintained and the fact that, despite the urgency of the situation, the Insured had decided to take his car to call for help rather than go to a neighbour’s house. In these circumstances, the case is referred to the Insurer's special investigation unit. The Insurer’s investigation ultimately led to the conclusion that the Insured had intentionally caused the fire. This meant that contractual and legal exclusions applied, allowing the Insurer to deny coverage and justify its refusal to pay an insurance benefit. The Insured, who represented himself at the trial, instituted legal proceedings for the sum of $680,000, seeking reparation for damage to the immovable, his movable property and for living expenses. He also claimed $20,000 in compensation for the alleged inconvenience he suffered as a result of the Insurer’s “abusive behaviour.” Analysis The Honourable Justice Sébastien Vaillancourt, J.S.C., pointed out that, under article 2464 of the Civil Code of Québec2 and the provisions of the insurance policy, the Insurer is not obliged to compensate for damages intentionally caused by the Insured. However, the Insurer has the burden of establishing the Insured’s intentional fault. The Court reiterated that intentional fault is defined as behaviour that is deliberately and voluntarily intended to cause harm.3 The offender’s intention must not only be evident in the actions taken, but also in the ensuing consequences.4 This can be demonstrated through serious, precise and concordant presumptions, in accordance with the teachings of the Court of Appeal in Barrette on the subject.5 To meet its burden of proof, the Insurer presented to the Court the inconsistencies and improbabilities in the Insured’s statements. For example, in some statements, he claimed to be in a good financial position, while in others, he stated the opposite. In addition, the time at which he left his house after lighting the candle, what he did with his son after he left and how long he was gone changed from one statement to the next. The Insured had trouble explaining in a coherent manner why he was gone for so long late in the evening while his house was going up in flames. The Insured indicated that he went to the convenience store to contact the fire department after seeing the fire, stating that he did not want to go to his neighbour’s house because they had had a disagreement in the past. The Court concluded that this version was implausible given the gravity of the situation. Several other contradictions were noted in the Insured’s testimony at trial. The Insured tried to justify himself by claiming that he had trouble speaking in public and that his medication was causing him to lose his memory.6 However, there was no evidence to support these claims, and they were not upheld by the Court.7 Ultimately, the judge did not accept the Insured’s version. The sheer number of contradictions in his statements went beyond what was acceptable to the Court to consider them reliable. Given that certain contradictions emerged as early as the first statement after the fire, the time lapse between the incident and the trial could not be used as a justification.8 The statements were considered untrue, as they were mutually inconsistent.9 What is more, the contradictions and inconsistencies in the statements pointed to fraudulent intent on the Insured’s part. Lastly, the claim for damages in compensation for the Insurer’s abusive behaviour was also dismissed, given the absence of evidence in this regard.10 Conclusion Demonstrating fraudulent intent to deny coverage is no simple feat for insurers. In this case, the Insurer succeeded in meeting its burden of proof by relying on presumptions rather than hard evidence. The facts spoke for themselves. And faced with the Insured’s numerous inconsistent and contradictory statements, the Court ruled in favour of the Insurer. The Insured’s fraudulent intent was successfully substantiated and his claim against the Insurer was dismissed.11 Lallier c. Société d’assurance Beneva inc., [2024] n° 500-17-116356-216, QCCS. [Lallier] (Time limit for appeal: 30 days after the date of the notice of judgment). Civil Code of Québec, a. 2464; Lallier, para. 34. Allstate du Canada, compagnie d’assurances c. D., SOQUIJ AZ-50101469, J.E. 2001–1891, (C.A.), para. 18, as quoted in Lallier, para. 36. [Allstate] Allstate, para. 18, as quoted in Lallier, para. 36. Lallier, paras. 37–38; see Barrette c. Union canadienne (L’), compagnie d’assurances,2013 QCCA 1687, paras. 12–13. Lallier, para. 43. Lallier, paras. 44–46. Lallier, para. 47. Maud Rivard, Dispositions générales applicables aux assurances de dommages, JCQ-Droit civil Contrats nommés II, Fascicle 20, para. 92, updated to June 20, 2023, as quoted in Lallier para. 49. Lallier, paras. 59–62. Lallier, paras. 56–58.

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June 5, 2024

Almost two years after the issuance of the Single-use Plastics Prohibition Regulations, where do we stand and how are businesses affected?

On December 20, 2022, the federal government's Single-Use Plastics Prohibition Regulations1 (the “Regulations”) gradually came into force, with the effect, as the name suggests, of prohibiting (or restricting, in certain cases) the manufacture, import and sale of certain single-use plastics that pose a threat to the environment. In principle, it is now prohibited to manufacture, import and sell certain single-use plastic products made entirely or partially of plastic, such as foodservice ware, checkout bags and straws. On June 20, 2024, beverage ring carriers and flexible straws packaged with beverage containers have been added to this list.2 However, there are cases currently pending before the courts that have the potential to change the situation. Currently contested: the Regulations and the Order A contestation to the Regulations has been before the Federal Court since July 15, 2022, in an application for judicial review brought by Petro Plastics Corporation Ltd et al3 (the “Petro Plastics Case”). However, the parties to this case have asked for it to be suspended pending a final judgment in another case4 brought by the Responsible Plastics Use Coalition (the “Coalition Case”).5 In the Coalition case, the validity of the order by which plastic products were added to the list of toxic substances in Schedule 1 of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (“CEPA”)6 is called into question. The Federal Court of Appeal will soon hear this case and render a judgment that will affect the Petro Plastics case. On November 16, 2023, in the Coalition Case, the Federal Court ruled in favour of the Coalition, retroactively quashing the Order Adding a Toxic Substance to Schedule 1 to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (the “Order”) and declaring it invalid and unlawful as of April 23, 2021.7 Essentially, the Federal Court had two main reasons for concluding that the registration was illegal. Findings of the Federal Court Order found unreasonable The Federal Court concluded that the Order was unreasonable because the evidence that the federal government had in hand did not support the conclusion that all plastic manufactured articles were toxic within the meaning of CEPA. On the contrary, the evidence showed that certain plastic manufactured articles included in the scope of the Schedule 1 list were not toxic. According to the Federal Court, the government acted outside its authority by listing the broad category of plastic manufactured articles on Schedule 1 in an unqualified manner. Order found unconstitutional The Federal Court also concluded that the Order was unconstitutional because it did not fall within the federal government’s criminal law power. Only substances that are toxic in “the real sense” can be included on the list of toxic substances. They must be substances that are harmful, dangerous to the environment or human life, and truly have the potential to cause harm. In other words, according to the Federal Court, the power to regulate the broad and exhaustive category of “single-use plastics” lies with the provinces. The Attorney General of Canada appealed this decision with the Federal Court of Appeal on December 8, 2023. The Federal Court of Appeal granted a stay of the judgment rendered on November 16, 2023, until disposition of the appeal,8 such that the Order and the Regulations remain in force, at least for the time being. If the Federal Court of Appeal upholds the decision that the Federal Court rendered on November 16, 2023, this will affect the validity of the Regulations. Under section 90 of CEPA, a substance can only be added to Schedule 1 by order if the federal government determines that it is toxic within the meaning of CEPA, and, under section 93 of CEPA, the government only has the power to regulate such a substance after it has been added to the list. The plastic items in question Subject to the outcome of the court cases discussed above, here is the exhaustive list of items that the Regulations prohibit: Single-use plastic ring carriers designed to surround beverage containers in order to carry them together.9 Single-use plastic stir sticks designed to stir or mix beverages or to prevent a beverage from spilling from the lid of its container.10 Single-use plastic foodservice ware that (a) is formed in the shape of a clamshell container, lidded container, box, cup, plate or bowl, (b) is designed to serve or transport ready-to-eat food or beverages and (c) contains certain materials.11 Single-use plastic checkout bags designed to carry purchased goods from a business and : (a) whose plastic is not a fabric,12 or (b) whose plastic is a fabric that will break or tear, as the case may be, (i) if it is used to carry 10 kg over a distance of 53 m 100 times; (ii) if it is washed in accordance with the washing procedures specified for a single domestic wash in the International Organization for Standardization standard ISO 6330, as amended from time to time.13 Single-use plastic cutlery that is formed in the shape of a fork, knife, spoon, spork or chopstick and that (a) contains polystyrene or polyethylene; or (b) changes its physical properties after being run through an electrically operated household dishwasher 100 times.14 Single-use plastic straws that either (a) contain polystyrene or polyethylene, or (b) change their physical properties after being run through an electrically operated household dishwasher 100 times. Exceptions Single-use flexible plastic straws Single-use flexible plastic straws, i.e., those with a corrugated section that allows the straw to bend and maintain its position at various angles,15 may be manufactured and imported.16 These flexible straws may also be sold in any of the following circumstances:17 The sale does not take place in a commercial, industrial, or institutional setting. This exception means that individuals can sell such flexible straws. The sale is between businesses in packages of at least 20 straws. The sale of a package of 20 or more straws is between a retail store and a customer if the customer requests straws and the package is not displayed in a manner that permits the customer to view the package without the help of a store employee.18 The sale of straws is between a retail store and a customer, if the straw is packaged together with a beverage container and the packaging was done at a location other than the retail store. The sale is between a care facility, such as a hospital or long-term care facility, and its patients or residents. Export of single-use plastic items All the manufactured single-use plastic items listed above may be manufactured, imported or sold for export until December 20, 2025.19 That said, any person who manufactures or imports such items for export will be required to keep a record of certain information and documents as appropriate for each type of plastic manufactured item.20 Records of the information and documents will have to be kept for at least five years in Canada.21 Conclusion: an opportunity to rethink the use of plastics In the short term, businesses will need to start thinking about how they will replace the plastic manufactured items they use. To help businesses select alternatives to single-use plastic items, the federal government has released its Guidance for selecting alternatives to the single-use plastics in the proposed Single-Use Plastics Prohibition Regulations.m22 According to this document, the aim should be to reduce plastics. Businesses may begin by considering whether a single-use plastic product should be replaced or no longer provided. Only products that perform essential functions should be replaced with non-plastic equivalents. Stir sticks and straws can be eliminated most of the time. Another way to reduce waste is to opt for reusable products and packaging. Businesses are invited to rethink their products and services to provide reusable options. Reusable container programs (i.e., offering customers the option of bringing their own reusable containers) are a reuse option that businesses may want to consider, in particular to reduce the amount of plastic foodservice ware. Only where reusable products are not feasible should businesses substitute a single-use plastic product with a recyclable single-use alternative. In such cases, businesses are encouraged to contact local recycling facilities to ensure that they can successfully recycle the products at their end of life. Ultimately, charging consumers for certain single-use alternatives (e.g., single-use wooden or moulded fibre cutlery) may also discourage their use. SOR/2022-138 Regulations, ss. 3 (2), s. 11 and ss. 13 (4) Petro Plastics Corporation Ltd et al v Canada (Attorney General), Court File No. T-1468-22. Order registered on April 23, 2021 and published in the Canada Gazette on May 12, 2021 Court File No. T-824-21 S.C. 1999, c. 33 Responsible Plastic Use Coalition v. Canada (Environment and Climate Change) 2023 FC 1511 2024 FCA 18 Regulations, s. 1 and 3 Regulations, s. 1 and 6 Regulations, s. 1 and 6 “Any material woven, knitted, crocheted, knotted, braided, felted, bonded, laminated or otherwise produced from, or in combination with, a textile fibre” as defined in section 2 of the Textile Labelling Act, RSC 1985, c. T-10 Regulations, s. 1 and 6 Regulations, s. 1 and 4 and ss. 5 (1) Regulations, s. 1 Ibid, s. 4 Regulations, ss. 5 (2)–(6) According to Guidance for selecting alternatives to the single-use plastics in the proposed Single-Use Plastics Prohibition Regulations, the goal is to ensure that people with disabilities who need flexible single-use plastic straws continue to have access to them at home and can carry them to restaurants and other premises. Regulations, ss. 2 (2), s. 10 and ss. 13 (5). Ibid., s. 8 Ibid, ss. 9 (1). https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/managing-reducing-waste/consultations/proposed-single-use-plastics-prohibition-regulations-consultation-document.html

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April 15, 2024

Can artificial intelligence be designated as an inventor in a patent application?

Artificial intelligence (“AI”) is becoming increasingly sophisticated, and the fact that this human invention can now generate its own inventions opens the door to new ways of conceptualizing the notion of “inventor” in patent law. In a recent ruling, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (“UK Supreme Court”) however found that an artificial intelligence system cannot be the author of an invention within the meaning of the applicable regulations under which patents are granted. This position is consistent with that of several courts around the world that have already ruled on the issue. But what of Canada, where the courts have yet to address the matter? In this bulletin, we will take a look at the decisions handed down by the UK Supreme Court and its counterparts in other countries before considering Canada’s position on the issue. In Thaler (Appellant) v Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Mark,1 the UK Supreme Court ruled that “an inventor must be a person”. Summary of the decision In 2018, Dr. Stephen Thaler filed patent applications for two inventions described as having been generated by an autonomous AI system. The machine in question, DABUS, was therefore designated as the inventor in the applications. Dr. Thaler claimed that, as the owner of DABUS, he was entitled to file patent applications for inventions generated by his machine. That being so, he alleged that he was not required to name a natural person as the inventor. Both the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal dismissed Dr. Thaler’s appeal from the decision of the Intellectual Property Office of the United Kingdom not to proceed with the patent applications, in particular because the designated inventor was not valid under the Patents Act 1977. The UK Supreme Court, the country’s final court of appeal, also dismissed Dr. Thaler’s appeal. In a unanimous decision, it concluded that the law is clear in that “an inventor within the meaning of the 1977 Act must be a natural person, and DABUS is not a person at all, let alone a natural person: it is a machine”.2 Although there was no doubt that DABUS had created the inventions in question, that did not mean that the courts could extend the notion of inventor, as defined by law, to include machines. An ongoing trend The UK Supreme Court is not the first to reject Dr. Thaler’s arguments. The United States,3 the European Union4 and Australia5 have adopted similar positions, concluding that only a natural person can qualify as an inventor within the meaning of the legislation applicable in their respective jurisdictions. The UK ruling is part of the Artificial Inventor Project’s cross-border attempt to ensure that the DABUS machine—and AI in general—is recognized as a generative tool capable of generating patent rights for the benefit of AI system owners. To date, only South Africa has issued a patent to Dr. Thaler, naming DABUS as the inventor.6 This country is the exception that proves the rule. It should however be noted that the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission of South Africa does not review applications on their merits. As such, no reason was given for considering AI as the inventor. More recently, in February of this year, the United States Patent and Trademark Office issued a guidance on AI-assisted inventions. The guidance confirms the judicial position and states in particular that “a natural person must have significantly contributed to each claim in a patent application or patent”.7 What about Canada? In 2020, Dr. Thaler also filed a Canadian patent application for inventions generated by DABUS.8 The Canadian Intellectual Property Office (“CIPO”) issued a notice of non-compliance in 2021, establishing its initial position as follows: Because for this application the inventor is a machine and it does not appear possible for a machine to have rights under Canadian law or to transfer those rights to a human, it does not appear this application is compliant with the Patent Act and Rules.9 However, CIPO specified that it was open to receiving the applicant’s arguments on the issue, as follows: Responsive to the compliance notice, the applicant may attempt to comply by submitting a statement on behalf of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) machine and identify, in said statement, himself as the legal representative of the machine.10 To date, CIPO has issued no notice of abandonment and the application remains active. Its status in Canada is therefore unclear. It will be interesting to see whether Dr. Thaler will try to sway the Canadian courts to rule in his favour after many failed attempts in other jurisdictions around the world, and most recently in the UK Supreme Court. At first glance, the Patent Act11 (the “Act”) does not prevent an AI system from being recognized as the inventor of a patentable invention. In fact, the term “inventor” is not defined in the Act. Furthermore, nowhere is it stated that an applicant must be a “person,” nor is there any indication to that effect in the provisions governing the granting of patents. The Patent Rules12 offer no clarification in that regard either. The requirement implied by the clear use of the term “person” in the wording of the relevant sections of the law is important: It was a key consideration that the UK Supreme Court analyzed in Thaler. Case law on the subject is still ambiguous. According to the Supreme Court of Canada, given that the inventor is the person who took part in conceiving the invention, the question to ask is “[W]ho is responsible for the inventive concept?”13 That said, however, we note that the conclusion reached was that a legal person—as opposed to a natural person—cannot be considered an inventor.14 The fact is that the Canadian courts have never had to rule on the specific issue of recognizing AI as an inventor, and until such time as the courts render a decision or the government takes a stance on the matter, the issue will remain unresolved. Conclusion Given that Canadian law is not clear on whether AI can be recognized as an inventor, now would be a good time for Canadian authorities to clarify the issue. As the UK Supreme Court has suggested, the place of AI in patent law is a current societal issue, one that the legislator will ultimately have to settle.15 As such, it is only a matter of time before the Act is amended or CIPO issues a directive. Moreover, in addition to having to decide whether AI legally qualifies as an inventor, Canadian authorities will have to determine whether a person can be granted rights to an invention that was actually created by AI. The question as to whether an AI system owner can hold a patent on an invention generated by their machine was raised in Thaler. Once again, unlike the UK’s patent act,16 our Patent Act does not close the door to such a possibility. Canadian legislation contains no comprehensive list of the categories of persons to whom a patent may be granted, for instance. If we were to rewrite the laws governing intellectual property, given that the main purpose such laws is to encourage innovation and creativity, perhaps a better approach would be to allow AI system owners to hold patent rights rather than recognizing the AI as an inventor. Patent rights are granted on the basis of an implicit understanding: A high level of protection is provided in exchange for sufficient disclosure to enable a person skilled in the art to reproduce an invention. This ensures that society benefits from such inventions and that inventors are rewarded. Needless to say, arguing that machines need such an incentive is difficult. Designating AI as an inventor and granting it rights in that respect is therefore at odds with the very purpose of patent protection. That said, an AI system owner who has invested time and energy in designing their system could be justified in claiming such protection for the inventions that it generates. In such a case and given the current state of the law, the legislator would likely have to intervene. Would this proposed change spur innovation in the field of generative AI? We are collectively investing a huge amount of “human” resources in developing increasingly powerful AI systems. Will there come a time when we can no longer consider that human resources were involved in making AI-generated technologies? Should it come to that, giving preference to AI system owners could become counterproductive. In any event, for the time being, a sensible approach would be to emphasize the role that humans play in AI-assisted inventions, making persons the inventors rather than AI. As concerns inventions conceived entirely by an AI system, trade secret protection may be a more suitable solution. The professionals on our intellectual property team are at your disposal to assist you with patent registration and provide you with a clearer understanding of the issues involved. [2023] UKSC 49 [Thaler]. Ibid., para. 56. See the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Thaler v Vidal, 43 F. 4th 1207 (2022), application for appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States dismissed. See the decision of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office in J 0008/20 (Designation of inventor/DABUS) (2021), request to refer questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal denied. See the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Commissioner of Patents v Thaler, [2022] FCAFC 62, application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia denied. ZA 2021/03242. Federal Register: Inventorship Guidance for AI-Assisted Inventions. CA 3137161. Notice from CIPO dated February 11, 2022, in Canadian patent application 3137161. Ibid. R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4. SOR/2019-251. Apotex Inc.v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., 2002 SCC 77 at paras. 96–97. Sarnoff Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 712, para. 9. Thaler, paras. 48–49, 79. Ibid., para. 79.

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March 13, 2024

An insurer ordered to pay damages – The Court of Appeal intervenes

On February 12, 2024, the Court of Appeal of Quebec handed down its decision in Société d’assurance Beneva inc. c. Bordeleau,1 dealing in particular with the burden of proof incumbent on an insurer when it denies coverage on the basis of an insured’s intentional fault, and an award of damages against an insurer for breach of its duty of good faith. The facts This decision was rendered further to a dispute between Société d’assurance Beneva inc. (hereinafter the “Insurer") and some of its insureds, including Mr. Michel Bordeleau, the owner of a multi-storey rental building that was damaged by fire. He lived in one of the units with his parents. According to the uncontested expert evidence presented, the fire originated in one of the storage spaces in the basement of the building, which was assigned to a lessee couple. Access to the basement and all storage spaces was locked. The cause of the fire was deemed to be intentional, given the traces of accelerant found in the area of the fire’s origin. The instigator or instigators were not identified. On November 21, 2016, 60 days after the fire, the Insurer denied coverage because of the intentional nature of the fire, which it attributed to its insured, Mr. Bordeleau. A few months later, on March 22, 2017, it reached an agreement with Mr. Bordeleau’s hypothecary creditor. The subrogation release provides for the Insurer’s payment of the balance of the hypothecary debt of $149,720.99, and subrogation to the creditor’s rights up to the amount paid. Mr. Bordeleau, in his belief that he had been harmed by the Insurer’s decision, instituted legal proceedings to recover the insurance benefit to which he claimed to be entitled, while also claiming damages. The Insurer filed a cross-application for recovery of the balance paid to the hypothecary creditor. The trial The trial judge, relying on the evidence, concluded that although the fire was intentional in nature, the Insurer had not discharged its burden of establishing the insured’s involvement in the fire. Taking this conclusion into account, she then proceeded to analyze the plaintiffs’ claim and to weigh the damages in light of the evidence and the limits of the insurance policy. In particular, she ruled in favour of Mr. Bordeleau’s claim for damages for the building, the amount of which was admitted. In addition, she ordered the Insurer to pay $15,000.00 in damages for nuisance and inconvenience caused by its conduct, which she considered faulty. This conclusion was based on the Insurer’s duty to act in good faith, to consider the facts and act on their basis, and to conduct a full investigation, duty which the Insurer had breached by failing to sufficiently follow-up on leads that could have identified who was responsible for the fire. In order to deny coverage, clear and compelling evidence of the insured’s involvement, going beyond mere suspicion, was necessary. Given the sometimes implausible and sometimes contradictory testimonies of the people met during the investigation, there was no such evidence. In other words, the claims adjuster had jumped to conclusions. In light of her conclusions, the trial judge dismissed the Insurer’s cross-application, which she deemed to be unfounded, without giving further reasons. The appeal The Court of Appeal first refrained from intervening in light of the Superior Court’s conclusions regarding the failure to demonstrate Mr. Bordeleau’s involvement in the fire. It did however intervene on the damages awarded for nuisance and inconvenience suffered by the insureds, and pointed out the following: [40] [translation] Firstly, apart from the strict mathematical calculation of the amounts payable, and perhaps other technical aspects not requiring the exercise of judgment, the processing of a claim is an obligation of means, not one of result. The fact that a court found at the end of a trial held many years after the incident that an insurer should have covered in the first place obviously does not mean that the insurer necessarily committed a fault other than its refusal to pay, making it civilly liable, let alone that it acted in bad faith. [41] In this case, there was nothing in the evidence to support a finding of fault or breach of the duty of good faith. [42] On the contrary, there is enough evidence to conclude that the investigation by the appellant and its experts, which led to the denial of coverage, was not botched. . . . In the opinion of the Court of Appeal, the evidence showed that the Insurer’s investigation had been done in a conscientious manner, in particular because it had transferred the claim file to a special investigative unit, mandated a fire origin and cause expert and external investigators, and interviewed many witnesses who could have provided information on the circumstances of the incident. Moreover, it had no allegations that the Insurer had failed to consider exculpatory evidence against its insured. In this context, although it took several years for the insured to obtain his due, with all the inconveniences of going through proceedings, the Insurer’s conduct could not be considered offending or revealing of bad faith. No damages could be awarded. Lastly, the Court of Appeal took a closer look at the question of the Insurer’s subrogation to the hypothecary creditor’s rights, which was little discussed in the judgment under appeal. Reiterating the fundamental principle in property and casualty insurance that the indemnification of an insured cannot result in enrichment, the Court of Appeal concluded that dismissing the Insurer’s cross-application would have such an effect. In addition to receiving an insurance benefit for the damages sustained, Mr. Bordeleau would also have had seen his hypothecary debt discharged. This would have given him a clear advantage. In this case, the benefit paid to the hypothecary creditor needed to be deducted from the damages claimed by the insured. The trial judge’s finding were thus revised accordingly. Conclusion Despite the clear principles addressed in this case, the Court of Appeal’s analysis points to practical difficulties that insureds and insurers can encounter when dealing with similar claims. It points to the coexistence of two factors that can be difficult to balance: First, the burden of proof where coverage is denied on the basis of the insured's intentional fault, and second, the insurer’s obligation of means in processing the associated claim. The dismissal of a coverage defence does not in itself warrant awarding damages. Société d’assurance Beneva inc. c. Bordeleau, 2024 QCCA 171

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