The theme for this year’s World Intellectual Property Day is “IP and Sports: Ready, Set, Innovate”, celebrating IP’s contributions to the world of athletics, athletes, and fans alike. It may seem surprising, but the world of IP has always been strongly linked to sports, whether it be cutting-edge equipment and gear, or the latest trends and brands in apparel. In honour of this year’s theme, we at Lavery thought it would be fun to highlight various sports-related inventions that have been patented over the years. From the serious to the downright silly, we have chosen several patents that show IP’s important, and sometimes bizarre, contributions to sports and athletics. US 2642679A: Ice rink resurfacing machine Starting with a classic, Frank J. Zamboni’s 1949 patent for an “Ice rink resurfacing machine” is recognizable to anyone who’s ever attended a hockey game. Fun fact: between 1928 and 1978, Frank Zamboni was awarded a total of 15 patents related to ice resurfacing machines as well as other technologies.1 US 267799A: Cork swimming-suit Before there were swimsuits made of space-age materials featuring ultra-hydrodynamic designs, we apparently had swimsuits made of… cork? Patented by Paschal Plant in 1882, this suit was intended to be sufficiently buoyant so as to “enable a person to float with perfect security” and aid in coming up to the surface after a dive. Water safety has never been so fashionable! US6446264B2: Articles of clothing Fast forward 120 years to see how far swimwear innovation has advanced. The use of such “tech suits” correlated with the breaking of numerous swimming world records when introduced, emphasizing the real impact of innovation. US2662587A: Chair for aerial skilifts While modern ski lift technology has existed since the 1930s, Mcilvaine Alexander’s 1949 patent was the first to feature a retractable footrest that could be brought by the passenger into operating position during loading, thereby no longer requiring as much help from attendants.2 US642544A: Bicycle Patented by Louis S. Burbank in 1898, this “innovative” bicycle design is intended to “provide means whereby one may enjoy with a bicycle or similar vehicle exercise like that of rowing” and is “adapted to develop the muscles of the arms and body as well as those of the legs”. Looking at the image above, many questions arise, for example relating to starting, staying upright, and stopping. US638920A: Golf-tee According to the National Golf Foundation, at least 22,000 patents related in some way to golf were filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) between 1976 and 2018, the most of any sport by far.3 For comparison, baseball, the second most patented sport, saw 1,508 patents filed in the same period. An early example of a golf-related patent is this one for a “wooden” golf tee, patented by George F. Grant in 1899. According to the patent, the wooden golf tee was intended to replace “the usual conical mounds of sand or similar material formed by the fingers of the player on which the ball is supported when driving off”. US12011645B2: Golf tee Some 135 years later and golf tee innovation continues, in this case with a two-part design in which the upper portion can move and/or detach from the lower portion when the ball is struck, minimizing any resistance from the tee. US5356330A: Apparatus for simulating a "high five" When looking at technical achievements in sports, one can’t overlook the crowds of adoring fans. With that said, this invention relates to a self-righting hand-arm configuration, which is adapted to pivot when struck by a user, thereby simulating a "high five". According to the patent, solitary fans are, tragically, “unable to perform a ‘high five’ to express excitement during a televised sporting event”, making this invention nothing short of miraculous for such individuals. Other features of this invention include a “miniaturized, battery operated sound generator and speaker, for outputting a predetermined or user selectable sound in response to the striking of the simulated hand”. These sounds can include the “the cheer of a crowd or the voice of a specific player”. US1718305A: Basket ball Patented by George L. Pierce in 1928, this invention changed the look of basketballs to something more closely resembling their modern-day counterparts. According to the patent, basketballs had previously been made with panels tapering down to narrow points. This invention ensured a properly balanced basketball in which the best portions of the hide were saved and used in the pole portions of the ball. It is worth noting that basketballs were actually a dark brown until the late 1950s. The iconic orange colour we recognize today was initially selected by basketball coach Tony Hinkle, who thought it would be easier for fans to see.4 And there you have it, several sports-related patents, which—while not all game-changers—hopefully illustrated IP’s longstanding and far-reaching relationship with the world of athletics. It remains to be seen what wondrous (and wacky) inventions the future holds.   https://zamboni.com/about/zamboni-archives/patents/ https://gizmodo.com/17-historic-patents-that-make-winter-olympic-sports-pos-1520995330 https://www.dennemeyer.com/ip-blog/news/everyday-ip-the-notable-ip-of-golf-basketball-and-other-sports/ https://suiter.com/basketball-patents/

In the Henry decision rendered on January 16, 2026,1 the Professions Tribunal reiterated what framework applies to a guilty plea in disciplinary matters. In this case, the professional had pleaded guilty during his conviction hearing. After having ascertained that his pleas were made freely and voluntarily, the Disciplinary Council of the Ordre des dentistes (the “Council”) declared him guilty. However, the Council had not ensured that the professional admitted to the facts relating to the key elements of the offences at issue. During the penalty hearing, the professional raised questions about his guilty pleas. Although the Council had considered whether his pleas were valid and whether to withdraw them and return the case to a conviction hearing, the hearing continued and penalties were imposed on the professional. On appeal of the Council’s decision, the Professions Tribunal concluded that the Council had erred in accepting the professional’s guilty pleas when it had become clear that he denied the facts put forward in support of the charges against him. The Professions Tribunal concluded that the Disciplinary Council of the Ordre des dentistes had erred in accepting the appellant’s guilty plea when it had become clear that he denied the facts put forward in support of the charges against him.   The Professions Tribunal reasons were based on the following: The Professional Code2 contains no specific provisions governing the entering of a guilty plea.3 In the absence of specific rules, disciplinary law can draw inspiration from the criteria developed in criminal and penal law.4  By pleading guilty, the professional waives their right to a formal investigation and associated procedural safeguards.5  Pleading guilty is a significant decision in disciplinary proceedings, as it inevitably brings the investigation to a close and has detrimental consequences on the professional who pleads guilty.6 This decision serves as a reminder of the two-prong test7 a Disciplinary Council must use to accept a guilty plea: Admission by the professional: The professional must have formally admitted to the key legal elements of the offence.8 To be valid, a guilty plea must be voluntary, unequivocal and made with full knowledge of its effects and consequences.9 Acceptance by the Council: The Council may only accept the plea after ensuring that the professional knows and understands the nature of the offence they are charged with and the effects of their guilty plea. The Council must also confirm that the professional admits to the facts relating to the key elements of the offence in question.10 This decision also introduces the requirement to submit a joint statement of the facts11 or provide an account of the facts that led to the offences in order to properly contextualize them.12 Failure to comply with these requirements could result in the professional’s guilty plea being contested or dismissed by the Disciplinary Council. More recently in the Fernandez decision,13 the Disciplinary Council of the College des médecins was called upon to rule on whether the requirements of the Henry decision applied, in particular regarding the filing of a joint statement or account of the facts giving rise to the offences. In this case, the Council had taken cognizance of the Henry decision after having accepted the professional’s guilty plea, and no joint statement had been filed. After allowing the parties to present their observations, the Council declared itself satisfied with the parties’ claims that the Fernandez case differed from the Henry case in that Dr. Fernandez had admitted to the facts relating to the essential elements of the charge, that he had filed a 17­­-page statement, and that the Syndic had filed documents containing the accounts of eight patients. It will be interesting to follow how case law will develop on this issue to confirm what direction the various disciplinary councils will take. The members of Lavery’s professional and disciplinary law team regularly represent professional orders and professionals. They are available to advise you and answer your questions. Summary A guilty plea may expedite the disciplinary process, but it has the effect of depriving the accused professional of certain procedural safeguards. It is important to ensure that the conditions of validity and acceptance of a guilty plea are met, otherwise it may be dismissed or overturned on appeal. Summary evidence must be taken before a professional pleads guilty, whether it be through the filing of a joint statement of facts, the presentation of an account of the facts by one of the parties or the submission of documentary evidence. Henry c. Dentistes (Ordre professionnel des), 2026 QCTP 1 2 CQLR C-26. Henry c. Dentistes (Ordre professionnel des), 2026 QCTP 1, para. 24 Id. Id. Id., para. 27 Id., para. 25 Id., para. 26 Id., para. 28 Id., para. 27 and 29. Id., para. 30 Id., para. 31 Médecins (Ordre professionnel des) c. Fernandez, 2026 QCCDMD 5

The Court of Appeal intervenes in an interpretation dispute between a general contractor and its builders risk insurance carrier, the latter declining to indemnify the former for certain financial losses resulting from a flood that occurred at a construction site. FACTS General contractor CRT Construction Inc. (“CRT”) was charged with construction work by the City of Montréal (the “City”) in May 2017 at the Atwater drinking water treatment plant, a major project that included building several structures for underground water management. The City required CRT, among other things, to purchase builders risk insurance, which it did from the defendant insurer (the “Insurer”). At the time of securing the insurance, a flood coverage extension was taken out by way of endorsement, given the construction site’s proximity to a water source (the “Endorsement”). On November 12, 2017, a major flood occurred on site. The ensuing corrective work undertaken at the breach lasted around four (4) months. During this time, although CRT was able to continue a portion of the construction work (50%), the other portion remained at a standstill as it gave way to the repair work. A forensic accountant was hired by the Insurer to assess the extent of the damages allegedly sustained and claimed by CRT.1 These fall into two (2) categories: 1) costs incurred to repair the breach and restore the construction site2 (the “Costs of Repairs”) and 2) additional costs associated with construction delays3 (the “Additional Costs”). The Insurer agreed to indemnify CRT for the Costs of Repairs, but not for the Additional Costs. TRIAL Hence, the Superior Court of Québec was asked to study the policy at hand—including the Endorsement—and to decide the fate of CRT’s claim for the Additional Costs. The builders risk insurance policy provided that the base coverage included damage to “[translation] insured property arising from those perils designated as covered”. The term “property” referred to that property “located at the ‘construction site’”. The “cost of making good […]”, as well as “damage caused directly or indirectly by the interruption of construction […]” and “by delay, loss of market or loss of use”, were, on the other hand, excluded. However, the Endorsement provided that “[translation] coverage extends to direct physical loss or damage caused to insured property by a ‘flood’ occurring at the ‘construction site’ […]” and that damage resulting from a flood, under any coverage offered, were to be adjusted as one claim. Relying on the definition of “Sinistre” [“Occurrence”]4 included in the Endorsement, CRT contended that the extension of coverage applied to any type of damage, provided it resulted from a flood, such an interpretation being in keeping with CRT’s expectations, at the time of securing the insurance, to be fully covered in the event of flooding. The Insurer, however, argued the opposite: both the base coverage and the extension of coverage under the Endorsement applied only to direct damage to the insured property, the consequences of any delays otherwise being excluded. The trial judge agreed with the interpretation put forward by CRT and held that the claim for Additional Costs was admissible on grounds that: The Insurer viewed the flood as one and the same “Occurrence”—as it caused all costs claimed to be assessed, and the Costs of Repairs to be reimbursed to CRT, it follows that the Additional Costs should also be indemnified; The Insurer was unable to establish the applicability of any exclusion, and any ambiguity should be construed in favour of the insured; The definition of “Occurrence” included in the Endorsement provided for broad and complete coverage of any damage resulting directly or indirectly from a flood occurring at the construction site; and This interpretation, moreover, was in keeping with CRT’s reasonable expectations at the time of securing the insurance. APPEAL The Court of Appeal overturned the trial judgment. The interpretation upheld at trial did not take into account the true purpose of the insurance coverage, which is the cornerstone of the analytical framework. The Court recalled in passing the well-known three-stage test.5 Having found that the insurance coverage under the Endorsement applied in the event of a flood and thus simplifying the dispute, the Court of Appeal held that the terms of such Endorsement were clear and unequivocal: this extended coverage was limited to “[translation] direct damage to insured property”.6 Any losses of a different nature, such as the Additional Costs in the present case, were not included. There is no basis for resorting to the definition of “Occurrence” and doing so would have had the undesirable effect of unduly extending the coverage provided by the Endorsement. Relying on the Endorsement’s structure as a whole, the Court found that the definition of “Occurrence” was not meant to define coverage, but rather to implement the applicable deductible and limit of insurance. COMMENTS This decision is a practical reminder of the framework for interpreting an insurance policy and, further, of the overarching criterion that is the true purpose of coverage. Keeping this purpose and analytical framework in mind helps with interpretation, and also when it comes to resolving issues arising from a misalignment of an insured’s expectations with the insurance protection secured. It is also interesting to note the consideration of the text’s structure, in addition to its wording, as a guideline for analysis. Moreover, a review of this kind requires that the insurance policy as a whole be considered, rather than isolating the endorsements that are added to it and modify coverage. This is also the purport of the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in Emond v. Trillium Mutual Insurance Co.7 It is worthy of note that the assessment was produced without taking into account the coverage under the builders risk insurance policy. Cleaning, securing and repairing the site. Additional wages and per diems, workers’ inefficiency, wage indexing and cost increases, plus administrative costs and loss of profits. “[Translation] ‘Occurrence’: all loss or damage attributable directly or indirectly to one cause or a series of similar or related causes. All such loss or damage shall be treated as one (1) and the same ‘occurrence’.” Namely, 1) proof by the insured that the claim is included in the insurance coverage provided, 2) proof by the insurer of the applicability of an exclusion and 3) proof by the insured of the applicability of an exception to the exclusion. Our emphasis. 2026 SCC 3. See para. 36 of the decision: “[36] Endorsements are not self-contained and standalone contracts disconnected from the insurance policy of which they form a part. An endorsement “changes or varies or amends the underlying policy” (Pilot Insurance Co. v. Sutherland, 2007 ONCA 492, 86 O.R. (3d) 789, at para. 21). Some endorsements may be “comprehensive on the subject of the particular coverage provided in the endorsement”, but they are still “built on the foundation of the policy” (ibid.; see also Pickford Black Ltd. v. Canadian General Insurance Co., [1977] 1 S.C.R. 261, at pp. 265-66). It follows that endorsements do not change the generally advisable order. Aspects of the endorsement that affect coverage are considered as part of the coverage conferred by the insurance contract, aspects that create exclusions are considered later, followed by any exceptions to the exclusions created.”